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ABSTRACT: 
This thesis analyses the conditions for a concept of soteriology in modem secular society. 
And it examines the concept of salvation underlying 20th century existentiahst theology in 
order to see whether it complies with these conditions. 
The first chapter analyses philosophical concepts of salvation from Kant to Heidegger. It is 
shown that since Hegel salvation is mainly understood in terms of "alienation" and 
"overcoming of alienation" and that through the philosophical development of the 19th century 
two main conditions of modern soteriology have been derived from this understanding: a) the 
presupposition of an epistemological, existential and ontological unity of reality and b) the 
presupposition that individual, existential experience of salvation must basically be possible. 
The second and main chapter tries to bring out the concept of salvation inherent in the 
theologies of Paul Tillich and Karl Rahner. 
The third and concluding chapter shows how far TiUich's and Rahner's surprisingly similar 
concept of salvation comphes with the conditions worked out in the first chapter. The author 
argues that both theologies fulfil the postulate of epistemological and ontological unity of 
reality by substituting traditional theistic doctrines of God by an ontological understanding of 
God as Being itself. However, the second condition is not met: in order to maintain the claim 
of the unity of reality, both theologies presuppose an existentialist understanding of human 
existence: the existential status quo, and with it alienation, is necessarily posited as absolute. 
Thus the possibility of experiencing the overcoming of this existential state is a priori excluded. 
The conclusion is that existentialist theology does not convey an understanding of salvation 
which complies with the conditions of secular modernity. 
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0. INTRODUCTION 
0.1 THE QUESTION 
The question with which this thesis is concerned is whether existentialist theology conveys the 
solution for the problem current soteriology is in. What is the problem? 
In 1973 Joseph Ratzinger wrote: "Die schwerwiegendste Anfechtung des christlichen Glaubens 
liegt in seiner geschichtlichen Wirkungslosigkeit. Er hat die Welt nicht verandert, so scheint es 
wenigstens. Alle theoretischen Schwierigkeiten wiegen gering gegenuber dieser bedriickenden 
Erfahrung. Denn damit bleibt das Zentralwort des Christlichen, die Botschaft von der Erlosung, 
leer. Es bleibt ein blosses Wort. Wenn aber durch den Glauben nichts geschieht, dann ist auch alles 
was er sonst sagen mag, leere Theorie, ausserhalb von Verifikation und Falsifikation und damit 
belanglos."! 
It is surprising that so httle expMcit theological discussion about salvation and the issue of 
soteriology exists nowadays. The question what salvation actually is, is often regarded as 
embarrassing, sentimental or too intimate. Indeed, this question is intimate as it touches at the very 
core of theology, at the heart of theology and theologians. 
The problem is even aggravated by the remarkable fact, that for example the Lutheran confessions 
do not contain any explicit statement about the state of salvation itself. Throughout all my studies it 
struck me that just here is a certain emptiness in traditional dogmatics and a sort of theological 
taboo amongst theologians. It is left entirely to oneself, how one thinks salvation because either the 
question is condemned as prying and forward by theologians or any theological answer is 
considered to be impossible because of theological reasons, as for example the hiddenness of the 
eschata. The problem of modern soteriology is the fact that there is no modem soteriology which 
would meet the problems Ratzinger pointed out. 
It is obvious that theology has to face the challenge which results from the lack of an exphcit 
understanding of salvation for dogmatic reasons. However, also for practical and pastoral reasons 
theology ought to give up its noble restraint and should face the facts: it seems that exactly because 
1 Ratzinger, p. 141. 
of a lack in this all-decisive dogmatic point the erosion of the established churches at least on the 
European continent has become particularly evident since the 1970s. We have to admit that the so 
called Grosskirchen are suffering from a severe decrease in numbers and in credibihty and from a 
certain lack of theological orientation. Churches do often try to adopt the putative concerns of the 
man in the street in order to appear relevant and thus to legitimate their role in society; they try to 
get pally with the people who become increasingly alienated from and critical of the message of the 
church; this bears the danger of falling victim to every passing fashion. Or the churches cling to 
untouchable traditions and have to face an increasing irrelevance and become marginalized in 
society. The end of this trend is by no means yet in sight. 
This corresponds to the fact that there is an increasing growth of very different theological and 
religious movements such as the charismatic movement, poUtical and liberation theology, world-
wide fundamentalism, the esoteric new age movements and depth-psychological theology. All these 
quite different and partly opposed opinions and world-views, however, meet in one single point: in 
their criticism that the traditional churches are no longer "Uving"; rather that they are spiritually 
dead or politically and psychologically irrelevant. Being disappointed with the traditional churches 
people turn towards apparently more attractive and promising alternatives. Especially the increase 
in christian fundamentalism is (because of its relatedness to more conservative but still theological 
approaches) a matter of concern for many theologians and churchmen, at least on the continent. 
In order to be able to meet this criticism on theological grounds, one has to analyse on what 
presuppositions it is based. The criticism that the traditional churches are no longer hving, but that 
they are dead and irrelevant is apparently based on a certain concept of what being "hving" and 
being "relevant" means. This concept seems to be the principle of individual experience: what most 
people are missing in the traditional churches is the experience of the relevance of the christian 
message and preaching for their own life. Only that would make the church seem hving and 
relevant to them. And indeed, in turn all the above-mentioned "alternatives" are determined through 
a considerable emphasis on the possibility (or even necessity) of individual experience. The message 
of fundamentalism as well as of political theology, of charismatic as well as of esoteric movements 
is so striking and attractive because it appears to be "evidently right", due to the fact that it conveys 
(or pretends to convey) actual individual "experiences" of spiritual, social, political, psychological 
or charismatic character. That means that the traditional churches are not only "boring" or 
"unattractive". Being unattractive is no indicator of rightness or falseness. The serious accusation is 
"irrelevance": actually the churches are in the midst of a massive crisis necessitating that they 
prove the credibility and thus the legitimacy of the relevance of their behefs and doctrines. And they 
do not seem to be able to verify the rightness of their preaching and teaching by conveying relevant 
and appropriate experiences. The "alternatives" seem to be "right" because the actual individual 
experience everyone can have seems to verify and testify to their religious or soteriological claim. 
What has changed? Why are the traditional concepts of soteriology no longer vahd and sufficient 
in the modem, secular society? 
We can pinpoint the problem more precisely by referring to a famous essay of the theologian 
Gerhard Ebeling in which he is concemed with Das Verstandnis von Heil in sakularisierter Zeit. In 
this very thorough study he analyses the relation between the modem secular world and its negative 
or positive interdependence with what he calls "christianisierte Zeit", the age "der offendichen 
Vorherrschaft des Christentums im Zeichen einer - wenn auch nicht spannungslosen - Konkordanz 
von Christentum und politischer Macht, christlichem Glauben und Kultur."^ He first makes clear 
that one must not forget that the understanding of salvation which is nowadays challenged is still 
deeply influenced by the patterns of thought which derive from the "christianisierte Zeit". Therefore 
secular criticisms must not merely be rejected, but the christian's own inherited tradition of this kind 
of understanding of salvation must be theologically criticised as well, in order to see how far the 
inherited understanding can really be claimed to be the core of christian soteriology. 
Starting with this dialectical presupposition, he asks what led to the decreasing acceptance of the 
christian understanding of salvation: "Das christiiche Reden vom Heil gerat in der sakularisierten 
Zeit in eine Zersetzung. Die Spannungen, die in ihm enthalten sind, werden nun als unzumutbare 
Widerspruche empfunden. Das betrifft vor allem den Anspmch, mit dem die christiiche 
Heilsbotschaft steht und fallt: vom endgiiltigen, eschatologischen Heil zu kiinden. Beides ist logisch 
richtig: Soil Heil wirklich Heil sein, so dass keine Unheilsbedrohung es mehr in Frage stellt, dann 
2 Ebeling, p.351. 
muss es eschatologisches Heil sein, uniiberbietbare Vollendung. Jedoch: die Vollendung, die als 
definitives Ende dieser Welt zu denken ist, ist nicht als Heil vorstellbar. Konsequent gedacht ist sie 
das Ende auch aller Heilsvorstellungen."^ That means if salvation is really to be thought to be 
absolute and fulfilled it has to be thought of in eschatological terms. However, by definition any 
eschatological concept can not be proved or made probable. The only posibihty is to make a prior 
decision about one's own understanding of what one would regard as eschatological event: 
"Entweder die Heilsfrage ganz am Individuum und seinen Noten und Bediirfnissen zu orientieren, 
Oder im Gegenzug dazu die Ausrichtung auf Welt und Geschichte betonen; entweder sich in eine 
Spiritualisierung des Heilsverstandnisses zu retten oder auf dessen Konkretisierung im Leibhaften 
zu drangen; .... entweder eine prasentische Eschatologie zur Norm zu erheben oder gerade die 
futurische Eschatologie fiir das Entscheidende halten."^ 
Apparently the insistence on experience as means of verification and legitimation of the christian 
Heilsbotschaft stems from a perception of what eschatology is which is different from that of the 
traditional church. Whereas traditional dogmatics and the teaching of the churches throughout 
history stressed the spiritual, transcendent, ahistorical and future aspect of eschatology and 
salvation, its understanding changed dramatically in modern society during the last two hundred 
years. The understanding which is prevailing in society nowadays emphazises the necessity of any 
concept of salvation to be historical, present, concrete and open to individual experience. Ebehng 
summarizes: "Auf jeden Fall ist der sakularisierten Zeit ausschliesshch urn etwas zu tun, was 
wenigstens grundsatzlich in der Geschichte realisierbar sein soil - auch bei noch so bescheidener 
und relativer Zielsetzung - eine Besserung der Lebensbedingungen verspricht. Heil in 
sakularisiertem Verstandnis ist ausschliesslich in die Verantwortung des Menschen gelegt als 
Produkt seines Wirkens.... Versprechen kann man sich nur etwas vom Tun des Menschen und 
deshalb auch nur in den damit gesetzten Grenzen. Weil sakularisiertes Heil Werk des Menschen und 
somit relatives geschichthches Heil ist, bleibt es auf das beschrankt, wofiir das Wirken des 
Menschen zustandig ist. Die Idee eines eschatologischen Heils ist deshalb eo ipso 
3 Ebeling, p.354. 
4 Ebeling, p.354. 
ausgeschlossen."5 The background of the claim for verification is the idea that eschatological 
salvation must basically be realizable in history, i.e. within a framework which is open to 
experience. A fundamental change of the worldview of modern man in which the category of 
history and historicity is all-embracing, is the underlying ground for a different perception of the 
idea of eschatology and therefore different expectations regarding the content of salvation. The gap 
between traditional dogmatics and the actual preunderstanding in society seems to be unbridgeable. 
Ebeling continues: "Denn die hermeneutische Grundbedingung des christiichen Redens vom Heil 
ist seine Offenheit fiir die Wirklichkeit. Diese soil weder durch willkiirUche Behauptungen 
vergewaltigt noch durch illusionistische Visionen beschonigt werden.Here we are at the heart of 
the problem. The claim for a present eschatology and salvation in history is dependent on a 
different perception of what is Wirklichkeit. For modem secular man his own existence is historical 
and history is the only reality that is! Therefore everything which ought to be real must be historical 
and thus be open to experience. Therefore for modern secular man also eschatology and salvation, 
i f they are supposed to be true, i.e. real, must be historical and open to experience. That, however, 
excludes main parts of traditional christian eschatology. 
The contrast between secular and traditional christian understanding lies in the fact that 
Christianity traditionally presupposed the assumption of a second reality beyond the historical one, 
an assumption which is not generally shared any more. Formerly the lack of experience of salvation 
was explained and cancelled out through the idea of this second realm of future eschatology, in 
which salvation would at last actually be experienced. Since this idea for modern man with his 
perception of history as the only reality became more and more suspicious and in the end was 
assumed to be untenable, the lack of individual experience became the most influental 
counterargument against the traditional concept of salvation. 
I f the claim of Christianity is to survive the criticisms of the secular world, it must take them 
seriously and it must be prepared to struggle with the modem philosophical question of reality and 
experience, a question which could possibly cut the ground from under its feet. It must, however. 
5 Ebeling, p.356. 
6 Ebeling, p.358. 
anyway respond to the challenge, as Ebehng says: "Das Heil im christiichen Verstandnis ist, was 
immer es in sich schliessen mag, jedenfalls dies eine: das Sein in der Wahrheit. Das ist das Kriterium 
aller Heilsaussagen und des rechten Umgangs mit ihnen."^ 
Summarizing one can say: modern secular man does not any longer go by the assumption of a 
second reality beyond his own historical existence. The first task for any future soteriology will 
therefore be to take this into account and to try to make understandable the unity of the reality in 
which man himself, his quest for salvation and salvation itself are set. 
The second main precondition for the acceptance of any religious concept by modem secular man 
was that its results must be open to being experienced in his own life, in order, if not to prove, at 
least to make probable its credibility. Any future theology of salvation will have to bear that in mind 
as well. 
0.2 THE PLAN 
The aim of this thesis is therefore to see whether there is any theological way for the 20th century 
to face the challenge of the modern secular understanding of salvation. And the assumption of this 
thesis is that actually there was an attempt to mediate christian understanding of man and salvation 
with the secular modern world in the 20th century. However, for certain reasons this attempt was 
soon, possibly too soon, regarded as having failed: I mean "existentiahst theology" which, strange 
enough, turned out to be nothing more than a passing episode in the history of theology in the 20th 
century although it was once considered to be a new hope when it began to become famous 
through names like Bultmann, Tilhch and Rahner. One hoped that here theology would again seek 
to find common ground with the self-understanding of modem man, after the dialectical theology of 
theologians like Barth had practically dissociated itself from the modem world. Again, as in the 
previous centuries an intellectually honest union of theology and philosophy, of modern thought 
and christian tradition seemed be possible through a theology which expUcitiy considered itself to 
be "mediating theology". The more surprising it is that apparentiy it was denied any long-lasting 
7 Ebeling, p.358. 
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impact in the 20th century. My question is, whether existentialist theology possibly conveyed or 
conveys the means to work on the problem which the modern world left theological soteriology as 
a task, and i f not, why. 
In order to find out, whether the attempt of existentiaUst theology was or could have been 
successful in general, and whether it conveys ground on which theology can proceed and build, one 
must understand precisely what challenge it has to face. In a first chapter I will therefore show the 
historical development of the separation of philosophy from theology regarding soteriology and 
eschatology which led to modern secular man's so different view of what soteriology and salvation 
is. Only if we see the inner logic of this development, will we be able to do justice to the secular 
criticisms of the traditional christian points of view. I will therefore not give an overview of the 
theological development. First we have to understand precisely what the status quo of the question 
is which is put before theology.^ It will turn out that the philosophical tradition of understanding 
salvation can best be understood as the continuous attempt of understanding it in terms of the 
overcoming of alienation. 
Of particular importance is the transformation of the classical concept of salvation as the 
overcoming of alienation in the existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger. It was through his 
philosophy that theology felt the urge Md the possibility to answer the philosophical challenge set 
by the 19th century. As Heidegger sought to overcome traditional metaphysics through an 
existential and ontological analysis of man theology here saw the means to express the christian 
message in the categories of modern thinking. This seemed to be even more promissing because in 
a popularized form Heidegger's Existenzialontologie became an influential feature in modern man's 
self-perception and world-view. This seemed to be the chance to formulate the Anliegen of 
theology in the terminology of modern self-understanding itself. 
8 Fortunately the history of these developments does not have to be elaborated by myself; in this I could rely on a 
famous study by the German theologian Peter Cornehl, which became a sort of standard work on the subject. His 
book is explicitly concerned with Eschatologie und Emanzipation in der Aufklarung. bei Hegel und in der 
Hegelschen Schule. I owe this profound study more than just the historical and philosophical material for this 
survey. His book was meant to clarify the problems soteriology and eschatology face today. My aim to show whether 
existentialist theology conveys a possible solution of these problems is thus dependent on the questions which Peter 
Cornehl left as task and problem for contemporary theology. 
11 
The influence of Heidegger on the theological tradition in the 20th century cannot be 
overestimated. However, whereas Bultmann's concept of revelation, the stress on personal decision 
and the idea of the "leap of faith" is mainly derived from Kierkegaard, theologians hke Tilhch and 
Rahner were much more directly influenced by Heidegger's philosophy. Here the interdependence 
of existentialist question and theological answer can be seen more clearly. Therefore I chose Tilhch 
and Rahner as the representatives of existentialist theology. 
In the second chapter I will expound and examine their theology separately. Here also a general 
critique of the approach of both theologians is necessary in order to prepare the ground for a 
special critique of their inherent concept of salvation. 
In the third chapter I will then examine their surprisingly rather similar understanding of salvation 
and I will see whether it contains the solution of the problems presented for soteriology today. 
12 
1. SALVATION AND ALIENATION 
S U R V E Y OF T H E PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION 
Bearing the actual objective of this thesis in mind it will become evident that this survey can not 
be more than just a brief outiine. Its aim is to mark out the mamstreams and tendencies which 
shaped the secular modern understanding of eschatology and salvation and to explain the origin and 
the status quo of the problems theology has to face with these issues. 
1.1 From Lutheran Orthodoxy to Kant 
In the beginning of the 18th century the petrified system of orthodox eschatology was more and 
more felt to be alienating: the orthodox doctrine had concentrated on the destiny of the individual 
soul only. Eschatological events such as the resurrection and the consummatio mundi were 
perceived as merely tiansitory states on the way towards the future judgement in which the 
individual was to be judged according to his attitude to faith and the law. Eschatology was thus 
part of the media salutis in so far as it liberated mm from this earth in order to lead him to the last 
judgement. The idea of a new creation was excluded, heaven and hell were regarded as eternally 
waiting for the redeemed or the doomed. Thus eschatology was more and more perceived to be a 
religious automatism, in which the individual merely played the role of a passive object, subdued to 
eternal law and decision. 
At the same time an increasing criticism of this dogmatic drama began, the aim of which was to 
make eschatology again existentially and religiously relevant for the individual. The authoritarian 
doctrine of the church had to be discriminated from the universal truth which was supposed to be 
inherent in the revealed understanding of christian eschatology. In the course of protestant 
historical studies of the bible, which were once, relying on the infalhbihty of the scripture, 
introduced to explore the claritas externa, one made the surprising discovery that actually the idea 
of an apocalyptic eschatology was not at all genuinely christian, but that it was originaUy jewish. 
Firmly clinging to the then prevailing aversion to all that was jewish and being convinced of the 
superiority of Christianity over the unredeemed jews, protestant theology of the early neologism had 
only two possibilities: either one identified Jesus with the jewish apocalyptic tradition, which would 
13 
lead to his irrelevance for christians or one could cling to the reUability of the christian claim and 
then one had to separate Jesus Christ and his message from the historically contingent jewish 
tradition. The so called "Neologen" started an extensive revision of the whole of traditional 
theology. The aim was to prove Christianity's claim to universality by deriving its content from 
universally intelligible presuppositions. As one still relied on the infallibility of the bible as historical 
document, this universal ground necessarily was historical reason: the non-appearance of the 
parousia which until then had been one of the most powerfull arguments against christian rehgion 
now became a proof of the supposedly uneschatological character of Christianity. The decision for 
or against the rightness of Christianity was made dependent on the intelligibility and reasonableness 
of its historical grounds. The actual development of reUgion and church after its pure beginnings 
was considered to be a distortion. The purely dogmatical teaching of the church could not be true, 
as it was not any longer universally intelligible and therefore not binding. 
Thus the historical person of Jesus and his destiny was considered to be totally unimportant; 
rather his message was what christian theology was all about. And this message (the days of Weiss 
and Schweitzer lay far ahead) was understood to be pure morality, as only morality was conceived 
to be universally intelligible. Apocalyptic eschatology was rejected as being jewish. The attempt to 
reduce Christianity to morality on rational grounds had as its aim the total individuaUsation of its 
message: only by individuaUzing it totally, could a universal intelligibility be made evident. Thus 
Jesus as a historical person was reduced to a mere teacher of the universal moral law. Only thus 
was the importance of his message open to individual appreciation and apprehension. 
Eschatology as the question for the future of the individual destiny had to be reinterpreted as 
well. Through the influence of philosophers like Wolff and Leibniz the idea of a general moral 
world order became common. To live according to the moral teaching of Jesus meant to live 
according to the moral law which was thought to be inherent in the world. Doing the moral law 
was perceived as man's response to God as the great creator of the moral world order. However, it 
is evident that the moral law is fulfilled only fragmentarily in this world; moreover, moral deeds and 
personal happiness do not correspond. Therefore it was assumed that there was an eternal realm in 
which all injustice is cancelled out in a judgement according to the individual's moral deeds. The 
14 
idea of an absolute moral world order made it reasonable to assume the reward of the righteous. 
Thus the reason for doing the good was the idea of a necessary correspondence to the predefined 
world order and the fear of damnation or the hope for eternal happiness. 
Here Kant's criticisms of the neological and enlightenment theology and philosophy found their 
origin. He claimed that the idea of a future realm of justice can neither be proved by reason nor 
must it be assumed because of "revelatory" reasons only: rather is this assumption the necessary 
postulate of the "unbedingten sittlichen Wollen." Man finds himself in the sensory world of 
phenomena where moral deeds and moral consequences for the individual do not correspond. The 
future realm of justice must not be assumed because the individual is disappointed with the lack of 
happiness as reward for his moral deeds. Rather must the idea of a future "Gliickseligkeit aller 
verniinftigen Wesen gemass ihrer Moralitat"^ be assumed to be logically necessary; as morahty has 
to exist in order to make human Ufe possible, the idea of the future reahn of justice must be 
assumed to be the necessary condition of the possibiUty of morality. 
However, and this is Kant's main contribution to the problem of eschatology, this idea has an 
important implication. Man is put under the obligation to fulfill the absolute moral law of the 
categorical imperative. This, however, is practically impossible in this world. I f therefore the 
categorical law is not supposed to be a merely unreasonable and arbitrary demand, one must 
assume the immortality of man, in order to make possible his infinite progress towards the 
fulfilment of the categorical imperative. Thus starting from the absoluteness of the moral law, Kant 
can now postulate man's immortality. However, the postulate of an infinite progress excludes the 
possibility of a final total identity of Sollen und Sein. Therefore in the end Kant has to introduce as 
a "second postulate" the idea of a graceful God, who regards the infinite process as fulfilled and 
who thus grants man his well-earned happiness. 
Kant's main aim was to stress the fact that the morally good must be done for its own sake, if 
one's deeds are to be considered to be morally good. The idea of a future reward or punishment, 
which the "Neologen" assumed according to thek concept of a moral world order, corrupts man's 
morality, by making fear or hope the motivating force for our deeds. However, at this point there is 
9 Kant, KriUk der Urteilskraft, §87, footnote p.531. 
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a certain inconsistency in Kant's arguments, an inconsistency which Hegel was to take up later: 
Kant had to postulate the idea of the realm of absolute justice as the condition of the practical 
possibility of actual morality. Man has to suppose this realm lest morality becomes impossible. 
Nevertheless man must not hope to enter into this realm of happiness, because that would corrupt 
the motivation of their morality. Practically man must hope what theoretically he is forbidden to 
hope. 
1.2 Idealist criticisms of Kant 
A) Schleiermacher 
Schleiermacher's whole theological work can be considered as pursuing the aim of separating 
religion from morality and metaphysics. For Schleiermacher a religious realm is not the necessary 
postulate of human morality. Rather is reUgion the immediate encounter with the infinite itself in 
one moment: "Religion ist Sinn und Geschmack fiir das Unendliche."^^ This experience of the 
universe in a revelatory moment, in which infinity becomes present, is the actual content of reUgion. 
The last and inherent aim of this encounter is the dissolution of the individual into the infinite. 
Schleiermacher therefore criticises Kant's concept of immortality on psychological grounds: he 
suspected "die traditionellen Hoffnungen auf Unsterblichkeit als irreligiose Versuche, der heilsamen 
Negation der Individualitat zu entgehen.''^^ According to Cornehl Schleiermacher claimed that 
"Eschatologie als Projektion menschlichen Selbsterhaltungswillens hat mit Christentum nichts zu 
tun." 12 Because reUgion means: "Mitten in der Endlichkeit Eins werden mit dem UnendUchen und 
ewig sein in einem Augenblick, das ist die Unsterblichkeit der Religion." 13 Whereas Kant had 
shifted the eschatological idea of the immortality of the soul from a practical hope to the level of a 
practical moral postulate, Schleiermacher separates morality and religion and therefore excludes 
any idea of immortality which would serve any moral purpose as condition. Eschatology is the 
experience of the infinite universe in man's immanent life. 
10 Schleiermacher, Uber die Religion, p.30. 
11 Cornehl, p.84. 
12 Cornehl, p.84. 
13 Schleiermacher, Uber die Rehgion, p.74. 
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In his later written main work Christian Faith Schleiermacher actually based his whole theological 
approach on the idea of an immediate self-consciousness of dependency on the interrelation with 
the world. The whole Heilsgeschichte serves the purpose of awakening this self-consciousness and 
strengthening it. Any future eschatology is totally neglected. 
B) Fichte 
Fichte repeated Schleiermacher's criticisms of Kant, however, not in order to free rehgion from 
morality, but in order to free morality from the last bits of the "neological" concept of the 
eschatological realm of absolute morality as the necessary condition for human morality. Fichte 
takes seriously Kant's postulate, that morality is an end in itself and that it therefore has to be done 
for its own sake. However, total morality is not practicable in human hfe. Therefore, Uke Kant, 
Fichte postulates the immortality of the soul. As however, any sensory note like the hope for 
happiness must be removed from morality, the aim of the infinite process cannot be the final 
achieving of individual happiness but must be the state in which the moral effort actually produces 
the good for its own sake. Kant's second postulate of divine intervention is also removed, as this in 
Kant's system only served the purpose of making possible the final coincidence of individual 
happiness and morality. Eschatology is thus the infinite progress towards the fulillment of absolute 
morality. This process begins here on earth and is pursued through infinite worlds: "Wie viele 
endhche Leben er (der Mensch, A.S.) auch in linearer Folge durchlaufen wiirde: stets bleibt das 
wahre unendliche Leben im Jenseits, an dem er zwar je und je in der sittiichen Tat Anteil hat, das 
aber letztlich nie erfiillte Gegenwart werden kann, weil die Differenz als absolute fixiert wird.''^^ 
1.3 Hegel 
We now have to turn to Hegel's critique of the concept of eschatology and salvation in 
enlightenment and idealistic philosophy. His concept of eschatology was to become most influental 
through the mediation of his two pupils Feuerbach and Marx. Hegel overturned the whole 
14 Cornehl, p.89. 
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enlightenment concept of a future reconciliation of morality and man and tried to prove the real 
presence of reconciliation in history through the Absolute Consciousness. 
Cornehl has made very clear that one must understand Hegel's mature philosophical concept 
historically in its development in order to grasp its and his intention. 
In his Friihschriften Hegel developed a deeply atheistic critique of Christianity. Being strongly 
influenced by the French revolution he equated christian religion with its historical manifestation in 
the church and discovered that actually human freedom and dignity had become dissolved into a 
legalistic system, which formed part of a repressive society. Indeed Hegel thought that Christianity 
had not actually freed itself from jewish obedience to the law. Now in the age of philosophy, the 
time has come, in which man should become conscious about how things should be and in which he 
should finally free himself from the repressive ecclesiastical system; in order to designate the state 
of man while unfree Hegel uses the term "alienation". Man is alienated from himself, because he is 
bound to a system which does not allow him to become free and self-determined. The concept of 
man's actual existence of alienation was to become one of the ideas which Hegel passed on to the 
history of philosophy and which was to influence it decisively. We will encounter the category of 
alienation in every other philosopher who was concerned with the question for eschatology and 
salvation. Hegel saw man's being bound to an ecclesiastical religion as alienation; man ought to free 
himself towards humanity and affirmation of life: "Ausser friiheren Versuchen blieb es unseren 
Tagen vorzuglich aufbehalten, die Schatze, die an den Himmel verschleudert worden sind, als 
Eigentum des Menschen, zumindest in der Theorie, zu vindizieren, aber welches Zeitalter wird die 
Kraft haben, dieses Recht geltend zu machen und sich in den Besitz zu setzen?"^^ Hegel wants 
nothing less than a metaphysical revolution, the bearer of which is the absolute consciousness of 
man. Even the assumption of the existence of a God was considered to be the admission of human 
impotence and a loss of dignity. And as the absolute consciousness of man is the only authority 
Hegel acknowledges he agrees with Fichte in his criticism of Kant's concept of the intervention of 
God into the infinite process of approximating morality and humanity. 
15 Hegel, Die Positivitat der christlichen Religion, p.225. 
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However, during his time in Frankfurt, Hegel started to doubt the possibihty of the reconciliation 
of divine and human realm by means of a metaphysical revolution, in which man would reach the 
divine realm by positing himself in God's place. The revolution itself is still subdued to the 
heteronomy from which it pretends to free man. The gap between "Sittlichkeit" and "Sinnhchkeit" 
is not reconciled by a revolution, but revolution abolishes Sinnlichkeit by sacrificing the human 
reality on the altar of morality. In a revolution human reality will reach its moral challenge only on 
the expense of its own cancellation. It therefore becomes necessary to think a real reconciUation of 
both. 
Hegel started anew. The consciousness of man is the consciousness of the difference of self and 
world, morality and human reality, spirit and nature etc., but it is also the consciousness of a 
potential unity of these polarities. The polarities are experienced as difference, which would be 
impossible without a previous knowledge of their intiinsic unity. The hypothetical higher synthesis 
must be sought beyond the polarities, beyond either morality or human reality. Again Hegel used 
the concept of "alienation" to describe the tension between the polarities. Thus "alienation" is not 
only a characteristic of man alone, but is the decisive feature of the whole world. Alienation is the 
basic principle which underlies the world; alienation of everything from itself must be overcome in 
the synthesis beyond the polarities: the "notwendige Entzweiung ist ein Faktor des Lebens, das 
ewig entgegensetzend sich bildet und die Totalitat ist, in der hochsten Lebendigkeit, nur durch ihre 
Widerherstellung aus der Trennung moglich."16 
Hegel draws the daring conclusion: "... es (das Absolute, A.S.) ist das Ziel, das gesucht wird. Es 
ist schon vorhanden, wie konnte es sonst gesucht werden? Die Vernunft produciert es nur, indem 
sie das Bewusstseyn von Beschrankungen befreyt.... Fiir den Standpunkt der Entzweyung ist die 
absolute Synthese ein Jenseyts, das ihren Bestimmtheyten entgegengesetzte Unbestimmte und 
Gestaltlose. ... Die Aufgabe der Philosophic besteht aber darinn, diese Voraussetzungen zu 
vereinen, das Seyn in das Nicht-Seyn - als Werden, die Entzweyung in das Absolute - als seine 
Erscheinung, des Endliche in das Unendliche - als Leben zu setzen.''^^ As the absolute had to be 
16 Hegel, Die Differenz des Fichte' schen und Schelling' schen Systems der Philosophie, p. 13-14. 
17ibid.,p.l5-16. 
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thought of as inherent in man's consciousness, Hegel actually claimed that reason produces this 
absolute by thinking it and by dissolving the polarities into it. 
Going by this assumption Hegel developed his criticism of subjective ideahsm during his time in 
Jena. The philosophy of enlightenment had claimed the infinite to be utterly transcendent, whereas 
the real world had been regarded as the realm of mere phenomena. Both ideas perpetuate the 
division of the world into a realm of objectivity which now becomes unintelhgible (Kant) and 
subjectivity. An objective cognition of God is not any longer possible and religion has degenerated 
into sheer sentimentality (Schleiermacher), which cannot claim any objective truth anymore. Hegel's 
criticism is that actually the philosophy of subjective idealism split the world into unintelligible 
objectivity and sentimental subjectivity. Even in the concept of eschatology as the infinite process 
of moral perfection (the aim of which had been to criticise the primitive eudaimonism of the 
enlightenment) ideaUstic philosophy fell victim to this presupposition, as the "wahre unendliche 
Leben" (Fichte) remains always transcendent. Due to their absolute division between subjectivity 
and objectivity they have to claim that the process is infinite. Hegel saw this spUt between 
subjectivity and objectivity as the expression of the universal alienation which permeates the whole 
world. Also the alienation of subjectivity from objectivity is the alienation of something which 
actually is supposed to form a unity and which therefore has to be reconciled in the absolute 
consciousness through thinking. A real reconciliation can therefore not be achieved as long as one 
holds an idea of subjectivity, the only aim of which is to perpetuate itself 
Hegel suspected that in the last analysis idealistic eschatology (especially Fichte's) even denied 
the necessity of salvation through reconciliation, because human subjectivity is a final state and is 
therefore practically regarded as sufficient unto itself A real dissolution of the self into the absolute 
beyond the polarity of subjectivity and objectivity is not dared. Instead Fichte demands an infinite 
number of lives in which the self can perpetuate itself, not willing to surrender itself to the absolute. 
Hegel then goes on: if reconcihation as salvation is not supposed to be ultimately postponed in an 
infinte process, i f thus man should be thought of as freed from the tension between "Sein" and 
"moralischem Sollen", then reconciliation must be thought to be present and manifest. And if it is 
supposed to be present, then it must be thought of as historically reall 
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Hegel now developed a particular christian philosophy in which Jesus of Nazareth is the 
incarnation of God in humanity. In the historical person the real reconciliation of God and man, 
infinite and finite, actuality and morality is historically manifest. It is, however, important to 
understand the degree to which this more "theological" approach does not contradict Hegel's 
philosophical presupposition that the absolute as the reconciliation of the polarities is produced in 
the absolute consciousness of man: at first the absolute consciousness infers the idea of an absolute 
and its necessary historical manifestation. And only then the historical appearance of Jesus Christ 
can be realized as the manifestation of this absolute, which is necessary to make the reconciliation a 
historical matter of fact. The act of thinking the absolute verifies itself through the coincidence of 
necessary philosophical postulate and historical phenomenon. 
As he presupposed the assumption that reconciUation had to be historically manifest, Hegel now 
set out to prove the actuality of world history as the development of the present reconciliation. As, 
however, the reconciUation in the time after Jesus Christ is manifest only in man's consciousness of 
it, the course of present reconciliation is more or less identical with the "Geschichte des Geistes". 
Philosophy as the thinking of the absolute is in the last analysis claimed to be the manifestation of 
the reconciliation of infinite and finite, subjectivity and objectivity, divine and human realm. 
Hegel's idea of universal self-alienation and of salvation as the identity of God and man was to 
become most influential in the 19th and 20th century. Equally important was Hegel's claim that this 
reconciliation must be thought to be historically manifest. 
1.4 Feuerbach, Marx and Bloch 
Hegel's most important legacy was that he rejected the idea of another, divine realm beyond the 
realm of history. Both are identical in as much as history is the history of the self-explication of the 
"Weltgeist". 
After Hegel's death two of his pupils took over his ideas; however, they interpreted them sUghtly 
differentiy. The point in which Hegel differed from his pupils and the pupils amongst themselves, 
was the status of the christian reUgion in the process of reconciUation of man and God in history. 
Hegel had roughly identified history with the development of the Weltgeist; and as the christian 
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religion had as its content the historical manifestation of the reconciliation, it had a rather positive 
value for Hegel, although of course the final reconciliation could only be achieved in the absolute 
consciousness. That changed totally in Feuerbach's and Marx's approach. 
A) Feuerbach 
Feuerbach identified religion (especially Christianity) in general with the old, degenerated concept 
of future eschatology; as for Hegel in the beginning for Feuerbach the enhghtenment and idealistic 
dogma of the immortality of the soul was the expression of ultimate, selfish subjectivism. As Hegel 
had already shown, the perpetuation of subjective individualism meant the perpetuation of the 
dualism between subjective individual and objective God. Feuerbach therefore considered the 
christian idea of God as opposed to man to be the main obstacle on the way to real salvation: God 
as opposite to man is a mere projection which serves the purpose of immortaUzing the individual. 
As salvation is the identity of God and man, this state of opposition must be considered to be a 
state of self-aliention. Religion is merely a projection of man in order to save his individualistic 
subjectivity. Real reconcihation can therefore only be gained if the absurdity and the falseness of 
this projection is realized. In order to think the actual identity of man and God, Feuerbach 
developed a pantheistic concept of God, refering to Spinoza: "Kommt daher Finer und sagt und 
zeigt ihnen, dass Gott wirklich ist, dass sein Sein nicht bloss ein vorgestelltes, unwirkhches, 
sondern dass Natur und Weltgeschichte die Existenz (freilich nicht das Wesen) Gottes sei, so gilt 
ihnen dann ein solcher, welcher einen wirklichen Gott glaubt, gerade deswegen, well er behauptet, 
dass Gott ist, fur ein Gottesleugner und Naturahst.''^^ 
Feuerbach clung to Hegel's idea of the self-alienation of man and of salvation as the identity of 
man and God. However, different from Hegel, he considered religion and religious concepts of God 
not as preparatory stage of the realization of this identity. Rather is religion and its concept of God 
the actual enemy of true salvation, because religion creates the conceptual dualism between man 
and God. 
18 Feuerbach, Gedanken uber Tod und Unsterblichkeit, p. 195. 
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B) Marx 
Marx had a slightly different but equally negative attitude towards religion; he also set out from 
Hegel's idea that salvation is the reconciliation of man and God in history. However, he rejected 
Hegel's idea that this reconciUation was manifest in absolute consciousness and in philosophical 
thinking. CUnging to Hegel's concept of reconciUation as real and historical, he did not confine 
himself to an abstract "idea of history", but turned to actual economy and politics as the forming 
powers of history. He rejected Hegel's intellectual optimism and became a critic of actual society, in 
which nothing of the reconciliation Hegel had presupposed was visible yet. 
He became especially critical of the role of christian religion in society: like Feuerbach he equated 
traditional eschatology and actual church and Christianity in general and came to the conclusion that 
religion was nothing but the exploiters' attempt to put the people off with the idea of a future better 
world, in order not to have to change the socially unjust status of society. Like the early Hegel 
Marx saw religion as part of a repressive society, which prevented man from becoming free and 
self-determined. Alienation must not be understood metaphysically but practicaUy: man is alienated 
from himself because he is alienated from the product of his work and from the process of his 
work. In the capitalist class system both are no longer the expression of his own personality but a 
function of his exploitation. Man is alienated from himself due to the exploiting conditions of the 
process of production and is therefore in danger of faUing victim to the religious concept of a 
transcendent better world, what prevents him from seeing the actual ground of his alienation, which 
is economic exploitation. Therefore society has to be changed until a state can be reached in which 
religion and its idea of a future salvation would not any longer be necessary: "Die Aufhebung der 
Religion als des illusorischen Gliickes des Menschen ist die Forderung seines wirklichen Gliickes. 
Die Forderung, die lUusionen iiber seinen Zustand aufzugeben, ist die Forderung, einen Zustand 
aufzugeben, der der lUusionen bedarf'^^ 
Marx kept Hegel's ideal of salvation as reconciliation. However, one important change is 
noticable: he replaces the term "reconciUation" with the term "Gliick" i.e. happiness; Marx's turn to 
the empirical world of the working classes made experience the criterion for the reality of salvation. 
19 Marx, Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, p.l71. 
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Not any longer is an eternal, transcendent "rapture" the aim of eschatology. Linked to man's actual 
existence, the content of salvation becomes a happiness to be experienced practically. The necessity 
of grounding any concept of salvation in man's empirical experience was to become the decisive 
feature of philosophical criticisms of religious concepts of salvation in the 20th century. Any 
concept of salvation that does not contribute to the happiness of man's actual experience is open to 
the suspicion of being merely deliberate ideological betrayal of the working classes. 
It is not the task of this thesis to describe how far Marx saw religion not only as means for the 
perpetuation of the exploiting class system but also as the inherent result of the alienation of man 
from himself and his work through the introduction of the division of labour and the class system. 
The main point is that Marx still held to the idea of a salvation and reconciUation in history, which 
originally had been derived from theology and religion. Rehgion itself however is to be abohshed. 
According to Hegel's own presuppositions salvation must necessarily be thought to be reahzable in 
history. Otherwise it seems to be nothing more than wishful thinking. Marx, however, differed from 
Hegel in thinking the realization practicable through revolution: he therefore claimed that he had 
"Hegel vom Kopf auf die Fusse gestellt". 
Marx himself, however, did not develop a precise concept of the happiness of a state in which 
man would fmaUy overcome his self-alienation in being reconciled with himself and the products of 
his labour in a classless society.20 
C) Bloch 
Marx's critique found a worthy successor in the marxist philosopher Bloch, who in his main work 
Das Prinzip Hoffnung is explicitly concerned with the christian concept of salvation and 
eschatology. 
Bloch considers "hope" to be the main underlying principle of aU human existence. The 
transcending of the actual social injustice and society towards an eschatological future (which is 
made by man himself) is unthinkable without man's ability to transcend the facticity of things due to 
20 Moller, p. 112: "Uber die konkreten Bedingungen der Zukunftsgesellschaft gibt es bei Marx nur sparliche 
Angaben." 
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his hope for a better status. Hope is therefore a sort of proleptic thinking which is per se inherent in 
man. 
Every reUgion is just the temporary formulation of this eternal desire and hope for a better world. 
Bloch is therefore very critical of the clakn of Christianity, that salvation is aUeady present in Jesus 
Christ: "Und keine anthropologische Kritik der ReUgion raubt die Hoffnung, auf die das 
Christentum aufgetragen ist; sie entzieht dieser Hoffnung einzig das, was sie als Hoffnung aufhobe 
und zur aberglaubischen Zuversicht machte: die ausgemalte, ausgemachte, die unsinnig irreale, aber 
als real hypostasierte Mythologie ihrer Erfullung.''^! 
This is the climax of the development of a change in understanding of eschatology, which started 
with the attempt of neologism, to make Christianity's soteriological claim universaUy inteUigible. 
Bloch draws the final conclusion from this development: there is no universaUy intelUgible salvation 
in religion. Bloch accuses the christian reUgion of spreading the mere "Mythologie ihrer ErfiiUung", 
instead of nourishing practical hope for an actual change of mankind and society. 
Religion's claim for salvation in a transcendent eschatology is not provable and falls victkn to 
Marx's suspicion. ReUgion's claim for salvation in a present eschatology (e.g. in the style of Hegel) 
is a merely apodictic statement, to which no actual experiences correspond. It is "irrational", mere 
"mythology", and has therefore to be rejected. 
1.5 HEIDEGGER 
A) Introduction 
The concept of salvation as the overcoming of alienation underwent one final alteration. Although 
the marxist transformation of Hegelian dialectics into actual history became most influential 
through the rise of communism, surprisingly enough it was not before the 1960s that theology felt 
the urge to respond to Marx's critique of reUgion and to his own interpretation of salvation. And 
even now one cannot say that a marxist attitude towards reUgion and salvation is prevaiUng in 
western society. The alteration which the philosophical concept of salvation underwent in the 20th 
21 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, p.l523. 
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century and which gave to it the form with which it was to become part of common self-
understanding of modem man was the existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger. 
Of course, Heidegger had precursors: main features of his understanding of existence had been 
developed by Kierkegaard already; however, we will see that a basic feature of Heidegger's 
philosophy is the classical idea of salvation as the overcoming of alienation which he seemingly he 
adopted from Marx and Hegel. However, he put this concept in the form in which it presents itself 
today by shifting it onto an individualistic and ontological level: "Die Heimatlosigkeit wird ein 
Weltschicksal. Darum ist es notig, dieses Geschick seinsgeschichtiich zu denken. Was Marx in 
einem wesentlichen und bedeutenden Sinne von Hegel her als die Entfremdung des Menschen 
erkannt hat, reicht mit seinen Wurzeln in die Heimatlosigkeit des neuzeitlichen Menschen. Diese 
wird, und zwar aus dem Geschick des Seins in der Gestalt der Metaphysik hervorgerufen, durch sie 
verfestigt und zugleich von ihr als Heimatlosigkeit verdeckt."22 
This is comprehensible only in the framework of the whole of his Existenzialanthropologie. We 
will therefore now turn to Sein und Zeit. 
B) Heidegger's transcendental-ontological anthropology 
In Sein und Zeit Heidegger tried to give an entirely new view on philosophy and the human 
condition by turning away from traditional metaphysical philosophy. "Heidegger steht in dieser 
Hinsicht in der philosophischen Bewegung, die mit Feuerbach, Marx und Kierkegaard beginnend, 
die metaphysische Deutung des Menschen als eine Selbstentfremdung deklariert."23 Heidegger 
does not develop an idealist philosophy but starts to examine the existential everyday life of man. 
However, his aim is not to examine the culture and the habits of man. Rather is he interested in the 
question "nach dem Sinn von Sein"24. However, he is conscious of the fact that any question for 
"Sein" remains unanswerable as long as one asks in the traditional categorical way. According to 
Heidegger there is only one way to ask the question for being, namely to analyse man. The peculiar 
characteristic that makes man apt for this purpose is that he himself is being and therefore takes 
22 Heidegger, Brief iiber den Humanismus, p.339-340. 
23 Schulz, Philosophie, p.292. 
24 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p.l. 
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part in the process of being-there. Therefore Heidegger caUs man the Da-Sein and continues: "Das 
Dasein ist ein Seiendens, das nicht nur unter anderem Seienden vorkommt, es ist vielmehr dadurch 
ontisch ausgezeichnet, dass es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein um dieses Sein selbst geht. Zu dieser 
Seinsverfassung des Daseins gehort aber dann, dass es in seinem Sein zu diesem Sein ein 
Seinsverhaltnis hat. Und dies wiederum besagt: Dasein versteht sich in irgendeiner Weise und 
Ausdriicklichkeit in seinem Sein."^^ However, this "irgendwie" which is naive and obscure must be 
unfolded and made intelUgible: "Daher muss die Fundamentalontologie ... in der existenzialen 
Analytik des Daseins gesucht werden."^6 From a detailed analysis of the human condition, of the 
condition of Da-sein. he infers the structure of "Sein-selbst" as the necessary condition of the 
possibiUty of Da-Sein. As far as these structures concern human beings Heidegger calls them 
"Existenzialien"(existentials). As far as they concern only things or animals they are "categories". 
Due to his presupposition of an ontological-transcendental interdependence between Dasein and 
Being itself he defines Being itself through its manifestations in Dasein. 
According to Heidegger the basic and most important existential is Zeitiichkeit: "Als der Sinn des 
Seins des Seienden, das wir Dasein nennen, wird die Zeitiichkeit aufgewiesen. Dieser Nachweis 
muss sich bewahren in der wiederholten Interpretation der vorlaufig aufgezeigten Daseinsstruktur 
als Modi der Zeitiichkeit."^7 With the term Zeitiichkeit the main feature of Heidegger's 
anthropology is mentioned. Roughly speaking, one can say that the aim of Sein und Zeit can be 
summarized with the title of the first part of it: "Die Interpretation des Daseins auf die ZeitUchkeit 
und die Explikation der Zeit als des transzendentalen Horizontes der Frage nach dem Sein. "28 
Heidegger offers evidence for his assumption that Zeitiichkeit is the "Sinn des Seins" by 
introducing the two terms which in the course of time became infamous and significant for his 
work: Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentiichkeit. These terms have often been misinterpreted. However, 
they are supposed to be the adequate expression of the modi of the exclusively mdividual relation 
between the Sein and its bearer, the individual subject: "Das Sein, darum es diesem Seienden in 
25 ibid. p.l2. 
26 ibid. p. 13. 
27 ibid. p.l7. 
28 ibid. p.41. 
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seinem Sein geht, ist je meines. Dasein ist daher nie ontologisch zu fassen als Fall und Exemplar 
einer Gattung von Seiendem als vorhandenem. ... Und Dasein ist meines wiederum, je in dieser 
Oder jener Weise zu sein."29 That means that every Dasein, as it is conscious of itself, has a relation 
to itself as being. However, the actual being is by no means dependent on the subject. Rather it is 
the transcendental condition of subjectivity. Therefore: "Es hat sich schon immer irgendwie 
entschieden, in welcher Weise Dasein je meines ist."30 According to Heidegger the self-relation of 
Dasein has to be characterized as Moglichkeit (potentiality, possibility): due to its being-in-time the 
individual Dasein is never entirely actualized, i.e. its potentialities are never all fulfilled. There is 
always something else to come in the course of time and thus the relation of Dasein to its own 
being must be characterized as "potentiality". However, that bears a danger: "Das Seiende, dem es 
in seinem Sein um dieses selbst geht, verhalt sich zu seinem Sein als seiner eigensten Moglichkeit. 
Dasein ist je seine Moglichkeit und es hat sie nicht nur noch eigenschaftlich als ein Vorhandenes. 
Und well Dasein je wesenhaft seine Moglichkeit ist, kann dieses Seiende in seinem Sein sich 
'wahlen', gewinnen, es kann sich veriieren, bzw. nie und nur 'scheinbar' gewirmen. Verloren haben 
kann es sich nur und noch nicht sich gewonnen haben kann es nur, sofem es seinem Wesen nach 
mogliches eigentlich, d.h. sich zueigenes ist. Die beiden Seinsmodi der Eigentlichkeit und der 
Uneigentlichkeit - diese Ausdriicke sind im strengsten Wortsinn terminologisch gewahlt - griinden 
darin, dass Dasein iiberhaupt durch Jemeinigkeit bestimmt ist."31 Eigentlichkeit and 
Uneigendichkeit are modes of how Dasein is related to its own being as potentiality. Eigentlichkeit 
thus means a behaviour in which the individual is conscious of and serious about the fact that its 
own being is ultimately a matter of its own and that it is supposed to fulfi l those potentialities which 
are its "own" ones. Uneigenflichkeit is therefore the behaviour in which man is not willing to take 
over the responsibility for its own Dasein and its Je-meinigkeit. In a later chapter Heidegger takes 
this up again and states more precisely: instead of being concerned with the actuality of being as the 
utmost individual task to fulfil the inherent potentialities of Dasein. man flees this responsibihty by 
adopting the manners and structures of that which is ultimately not individual, namely the 




"Offentlichkeit des Man"^^. "j)as Dasein ist von ihm selbst als eigentiichem Selbstseinkonnen 
zunachst immer schon abgefallen und an die 'Welt' verfallen. Die Verfallenheit an die Welt meint 
das Aufgehen im Miteinandersein. ... Was wir die UneigentUchkeit des Daseins nannten, erfahrt 
jetzt durch die Interpretation des Verfallenseins eine scharfere Bestimmung."33 According to 
Heidegger the dialectic of Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentiichkeit must be considered to be the 
fundamental structure of existence34: "Mit der ontologischen Verdeutiichung der in diesen 
Phanomenen durchblickenden Seinsart des alltaglichen In-der-Welt-seins gewinnen wir erst die 
existenzial zureichende Bestimmung der Grundverfassung des Daseins."35 
Heidegger does not weary stressing that Uneigentiichkeit is not meant in a pejorative sense. 
Rather must it be understood as a Seinsmodus which is of the same ontological value as 
Eigentlichkeit. In an ontological sense Heidegger is right: as both modi are actuality, one must 
transcendentally conclude that both are founded and grounded in the structure of Being itself. "Das 
Nicht-es-selbst-sein fungiert als positive Moglichkeit des Seienden, das wesenhaft besorgend in 
einer Welt aufgeht. Dieses Nicht-sein muss als die nachste Seinsart des Daseins begriffen werden, 
in der es sich zumeist halt."36 However, it soon becomes evident that Uneigentiichkeit in 
Heidegger is not perceived neutrally as ontological potentiality of the same existential value as 
Eigentiichkeit. Rather it is described as deficient mode of Eigentiichkeit: "Wenn aber das Dasein 
selbst im Gerede und der offentiichen Ausgelegtheit ihm selbst die Moglichkeit vorgibt, sich im 
Man zu verlieren, der Bodenlosigkeit zu verfallen, dann sagt das: das Dasein bereitet ihm selbst die 
standige Versuchung zum Verfallen. Das In-der-Welt-sein ist an ihm selbst versucherisch. ...Gerede 
und Zweideutigkeit, das AUes-gesehen- und AUes-verstanden-haben bildet die Vermeintiichkeit aus, 
die so verfiigbare und herrschende Erschlossenheit des Daseins vermochte ihm die Sicherheit, 
Echtheit und Fiille aller Moglichkeiten seines Seins zu verbiirgen. ... Das verfallende In-der-Welt-
sein ist sich selbst versuchend zugleich beruhigend."37 
32 ibid. p. 175. 
33 ibid. 
34 Not of Dasein the fundamental structure of which is Zeitiichkeit. 
35 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit^ p.l77. 
36 ibid. p. 176. 
37 ibid. p. 177. 
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And now it suddenly becomes clear what Heidegger's Unk with the traditional philosophy is: "In 
diesem beruhigten, alles verstehenden Sichvergleichen mit allem treibt das Dasein einer 
Entfremdung zu, in der sich ihm das eigenste Seinkonnen verbirgt."-^^ Heidegger introduces the 
term Entfremdung in order to describe the actuality of existence. AUenation as Uneigendichkeit is 
the mode of being "in der es sich zumeist halt."39 However, there remains an uncertainty about 
what alienation means ontologically: on the one hand Heidegger stresses that alienation hides the 
"eigenste Seinkonnen", which thus alienates man from his authentic relation to Being itself On the 
other hand he claims that also Uneigentiichkeit is an actual ontological mode of Dasein as being: it 
seems that neither does Uneigentiichkeit alienate man from himself nor from Being itself! "Diese 
Entfremdung, die dem Dasein seine Eigentiichkeit und Moghchkeit, wenn auch nur als solche eines 
echten Scheiterns, verschliesst, liefert es jedoch nicht an Seiendes aus, das es nicht selbst ist, 
sondern drangt es in seine Uneigenthchkeit, in eine mogliche Seinsart seiner selbst. "40 Thus 
Heidegger can produce the apparently paradoxical sentence: "Das Dasein stiirzt aus ihm selbst in es 
selbst, in die Bodenlosigkeit und Nichtigkeit der uneigentiichen Alltaglichkeit.''^! 
Heidegger's terminology impUes a moral assessment, although he wants to deal with the 
"existentials" as purely ontological phenomena. His introduction of the term Entfremdung finally 
makes clear that Uneigentiichkeit is the negative, deficient mode of Eigentlichkeit because by using 
the traditional concept of man's existence as endangered of becoming alienated, he indicates the 
ontological possibility of a "better" state, the state of non-alienation. 
And in fact Heidegger assumes that this state exists and that it is basically possible to gain it. If 
Eigentlichkeit is the positive alternative to alienation, then alienation can be overcome through the 
contemplation of what is je-meinig. As mentioned above, for Heidegger the basic existential of 
Dasein was Zeitiichkeit. Due to its temporality the being of Dasein had to be perceived mainly as 
"jemeinige Moglichkeit". I f Dasein therefore is supposed to become "eigentiich", it must become 
conscious of the temporal and finite character of its own being. According to Heidegger death 
38 ibid. p. 178. Italics by A.S. 
39 cf. footnote 36. 
40 ibid. p. 178. 
40 ibid.. 
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must be considered to be the ultimate, last and most "eigendich" potentiality of man at all. The own 
death is the most individual act in human life, because in this matter no human being can stand in 
for another: "Der Tod als Ende des Daseins ist die eigenste, unbezugliche, gewisse und als solche 
unbestimmte, unuberholbare Moglichkeit des Daseins. "42 in the last analysis the attitude towards 
death makes the difference between Uneigentlichkeit and Eigentlichkeit. The "uneigentMche 
Dasein" does not accept the own death as its ultimately "own" but flees from it and tries to hide in 
the anonymity of the "Man": "Das Man lasst den Mut zur Angst vor dem Tode nicht aufkommen ... 
Versuchung, Beruhigung und Entfremdung kennzeichen aber die Seinsart des Verfallens. Das 
alltagliche Sein zum Tode is als verfallendes eine standige Flucht vor ihm. Das Sein zum Ende hat 
den Modus des umdeutenden, uneigentlich anstehenden und verhiillenden Ausweichens vor ihm."^^ 
The "eigentliche Dasein", however, is conscious of the fact that "der Tod ist die eigenste 
Moglichkeit des Daseins. Das Sein zu ihm erschliesst dem Dasein sein eigenstes Seinkonnen, darin 
es um das Sein des Daseins schlechthin geht. Darin kann dem Dasein offenbar werden, dass es in 
der ausgezeichneten Moglichkeit seiner selbst dem Man entrissen bleibt, d.h. vorlaufend sich je 
schon ihm entreissen kann."^^ JY^Q alienation as Uneigentlichkeit can be overcome through the 
anticipation (Vorlaufen) of death as the ultimate and most "eigentiich" possibility of Dasein. The 
Eigentlichkeit of Dasein reaches its consummation through the becoming conscious of its utmost 
ontological potentiality: "Das Sein zum Tode ist Vorlaufen in ein Seinkonnen des Seienden, dessen 
Seinsart das Vorlaufen selbst hat. Im vorlaufenden Enthullen dieses Seinkonnens erschliesst sich 
das Dasein ihm selbst hinsichtUch seiner aussersten Moglichkeit. Auf eigenstes Seinkonnen sich 
entwerfen aber besagt: sich selbst verstehen konnen im Sein des so enthiillten Seienden: existieren. 
Das Vorlaufen erweist sich als Moglichkeit des Verstehens des eigensten, aussersten Seinskonnens, 
d.h. als Moglichkeit eigentlicher Existenz" ["^ ^ 
However, it is most important that the "Vorlaufen zum Tode" is not an ethical advice or a moral 
postulate. Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit are not a matter of personal decision but an 
42 ibid, p.258. 
43 ibid, p.254. 
44 ibid, p.263. 
45 ibid, p.263. 
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ontological and existential matter of fact, a mode of Dasein. Thus it is Heidegger's aim to show by 
analysing the existential everyday life of man that Eigentlichkeit and Uneigendichkeit exist as 
actualized ontological potentialities of Dasein. I already pointed out above that Heidegger wants to 
analyse the existential structure Dasein in order to be able to postulate the transcendental structures 
of Being itself. 
Heidegger finds the actuality of "Vorlaufen zum Tode", the actuality of the overcoming alienation 
in the phenomena of conscience, guilt and anxiety. Every Dasein is guilty, not in a moral sense but 
in the sense that the conscience of being guilty is the consciousness of the fact that Dasein is bound 
to the actualization of its "own" potentialities and is thus endangered of not achieving its purpose. 
Guilt becomes evident when conscience reveals the Uneigentlichkeit of Dasein. Conscience is thus 
the consciousness of Eigentlichkeit: "Das Verstehen des Gewissensrufes enthiillt die Verlorenheit in 
das Man. Die Entschlossenheit holt das Dasein auf sein eigenstes Selbstseinkdnnen zuriick. 
EigentUch und ganz durchsichtig wird das eigene Seinkonnen itn verstehenden Sein zum Tode als 
der eigensten Moglichkeit."46 in existential anxiety before death, conscience reveals the 
"eigentlich" and primordial structure of Dasein: "Die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit ist kein Ausweg, 
erfunden, um den Tod zu 'iiberwinden', sondern das dem Gewissensruf folgende Verstehen, das 
dem Tod die Moglichkeit freigibt, der Existenz des Daseins machtig zu werden und jede fliichtige 
Selbstverdeckung im Grunde zu zerstreuen."47 
One can easily see how much the understanding of alienation and of salvation as overcoming the 
alienation has changed since Hegel and Marx. One may recall the initial quotation of Heidegger: 
"Die Heimatlosigkeit wird ein Weltschicksal. Darum ist es notig, dieses Geschick seinsgeschichtlich 
zu denken. Was Marx in einem wesentlichen und bedeutenden Sinne von Hegel her als die 
Entfremdung des Menschen erkannt hat, reicht mit seinen Wurzeln in die Heimatlosigkeit des 
neuzeitlichen Menschen. Diese wird, und zwar aus dem Geschick des Seins in der Gestalt der 
Metaphysik hervorgerufen, durch sie verfestigt und zugleich von ihr als Heimatlosigkeit 
46 ibid. p.307. 
47 ibid. p.310. 
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verdeckt."48 Now it is clear that alienation as Heimatlosigkeit means ontological 
"Heimatlosigkeit", i.e. Uneigendichkeit. That is the reason why Heidegger claims that it is 
necessary to think it "seinsgeschichtlich". 
It is also clear in what way Heidegger transformed the classical concept of alienation: he 
connected it with ontology and its inherent concept of existence. One can say that in a dialectical 
way Heidegger thus both universalized and individualized the classical concept of alienation. Due 
to his attempt to lay bare the structures of Being itself through an analysis of Dasein he 
concentrated entirely on the individual. In fact he even elevated Eigentlichkeit. the utterly 
individualistic actualization of Dasein. to the level of a main principle of his philosophy of 
existence. In total distinction from Marx, Heidegger entirely leaves out actual history and society 
and applies alienation and salvation to the individual only. However, similar to Kant, whose 
transcendental method he admired and adopted, by concentrating on the transcendental condition 
of the Dasein. Heidegger seemingly transcends the individual towards an underlying all-embracing 
ontology. Alienation thus is understood as a mode of Being itself and can now be overcome only 
through the cognition of the temporal structure of Being itself. Alienation is now the most basic 
structure of all, originating from the relation of time and Being. However, the problem of this 
relation remains unsolved in Sein und Zeit. It should have been dealt with in the second volume, 
which, however, Heidegger never wrote: "Die existenzial-ontologische Verfassung der 
Daseinsganzheit griindet in der Zeitlichkeit. Demnach muss eine urspriingliche Zeitigungsweise der 
ekstatischen ZeiUichkeit selbst den ekstatischen Entwurf von Sein iiberhaupt ermoglichen: Wie ist 
dieser Zeitigungsmodus der Zeitlichkeit zu interpretieren? Fiihrt ein Weg von der ursprunglichen 
Zeit zum Sinn des Seins? Offenbart sich die Zeit selbst als Horizont des Seins?"^ ^ 
48 cf. footnote 22. 
49 ibid, p.438. 
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1.6 SUMMARY 
It was the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and his concept of life as existence which shaped the 
modern understanding of man so much that it found its way into academic theology. Heidegger 
broke with the essentialist, metaphysical tradition of philosophy in the 19th century. He started 
anew with the existence and the ontology of the individual. And it was this altered understanding 
of man himself which led Heidegger to a different concept of man's salvation. Since Heidegger the 
problem of soteriology has the form with which we were concerned in the initial chapter: today 
soteriology presents itself as the question for salvation within the boundaries of individual 
existence and its existential experience. 
Heidegger's formulation of the question as well as his attempt to answer it in his main work Sein 
und Zeit became the yardstick for every theological approach to the subject, because after 
Heidegger it is no longer possible to neglect the existential aspect of religion and theology. Names 
like Bultmann, Tillich and Rahner indicate that Heidegger's anthropology soon became most 
influential in philosophy and theology and it was his concept of soteriology which challenged 
theology most. However, it was not the ontological but the individualistic element of Heidegger's 
Existenzialanalyse which became famous and made his concept of Uneigentlichkeit and 
Eigentlichkeit the basis of the modern idea of "self-realization" which became so infamous in the 
1970s. 
In Heidegger's philosophy a long-lasting development in philosophy came to an end, which started 
with Hegel's turning eschatology into the history of the Weltgeist. He developed the philosophical 
concept of alienation. Marx "transcended" this concept by turning to actual political history and the 
actual reality of the human condition. Heidegger finally neglected even the historical, political and 
social circumstances of man and put the individual as such in the center of his considerations. The 
framework of his concept of man was no longer christian eschatology or political history, but 
ontology of the individual Dasein. 
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The self-understanding of modern man is shaped by the idea of both historicity and individualism. 
And today the individual in real history and its personal needs and BefindUchkeiten are the starting-
point for every understanding of soteriology and salvation, as Gerhard Ebeling pointed out^ O. 
We will now turn to existentialist theology in order to see whether there is a christian theology 
which faces and meets these preconditions and expectations of modern man's understanding. 
50 cf. the introduction. 
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II. THE CONCEPT OF SALVATION IN EXISTENTIALIST THEOLOGY 
I I . l INTRODUCTION 
The reason for choosing existentiahst theology in order to see whether there is a theology which 
meets the prerequisites of soteriology today is obvious. As I showed in the previous chapter the 
problem soteriology has to face today is the individuahstic and existentialist understanding of man 
and his salvation as the overcoming of alienation. A theology which explictly is considered to be 
"existentialist" seems to be most apt for our purpose. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that out of the wide range of existentialist philosophers 
only two, Kierkegaard and Heidegger, had a long-lasting impact on theology, in a quite different 
way though. Kierkegaard's philosophy became the basis for the "new orthodoxy" of the dialectical 
theology like of Earth (and also Bultmann): the exclusivess with which dialectical theology stressed 
the category of the paradoxical, eternal revelation (heritage of Kierkegaard's) led theology to its 
• philosophical dissociation from the modern world. Heidegger's Existenzialanalyse. however, 
became the philosophical foundation for theologians, who are normally considered to be more 
radical and progressive or at least to be Vermittlungstheologen. His turning to Being itself, in 
which Dasein a priori ontologically participates seemed to open up ways for a new understanding 
of God, man and salvation. We will examine that in more detail in the following chapter. 
Out of the wide range of theologians influenced by Martin Heidegger I chose the two most 
famous ones, Paul TilUch and Karl Rahner. Even though direct references to Heidegger are rare in 
both Rahner's and TiUich's theological works one immediately notices that their whole way of 
conceiving the human condition, the question of finitude and anxiety and the question of Being 
itself is based upon Heidegger's analysis of existence. 
Surprisingly enough there is little or no material about the actual influence of Heidegger on TiUich 
or Rahner. However, the aim of this study is not to examine the interrelation between existentialist 
philosophy and existentialist theology, but to see whether existentialist theology meets the 
conditions of a modern soteriology as pointed out above. The expounding of the philosophical 
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tradition only served the purpose to clarify the intellectual background to which an existentialist 
soteriology has to stand up. 
II.2 PAUL TILLICH 
II.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
A) Biographical note 
Paul Tillich was born on August 20th 1886 in Starzeddel, Germany. When his father became a 
pastor in Berlin (1903) Paul Tillich attended the Gymnasium in Beriin. After having done his Abitur 
he enroled for philosophy and theology at the University of Berhn, studied one semester in 
Tubingen, four semesters in Halle, returned to Berhn in 1907 and in the winter of 1909 he passed 
his first theological exam. In 1910 he did his doctorate writing a dissertation about "Die 
religionsgeschichUiche Konstruktion in ScheUings positiver Philosophic, ihre Voraussetzungen und 
Prinzipien". In 1911 he did his Lic.theol again with a thesis on Schelling: "Mystik und 
Schuldbewusstsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwicklung". In 1912 he passed his second 
theological exam and started to prepare his Habilitation about "Der Begriff des Ubematiirlichen". 
Due to the outbreak of the war in 1914 he was not to finish and pass his Habilitation till 1916. 
He became an army chaplain on the west front and survived the siege of Verdun, an experience 
that turned him into an existentialist, as he said 51. His later interest in sociahsm and the soziale 
Frage derive from this experience of war and the encounter with the working classes. From 1918 
till 1926 he was Privatdozent in Berlin, 1924-26 Extraordinarius in Marburg, 25-29 Ordinarius in 
Dresden and finally in 1929 he got the chair of philosophy and sociology in Frankfurt/M. There he 
worked together with Adorno and Horkheimer in their then recentiy founded "Institut fiir 
Sozialforschung". In 1933 he was the first German professor to be dismissed by the Nazis because 
of his close connections with Adorno, his "unvolkische Theologie" and his sympathy for socialism 
and the concerns of the working classes. He emigrated to New York and became professor at the 
51 Grescliat, p.312. 
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Union Theological Seminary where he stayed untiU 1955. He was offered a chair in Harvard in 
1955 and later from 1962 he taught at the University of Chicago till his death in 1965. 
B) Martin Kahler and the "protestant principle" 
Apart from Heidegger's existential philosophy the second main influence on Tilhch was Martin 
Kahler, his theological teacher in Halle, whose interpretation of the reformed doctrine of 
justification TilUch adopted. The peculiarity of Tillich's application of theology and the 
Heideggerian concept of existence remain uninteUigible without appreciation of the fact that it was 
Kahler who shaped the theological basis of Tillich's thoughts. Kahler's aim was to separate the 
doctrine of justification from a merely moralistic understanding and to apply it also to the sphere of 
thinking and of doubt, in order to show how far this doctrine could be regarded as the centre of 
faith even of modern man. From this TilUch developed his "protestant principle" which was to 
become significant for all his theology. This so-called "protestant principle" seeks to overcome the 
subjectivism of liberal theology by emphasizing that "Rechtfertigung ist ein Akt Gottes, der in 
keiner Weise vom Menschen abhangt"^^ n jg "(jje an keine Vorbedingung gekniipfte Vergebung 
der Sunden, sie hat den Charakter des 'trotzdem': Gott nimmt den an, der unannehmbar ist ... Der 
Mensch kann Gott keinen Anlass dafiir geben und gerade das muss er annehmen: er muss das 
'trotzdem' annehmen.'Er muss bejahen, dass er von Gott bejaht ist; er muss die Bejahung 
bejahen"'53 xhis is in strong opposition to every kind of ethical or liberal theology of the 19th 
century. By emphasizing that justification is the work of the revealed God alone Tillich joined the 
Theologie der Krisis. This expression was the keyword of the early dialectical theology. Together 
with Barth, Tillich agreed that every attempt to reach God conceptually was against his absolute 
transcendence and was doomed to failure, as well as every attempt to reach him by "the works of 
the law". This implied that religion, church, piety and traditional Christianity should be viewed in 
radically relative terms: the only reliable foundation for man was the revealed "protestant principle" 
of unconditional acceptance. In his later works acceptance and justification of man by God as 
52II, 205. 
53 Rolincic, p.37. 
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applied to modern autonomous man led TUhch to a critique of theistic concepts of God: such 
theistic concepts degrade man and humiliate him by positing an omnipotent supernatural being 
whose mere object man becomes. Thus man becomes estranged from what he should ultimately be 
concerned with, the ground of his own being, i.e. God as Being itself. Tillich hoped to make 
understandable the protestant message of unconditional acceptance by God by translating it into the 
language of existentialism and ontology: by becoming aware of himself in the ground of his own 
being, thus by becoming theonomous, man finally becomes actually autonomous, i.e. free and in 
totality what he or she really and essentially is and ever has been. This is for Tilhch the state of 
being justified by the gracious God, who does not force man into humiliating heteronomy, but who 
is in fact the real ground of man's being and therefore the source of true autonomy. 
This state cannot be realized or actualized by man but only by God; it is beyond any historical or 
human effort and thus a critique of everything which is not reliant on revelation alone. "Der 
Protestantismus als geschichtiiche Epoche kann an sein Ende gelangen, aber das protestantische 
Prinzip ist ewig, well es ein allgemein christliches Prinzip ist und dem Wesen des Menschen 
entspricht."^^ Tillich, however, saw the necessity to mediate the doctrine of the justifying God into 
the circumstances and into the self-understanding of 20th century man. That set him apart from 
Barth and the "dialectical theology" of the early years. TilUch tried to be radically "dialectical" and 
for him that meant to confront divine revelation with the questions of modern man and to answer 
the latter by the former. This is the basis for Tillich's famous concept of correlation, with which we 
will be concerned in more detail when considering the epistemological presuppositions of Tillich's 
Systematic Theology. 
54 Rolinck, p.39. 
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11.2.2 METHOD OF CORRELATION AND TILLICH'S EPISTEMOLOGY 
In order to give an adequate analysis ot Tillich's concept of salvation it is necessary to examine his 
epistemological presuppositions first. Not only is it a truism that one's hermeneutics and 
epistemology do shape the form of one's enquiry and thus also have great impact on a possible 
answer; in Paul Tillich's work epistemological questions have their own dignity and are not merely 
an epistemological framework. In his well known method of correlation he deliberately elevated the 
epistemological question to the level of a theological issue. Whereas other philosophers and 
theologians considered the so-called hermeneutic circle to be an unavoidable reduction of the 
objectivity of every intellectual statement, TUlich sees it as the one and only condition of 
understanding which is necessary and helpful and makes possible cognition and knowledge by 
applying the answer to the question: "der Mensch kann Antworten auf Fragen, die er nicht gestellt 
hat, nicht entgegennehmen."55 i ^ his concept of correlation the dependency of question and answer 
is made into a method with specific theological significance. 
A) The method of correlation 
The difficulty in every theology is that the questions which are inferred into theology do not only 
emerge from the theological context but are existential questions from man's daily Ufe. The answer, 
however, is to be conveyed from the source of revelation and that means that both "language 
games" have to be mediated in order to make possible mutual comprehensibility: "Die Theologie 
steht in der Spannung zwischen zwei Polen: der ewigen Wahrheit ihres Fundamentes und der 
Zeitsituation."56 The method of correlation, as the word indicates, is therefore understood as the 
unity of mutual dependency and independency of existential question and theological answer^ .^ 
Mutual independency means that neither the question can be derived from a possible answer nor 
can the answer be derived from the question. The answer, however, can be given only within the 
realm which the question defined. It is important to bear in mind, that for Tillich the existential 
question (if it is supposed to be a really existential one) is not a sort of objective enquiry but it is 
55 1,65. 
561,3. 
57 Rolinck, p.50. 
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man himselfi "Sein Sein selbst ist die Frage. Als Fragender nach seiner Existenz ist er auf sich allein 
gestellt. Er fragt 'aus der Tiefe' und diese Tiefe ist er selbst."58 Already here the most important 
perspectives (and limits) of Tillich's theology are obvious: if man's own being is the question, then 
any possible answer can come only from the realm of Being itself; otherwise it would not be an 
answer to the question. As man does not ask a question about something objective but perceives 
his own being to be the question, the answer must be found in his very being itself. Man's being, as 
far as it is a secret for him, is the starting point, the reason for the question. But being, in turn, is 
also the thing/or which is asked and if there is an answer then it must be Being itself. TilUch does 
not weary of stressing that "der Mensch ist die Frage, aber er ist nicht die Antwort"^^. On the 
other hand he must admit, that if the answer is to meet the question, its content must be man's 
being itself, i.e. it must be the realization of this very being, because a merely conceptual answer 
about man's being would not correspond to the fact that he does not only ask the question but 
himself is the question. 
Already here it is quite obvious how closely TiUich's approach is related to Heidegger's attempt to 
clarify the structures of Being itself transcendentally by analysing the structures of human existence 
in its interdependence with Being itself. 
B) Epistemology 
To mediate answer and question, TUUch developed in a second step a theory of knowledge which 
also already anticipates issues of his later theology. Epistemology tries to give a reasonable account 
of the relationship between subject and object, from which knowledge derives. For TUUch knowing 
is a form of union^^, namely a conceptual union between the regarding subject and the regarded 
object. But there must be a sort of common ground betweeen subject and object if cognition is 
supposed to be possible and successful. What does TUUch think this common share of subject and 





Most important is TiUich's idealistic^l starting point from which he sets out to answer the 
question. He presupposes that there is an identity of being and thinking. If cognition is supposed to 
be possible, then object and subject must participate in a common structure. TilUch finds this 
structure in his concept of "objective and subjective reason". Just as man's subjectivity is 
reasonable, so the world's objectivity must be thought to be shaped in a reasonable form. Only this 
identity conveys the possibiUty of comprehension: "Subjective reason is the rational structure of 
mind, while objective reason is the rational structure of reality which the mind can grasp and 
according to which it can shape reality"62. This "being shaped", however, points to an ontological 
implication of reason. The identity of thinking and being cannot be merely conceptual (then we 
would have a sort of inherent, necessary Anschauungsformen like Kant) but must be ontological: 
"Reason in both its objective and its subjective structures points to something which appears in 
these structures but which transcends them in power and meaning... It could be called the 
'substance' which appears in the rational structure, or 'being-itself which is manifest in the logos of 
being, or the 'ground' which is creative in every rational creation..."63. The common ground of 
objectivity and subjectivity which makes possible cognition and knowledge is the fact that both 
share in the same structure of the world; TUUch calls this structure "depth of reason" because it is 
beyond objective and subjective reason and because both point to this common root. Knowledge as 
a form of union or participation is therefore possible in principle. 
Knowledge is successful if the subject is able to grasp the essential structure of its object; essential 
structure is equated with the greek term "ousia" and means that which makes a thing what it is in 
itself: "Truth therefore is the essence of things as well as the cognitive act in which their essence is 
grasped. The term 'truth' is, lUce the term 'reason', subjective-objective. A judgement is true, 
because it grasps and expresses true being; and the really real becomes truth if it is grasped and 
expressed in a true judgement"^^ There are, however, very different opinions throughout the 
history of philosophy whether there is something lUce an "ousia" in things and in how far man is 
61 "I am an idealist if idealism means the assertion of the identity of thinking and being as the principle of truth. 





able to grasp it. Tillich states that both realism and nominalism are untenable if taken purely. Rather 
he develops a concept of "individualization and participation" which "solves the problem of 
nominalism and realism, which has shaken and almost disrupted western civiUsation"65. TilUch 
found a common ground of subject and object in the reasonable logos-structure of the world: "And 
we have stated that these correspond to each other, without, however, giving any special 
interpretation of the correspondence. Reason makes the self a self, namely a centered structure and 
reason makes the world a world, namely a structured whole. Without reason, without the logos of 
being the world would be a chaos, that is it would not be being but only the possibiUty of it (me 
on). But where there is reason, there is a self and a world in interdependence"^ 6 SQ ^^ e logos-
structure is what world and mind have in common and this common share is the precondition for 
cognition, as cognition is a form of union. 
It is, however, doubtful whether the mere fact of a common ontological share conveys the 
possibility of grasping the essence of a thing and getting to know what it is in itself. This is not 
necessarily impUed in the abstract terms of being and reason, unless one thought the essence of 
every being to be its utter "being-ness". This, however, would remove the possibiUty of cognition 
of the peculiarity of the single being as it is in itself different from another being. TilUch 
nevertheless claims that "every relation includes a kmd of participation"67. Again, however he does 
not discrinUnate between essential and ontological participation and relation. According to TilUch, 
man is related to every being ontologically and participates in it: "Man participates in the uruverse 
through the rational structure of mind and reality. Considered environmentaUy he participates in a 
very smaU section of reality... Considered cosmically he participates in the universe, because the 
universal structures, forms, laws are open to him. And with them everything which can be grasped 
and shaped through them is open to him. ... The universals make man universal; language proves 
that he is microcosmos. Through the uruversals man participates in the remotest stars and the 






TilUch uses the term "universal" in order to describe the way of participation in things. However, 
Tillich uses the term in a nominalistic sense, namely as a conceptual abstract (of language) by which 
we transcend the single being towards common qualities. But a nominalistic concept does not 
prove the possibiUty of knowledge: "According to nominalism, only the individual has ontological 
reality; universals are verbal signs which point to similarities between individual things. Knowledge 
therefore is not participation. "^9 TiUich's use of the term universal would fulfil his requirements of 
making posssible knowledge and cognition then and only then, if one thought "universal" in realistic 
terms, namely as the inherent "eidos" of the thing; in order to get to know the thing as it is in itself, 
one would have to grasp the inherent essence of it. TUUch himself, however, excluded this 
possibUity of a realistic approach by reducing the common ground between subject and object to 
the mere "being-ness". In order to get to know the inherent essence of a thing, one would have to 
know the essential idea of the thing, (which would be either anterior to or in the thing) and not only 
the mere being-ness or reasonable-ness of the thing. TUUch has not solved the problem of reaUsm 
and nominalism. Cognition and knowledge have not been deduced consistentiy from ontology. At 
last TilUch has to plea for a "mystical realism", which "emphasizes participation over against 
individualisation, the participation of the individuals in the universal and the participation of the 
knower in the known"^^. 
It is, however, important to bear in mind the essentials of TilUch's line of thought: thinking and 
being are identical, and therefore true cognition is possible. Being (with its mutual interdependence 
of subject and object) makes possible cognition and cognition (as it is participation) affects our 
being. It is possible to mediate and to change being by noetic processes, because every cognition 
means the becoming aware of previous ontological participation. Without having touched upon any 
specifically theological consideration of TUUch it is already clear where and how the question for 
salvation within TilUch's system is unfolded: man is the existential question for his own being. This 




in which the primordial kinship of man and being becomes conscious and through which the 
participation in being can be increased. 
II.2.3 THE HUMAN CONDITION 
TilUch now turns to the actual existence of man. The idea that man's being is the question he asks 
and that any possible answer can only be Being itself was a merely apodictical statement on which 
TiUich based his epistemological considerations. He now has to prove this presupposition of his to 
be an actual feature of human existence: Why must man's being be conceived as a question for 
being itself? 
A) Finitude and actual existence 
TilUch finds the corresponding feature to the question for Being itself in the problem of "fmitude" 
and man's existential anxiety before nothingness and death. Man is aware of his finitude and asks 
for the infinite as something which could overcome his finitude. Like Heidegger TUUch stresses that 
"Endlichkeit" is the main quality of human existence; it is "der erste und zugleich wichtigste Begriff, 
der im existentialphilosophischen Denken niemals fehlt"^!. "EndUchkeit" is characterized by 
"ZeitUchkeit" i.e. the fact that man's existence is bound to death, limited, finite. Man's attitude 
towards his own finitude is "care", Sorge. Care drives man to ask about his finitude. For TUUch the 
question of the finitude of one's existence includes an awareness of the infmite, otherwise man 
would not ask: "Man knows that he is finite, that he is excluded from an infinity which nevertheless 
belongs to him. He is aware of his potential infinity while being aware of his actual finitude. If he 
were what he essentially is, if his potentiality were identical with his actuality, the question of the 
finitude would not arise. "^2 ^or TUUch the question of fmitude has to be expressed in ontological 
terms, because finitude is indeed nothing else than actual nothingness, the non-being in the realm of 
being. "As the survey shows, the dialectical problem of non-being is inescapable. It is the problem 
71 TilHch: Wesen und Bedeutung des existenzialistischen Denkens, p.l77 (IV). 
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of finitude. Finitude unites being with non-being. Man's finitude or creatureliness is unintelUgible 
without the concept of non-being."^3 
Out of the question of finitude or of the question of non-being the issue of the mfinite and of God 
arises in a twofold manner. On the one hand the infinite appears as that which is always UnpUed in 
the question of finitude; on the other hand man in his anxiety (another major term of existentiaUsm) 
asks for something that enables hun to overcome his finitude or at least his anxiety of non-being: 
"The question of God must be asked because the threat of non-being, which man experiences as 
anxiety, drives him to the question of being, conquering non-being and of courage conquering 
anxiety. "^4 j^^n "must ask about that which gives him the courage to take his anxiety upon 
himself. And he can ask this double question because the awareness of his potential infinity is 
included in his awareness of finitude. "^ 5 SQ the existential question, which as TilUch said man was, 
is actually the question that searches for the infinity of his very existence. And as infinity means 
unconditional being, in distinction from non-being one expression of which is finitude, man's 
existential question is the question for being. 
God as Being-itself, however, cannot remain in utter transcendence. Rather must there be a 
previous awareness of God, i.e. of Being-itself, which precedes the question of man's finitude, 
otherwise man would not ask for it. Therefore TUUch concludes: "Being-itself manifests itself to 
finite being m the infinite drive of the finite beyond itself. "^^ The question of finitude proves that 
man's existence has a dialectical character. He is separated from Being itself as the ground of his 
being, and is nevertheless united with Being itself But how does TilUch think this indestructable 
ontological connection between man and the Being itself? 
The previous connection between man and Being itself can be expressed in the epistemological 
terms which we worked out m the chapter about TiUich's epistemology: man participates m the 
world through the identity of thmking and being. Man asks the ontological question because the 






through his objective reason. Now Tillich's thesis becomes very important on which indeed the 
whole of his further concept of salvation rests: not only can man ask the ontological question 
because of his participation in the world, rather he is even able to answer it because of the same 
reason: "Man occupies a pre-eminent position in ontology, not as an outstanding object among 
other objects, but as that being who asks the ontological question and in whose self-awareness the 
ontological answer can be founcf^. The old tradition - expressed equally by mythology and 
mysticism, by poetry and metaphysics - that the principles which constitute the universe must be 
sought in man is indirectly and involuntarily confirmed even by the behaviouristic restriction. 
'Philosophers of Life' and 'Existentialists' have reminded us in our time of this truth on which 
ontology depends. ... Man is able to answer the ontological question himself because he 
experiences directly and immediately the structures of being and its elements. "^^ 
Through the profound correspondence, even identity, of subjective reason and objective reason 
man takes part not only in being but even are the structures of being open to him. This is in fact the 
whole of Tillich's concept of salvation in nuce: i f man is threatened by non-being; and i f the only 
possibility for him to overcome the anxiety of non-being is his participation in Being itself; and if 
man already participates in Being itself through an act of his subjective reason: then the overcoming 
of the anxiety of non-being must mean an increase of participation in Being itself. As, however, 
one participates in Being itself through one's subjective, reasonable self-consciousness, an 
increasing participation in Being itself must be an increasing consciousness or awareness of one's 
participation in the being. Within Tillich's system this is perfectly consistent; as we saw, according 
to his epistemological presuppositions an act of cognition and knowledge means the ontic 
participation in the known. Therefore TilUch can conclude that "man is able to answer the 
ontological question himself, because he experiences directly and immediately the structures of 
being and its elements."^^ 




B) Existence and Essence 
Thus according to Tillich man's being must be conceived to be in a dialectical relation to Being 
itself. On the one hand man is united with it primordially, which can be seen by the fact that he is 
able to ask the question for Being itself, even to answer this question by himself. On the other hand 
he must be thought to be separated from Being itself, which can be seen by the fact that man has to 
ask for it because of his fmitude. Without understanding the dialectical nature of man's existence 
the whole of TiUich's concept of salvation wiU remain unintelligible. Now Tillich introduces a 
concept in which he tries to describe this very dialectical structure of man's being. He introduces 
the terms "existence" as opposed to "essence". He splits the unity of man's being into two and 
appUes two different terms according to the angle with which he perceives it: the idea that man is 
not fully united with Being itself leads Tillich to the assumption of an "essence" as the true nature 
of man, which is not fiiUy embodied in his actual existence. However, there is a real tension 
between Tillich's usage of the terms "essence" and "existence" and also in what they are supposed 
to indicate: according to the above-mentioned structure of human being, it must be considered to 
be basically dialectical. Through his terms "essence" and "existence", however, Tillich gives the 
impression that both are totally different ontological states: essence is the true being of man, but 
not yet actual; existence is the actual being of man, but not his true one: "He is aware of his 
potential infmity while being aware of his actual fmitude. I f he were what he essentially is, if his 
potentiality were identical with his actuality, the question of the finitude would not arise."^0 
Essence becomes mere potentiality, existence becomes mere actuality. The dialectical character of 
man's existence of being both united and separated from being itself has been neglected in favor of 
a merely dualistic understanding of it. 
Excursus: Schelhng's influence on Tillich 
In his differentiation between essence and existence Tillich takes up the classical idea of the status 
of man as one of alienation and estrangement^!. We showed how this old concept was treated in 
Hegel's philosophy where it was transformed into the shape in which it became the crossroads of 
every modern concept of salvation. Tillich's understanding of estrangement as the gap between 
801,220. 
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essence and existence, however, is based not so much on Hegel's but on Schelling's philosophy^2 
But ScheUing developed his concept in negative dependency on Hegel's attempt to prove the 
presence of the eternal, historical reconciUation of finite and infinite, world and ego, morality and 
humanity83. Hegel had represented a philosophy in which the difference between objective and 
subjective world was overcome in the thinking of the absolute by man. And a philosopher like 
Fichte had gone even further: he tried to derive the whole objective and subjetive world from the 
absolute ego itself. 
This has to be understood as a reaction against the epistemological dualism in Kant's Critiques. I 
already meantioned Hegel's criticism that Kant's ideas spUt up of the world into an unintelligible 
objectivity and a sheer subjectivity without any claim of objective cognition. The idea of an 
unintelligible "thing-in-itself seemed to be untenable to the idealistic philosophers as it made 
impossible true cognition of the world. 
So this duality had to be overcome by an entirely new theory of the relation of subject and object. 
Fichte started with the absolute ego, prior to any specific or definable thing, which posits itself as 
the ego. This activity of the absolute ego was the pre-eminent truth of Fichte's philosophy. The 
absolute ego also posits a non-ego, a field in which the ego can work and unfold its activity. By 
defining its own realm of activity the ego, however, has limited its possibiUties; thus "the conditions 
of finitude and definitions have emerged out of the undefineable ultimate self-activity of the infinite 
ego"84. 
This was Schelling's starting point for criticising Fichte. Being the philosopher of romanticism and 
individualism (before Kierkegaard), the fault he found with Fichte was that the individual 
personality necessarily ceases, i f it is equated with an absolute ego which posits itself. Morever, the 
fact that the ego posits not only itself but also the non-ego abolishes the freedom of the absolute 
ego, as the absolute ego is forced to posit the non-ego in order to be able to actualize the activity 
of itself. 
For Schelling, like for Kant, actual freedom was an act of WiUkur, which a priori presupposes 
something different from the self towards which the self turns. Schelling thought the antagonism of 
nature and mind to be this primordial differentiation: the mind is always mixed with the 
unconscious, in which nature is present. Thus the self is always confronted by something which it 
did not posit by itself. The being of man is a unity of ego and non-ego, i.e. mind and nature, the 
latter of which cannot be derived logically from the former. In man's being mind is always under the 
influence of something which is not itself. Through nature the self is estranged from its essential 
being to be purely itself. Man's being is split thus into essence and existence: "Es gibt, das sieht er 
nun, keine Ableitung der Existenz aus der Essenz in Form rationaler Notwendigkeit. Gabe es sie, so 
wurde die Existenz selbst essential sein, d.h. als Existenz aufgehoben sein, wie es bei Hegel in der 
Logik der Existenz der Fall ist."^^ 
Schelling explained the coming into being of the differentiations between essence and existence 
with a half-mythological theory about a "fall" from essence to existence. This is, however, not 
meant as historic event in the remote history of mankind. The stress is on the idea of a disruption 
and distortion within the realm of essence which makes it impossible to derive existence from 
essence logically without a break. This break was necessary for Schelling, in order to maintain his 
understanding of the free acting will and its Willkiir. Schelling's theory about the tension between 
essence and existence is not meant historically but is supposed to be an analysis of the actual 
82 However, Tillich explicitly admits that it was Hegel who discovered the principle of estrangement in all things. 
Tillich: Versohnung und Entfremdung im modernen Denken, p. 186 (IV). 
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powers that form life. We have already seen that the primordial distinction for Schelling was the 
tension of nature and mind: "Es ist die Spannung zwischen dem unbestimmten, formlosen 
Lebensdrange und dem bestimmten, geformten Element alles Lebendigen, die in der Potenzenlehre 
durchgefiihrt wird. Reiner Essentialismus kennt nur die zweite und nicht die erste Potenz, reiner 
Existentialismus kennt nur die erste und nicht die zweite Potenz."^^ The essence is the formed and 
determined element which makes a thing what it is in itself Existence is the Lebensdrang of nature 
which leads to the actualization and the coming into being of the essential element. So both belong 
together in order to constitute a being. Schelling did not think that the gap between both was 
absolute: "Er hatte den Satz Sartres, dass seine Existenz des Menschen Essenz ist, niemals 
annehmen konnen. Der Sprung zur Existenz bleibt im Rahmen der Identitat. Er ist kein Abbruch. 
Denn ein solcher wiirde konsequenterweise Denken und Handeln der totalen Willkiir 
iiberliefern..."^^. Existence is formed according to the essence of man and essence becomes real 
through the Lebensdrang. Both are united and separated in man at the same time. 
Tillich adopted large parts of ScheUing's distinction between essence and existence. However, in a 
detailed study of Tillich's ontology A.Thatcher has shown that Paul Tillich uses three different 
definitions to describe the nature of "essence". Firstly Tillich uses "essence" as the antecedent 
condition of existence. We came across this usage in Tillich's discussion of finitude. This is a mainly 
Aristotelian understanding of essence. Secondly Tillich uses "essence" in order to describe a sort of 
general property, i.e. as a nomen post rem, which is a phenomenon of human abstraction and 
language. We discussed its function already in TiUich's epistemology. This is a mainly nominaMstic 
understanding of essence. 
Thirdly Tillich uses "essence" as the ideal of what a thing essentially ought to be. This is a mainly 
platonic understanding of essence. Thatcher showed that this understanding is by far the most 
common one in Paul Tillich's works^^: "... TiUich's essences transcend the empirical world, they 
constitute a higher level of being which is realized only imperfectly within the realm of 
existence."^9 "Everything that is is the manifestation of an Essence. Essences actualize themselves 
in existence and in doing so they do not remain what they essentially are. They become distorted 
within existence and what emerges is the ambiguous actuality..."90. 
86 ibid. 
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It is important to bear in mind the above-mentioned fact, that TUUch changed his dialectic 
understanding of the nature of man's existence into a more dualistic one. Man's existence now is 
perceived as opposed to his true nature, his being united with being itself. 
C) Essence and Estrangement 
To illustrate the ontological relation between essence and existence TilUch now uses Schelling's 
idea of the fall into estrangement: "Der Fall des Menschen sowohl in christUcher wie auch in 
nichtchristlicher mythologischer Darstellung, ist die Voraussetzung der Existenz. Es gibt keine 
Existenz vor der Existenz und keine aktuelle WirkUchkeit vor dem Fall. Wir diirfen nicht die der 
Zeit verhafteten Symbole des Mythos mit der ontologischen Beziehung von Essenz und Existenz 
verwechseln."91 Existence is the unavoidable actualized form of the being of human beings. 
Essence is mere potentiality, the (onto-)logically necessary prior to our naked existence. Whenever 
this potentiality becomes actual it becomes existence. TUlich caUs this theoretical status of man 
"dreaming innocence" and compares its transition to existence with an awakening: "At the moment 
when man becomes conscious of his freedom the awareness of his dangerous situation gets hold of 
him. ... Man experiences the anxiety of losing himself by not actualizing himself and his 
potentialities, and the anxiety of losing himself by actualizing himself and his potentialities. He 
stands between the preservation of his dreaming innocence without experiencing the actuality of 
being and the loss of his innocence through knowledge, power and guilt... Man decides for self-
actualization, thus producing the end of dreaming innocence"^^ However, it is important to bear in 
mind that this is merely an illustration, which again uses half-mythological metaphors. TilUch thinks 
the whole world to be fallen, which is understandable because everything that is, is actual and 
therefore existing, while merely potentially being things are not reaUy things. However, the faU is 
caused by the coming into being of the self-consciouness of man, his "awakening". Within TiUich's 
system therefore there remains a certain ambiguity about whether the faU concerns only human 
nature (as it is the actualization of its freedom) or whether it is a universal destiny. 
91 Tillich: Die Lehre von der Inkarnation in neuer Deutung, p.213 (VIII). 
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As man's essential nature can be found only in being itself, i.e. God, Tillich's concept of self-
alienation and alienation from God converge. This resembles very much Hegel's concept of 
alienation which designates the split between man and God and means therefore both self-alienation 
and alienation from God. The importance of Tillich's concept of estrangement from God is 
understood only if it is understood as self-estrangement. Estrangement from an object which is not 
I myself "hat keine zerstorerischen Konsequenzen; aber eine unertragUche Situation entsteht, wenn 
Subjekt und Objekt der Entfremdung identisch sind; die Entfremdung wird zur 
Selbstentfremdung."93 The conditio humana is the condition of self-estrangement, the 
estrangement from essence. And as this also means the estrangement from God, Tillich uses the 
classical terminology of theology and calls this state the state of "sin". 
By his introducing the dualistic concept of essence as opposed to existence Tillich could claim 
that the essence of man cannot be found within the realm of his existence. Tillich seems therefore 
perfectiy consistent when he now concludes that only revelation can answer the question of man's 
essential being, the ontological question. However, we must see at what expense Tillich has 
achieved his aim of proving the necessity of revelation. Having started with a dialectical 
understanding of human nature Tillich could claim that "Man (!) is able to answer the ontological 
question himself because he experiences directiy and immediately the structures of being and its 
elements."94 By introducing the dualist principle of existence as opposed to essence Tillich now 
pretends that there might be a state in which man's alienation cannot any longer be overcome by an 
increasing self-awareness and awareness of Being itself but only by an exterior intervention from 
beyond the realm of existence, by a revelation. One has to keep this change, even contradiction in 
mind, because it becomes one of the main weak points of Tillich's whole system. 
93 Tillich: Versohnung und Entfremdung im modernen Denken, p. 184 (IV). 
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n.2.4 THE NEW BEING 
Thus Tillich has supposedly prepared the ground for his all-decisive doctrine of Jesus Christ as the 
revelation of the New Being. This New Being must appear as a revelation, because man's essential 
being cannot come from within the realm of existence. Moreover only a revelation conveys the 
possibiUty of everyone's participation in it by cognition, which is participation in the new Being 
itself. More precisely TUUch can say that this revelation must appear in a personal Ufe: "for 
humanity it could not have appeared in any other way. ... Only where existence is most radicaUy 
existence ... can existence be conquered."^^ In order to be recognizable as the true essence of man 
this true essence (as it is totally new and therefore unknown) must appear in the form of a human 
being. As it is, however, the new being which is to be revealed aU other more humane aspects of 
this human being have to be totally neglected: "It is his being that makes him the Christ because his 
being has the quality of the New Being beyond the split of essential and existential being. From this 
follows that neither his words, deeds, or suffering nor what is called his 'inner life' make hun the 
Christ. "96 However, TiUich's idea of the revelation of essential human nature in a person under the 
conditions of existence contains a contradiction. How can something be essential but nevertheless 
be actualized within existence, i.e. be existential? This contradicts TiUich's basic assumption that 
whatever is existent and actual cannot be essential and potential. To solve the problem, TiUich has 
to introduce his concept of the "paradox". 
A) Tillich's concepts of the "paradox" 
TilUch's concept of the paradoxical character of the New Being is not merely the attempt to come 
to terms with the unthinkable. Rather is it rooted in his whole concept of what religion is. 
According to TilUch the term "reUgion" contains a paradox in itself because it is the term for 
something which is destroyed exactly through this term. The "content" of reUgion is the 
unconditional and ultimate. The term "reUgion" however degrades the unconditional to a 
conditional because it deals wUl the ultimate as if it was an actual object. Nevertheless man must 
95 n, 138-139. 
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use terms like "religion" i f he wants to speak about it: "Die Aussage iiber das Unbedingte geschieht 
notwendig in den Formen des Bedingten, d.h. im Subjekt-Objekt-Schema und macht das 
Unbedingte damit zum Objekt. Sie muss diese ihre Unzulanglichkeit offenbar machen, d.h. sie muss 
die Form der Paradoxic haben."97 Every revelation of the ultimate and unconditional therefore 
necessarily transcends its own conditional limited form. It does not only transcend its form, but 
must even negate it. This is for Tillich one criterion of revelation: "A revelation is final if it has the 
power of negating itself without losing itself. This paradox is based on the fact that every revelation 
is conditoned by the medium in and through which it appears. "98 Tillich, however has to admit that 
"such criteria cannot be derived from anything outside the revelatory situation. But it is possible to 
discover them within this situation. "99 Therefore for Tillich the revelation of the New Being in a 
single human being is not an annoying contradiction which would better have been avoided. On the 
contrary, it is a characteristic mark of the revelation's rightness."Die letztgiiltige Offenbarung 
erscheint in der Form eines konkreten Absoluten."^00 
B) Christ as the New Being 
The paradoxical character of Jesus Christ as the New Being "consists in the fact, that although he 
has only finite freedom under the conditions of time and space, he is not estranged from the ground 
of his being." 1^1 The fact "that there is no passage in the gospels - or for this matter in the episties 
- which takes away the power ... of the New Being in the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ" 
seems to be Tillich's proof that Christ is the manifestation of the essential being. But how can we 
think of him as not being "estranged from the ground of his being"? 
As we saw, in order to reveal the ultimate and the unconditional, the form of the revelation has 
paradoxically to be transcended and to be negated. Indeed, for Tillich, this criterion is fulfilled as 
far as Jesus is concerned. Jesus' unselfish life and his death on the cross according to the will of the 
97 Rolinck, p.48. 
98 1,148. 
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Father "is his decisive test of his unity with God, of his complete transparency to the ground of the 
being." order to be the bearer of the New Being Jesus has to sacrifice himself totally and 
neglect everything which "is merely 'Jesus' in him"104 "jesus of Nazareth is the medium of the 
fmal revelation, because he sacrifices himself completely to Jesus as the Christ. He not only 
sacrifices his Ufe, as many martyrs and many ordinary people have done, but he also sacrifices 
everything in him and of him which could bring people to him as an 'overwhelming personality' 
instead of bringing them to that in him which is greater than he and they."105 order to become 
transparent for the ground of the being he has to give up himself completely. 
However, one might doubt whether one stUl can call Jesus Christ the paradoxical essentielle Gott-
Mensch-Einheit when everything that is human has to be neglected totally. In what way does Jesus 
reveal the essential being of man, when he has to sacrifice everything that is particularly human in 
him? According to TiUich's dualistic concept of existence and essence (which is presupposed i f he 
assumes a "paradoxical unity" of God and man in Jesus) it becomes impossible to say that by 
revealing true godhood Jesus reveales essential manhood: godhood and essential manhood are not 
identical, otherwise it would make no sense to speak of a paradoxical unity. TiUich's idea of the 
paradoxical character of revelation in Jesus becomes senseless, if he does not assume a reaUy 
paradoxical unity of godhood and manhood in Jesus. Nevertheless TUUch insists that in Jesus the 
essential god-manhood as ontological unity is revealed: "Das neue Sein, das eine Schopfung der 
Inkarnation ist, steht iiber dem essentiellen Sein, well es aktuell und nicht bloss potentiell ist und 
gleichzeitig steht es iiber dem existentieUen Sein well es essentieUes Sein oder essentielle Gott-
Mensch-Einheit in die Existenz bringt." 
At least here TilUch has left the dialectical concept of man's being as the ontological share of man 
and God: the idea of a paradoxical unity of Godhood and manhood makes sense only i f they are not 
ontologically identical. This, however, was the necessary implication of TiUich's idea that man's 
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presupposes the dualistic concept of essence and existence can one say that it is a paradox that the 
essence of man appears under the conditions of existence. Then, however, it becomes 
incomprehensible why Tillich thinks Jesus to be sacrificing everything that is human in him: exactiy 
this abolishes the paradoxical character of his essential "God-man" unity. 
The idea of becoming transparent towards God through a continuous self-sacrifice makes sense 
only if one endorses the assumption of a dialectical character to human existence: if human beings 
are ontologically united with being itself and i f it can therefore basically be found in man himself he 
must tend to sacrifice the more existential characteristics in him in order to become transparent for 
the more essential features which must, however, be supposed to be inherent in him. I f one 
presupposes the dialectical approach it also becomes understandable (and not only paradoxical) 
how Jesus can become the bearer of the New Being: according to TiUich's epistemological concept 
of cognition as ontological participation, Jesus could be considered as the bearer and revealer of the 
New Being in so far as on can assume that he is fully conscious and aware of his primordial 
essential unity with being itself 
But by introducing the concept of Jesus Christ as sacrificing everything human in him Tillich 
excludes this way of understanding the person of Christ. Going by the dualistic concept of 
existence as opposed to essence he has to claim that the unity of essential manhood and essential 
godhood is paradoxical. However, a paradox is, due to its very character, not open to reasonable 
understanding: the revelation and with it the ontological character of the person of Christ remains 
theologically unclear in Tillich's system. 
Either Tillich thinks self-sacrifice to be the means of revelation: then he would presuppose the 
dialectical approach towards human life and essential man-hood would be true godhood and vice 
versa. This would be compatible with Tillich's epistemological ideas. 
In his christological considerations, however, he introduces the category of the paradox and thus 
apparentiy thinks the paradoxical unity of manhood and godhood to be the main characteristic of 
revelation: then he would presuppose the dualistic approach towards human life and the idea of 
what essential man-hood actually is remains entirely empty and meaningless. 
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n.2.5 THE PROCESS OF SALVATION 
A) Historicity 
Though presupposing the idea of the "paradox" TUUch pursues the idea of Jesus' total self-
sacrifice through which Jesus becomes entirely transparent towards Being itself and by which he 
aboUshed everything which was merely human in him. 
A significant mark of the Christian religion and theology is that it is traced back to Jesus of 
Nazareth as a historical figure. There were attempts to reduce Christianity to a myth (gnosticism, 
D.F.Strauss) but they were not successful. Christianity claims to have historical roots and 
foundations. However, within TiUich's system this is quite impossible because if Jesus sacrificed 
everything which is human in him he also sacrificed the only thing which was historical in hUn. The 
historicity of Christianity is m danger of being dissolved into a sheer myth. However, only this total 
evaluation of every particularly historical and specifically individual meaning makes possible Jesus' 
universal effectiveness: "For us this means that in following hun we are liberated from the authority 
of every finite in hun, from his special traditions, from his individual piety, from his rather 
conditioned world view, from any legaUstic understanding of his ethics." ^ 07 How can this general, 
universal revelation be connected with the historical person of Jesus Christ? TUUch finds the answer 
in his understanding of cross and resurrection: cross and resurrection became symbol for what 
Jesus himself was, an essential human being under the conditions of estrangement (death on the 
cross) but who nevertheless conquered them through the power of his essential being 
(resurrection). This impUes that also the resurrection must have some historical truth in it: "The 
disciples had been convinced that the power of his being was that of the New Being; and on the 
other hand, they felt that Jesus' disappearance was inconsistent with the character of the bearer of 
the New Being. 'In this tension something unique happened. In an ecstatic experience the concrete 
picture of Jesus of Nazareth became indissolubly united with the reality of the New Being'. He is 
present wherever the New Being is present."^08 However, here TilUch wants to found the 
1071,149. 
108 Thomas, p.lOl. 
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historicity of Christianity on an "ecstatic experience" which on top of everything is also described as 
universal. 
TiUich has major problems in defending the historicity of Jesus Christ in his concept of 
christology, according to which Jesus is actually only the sheer God-hood under the conditions of 
existence. As according to Tillich's dualistic approach man's "essence" is totally un-existential, it 
seems to be also totally un-historical. Its only connection to reality seems to be its being 
experienced by individuals. However, as we saw above, Tillich uses "essence" in a platonic sense, 
which impUes that it is an entity of its own, which really is though not under existential conditions. 
The nature of the New Being is therefore a platonic one: it is not wnhistoric but ahistoric; its reaUty 
is a universal one but can be experienced only in the individual. 
Therefore TilUch now turns to the doctrine of atonement as: "The doctrine of atonement is the 
description of the effect of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ on those who are grasped by it in 
their state of estrangement." 1^ 9 
B) The doctrine of atonement 
He firstiy turns to the so called objective side of the doctrine, i.e. the doctrine in so far as God as 
the giver of justification is concerned. He therefore does not yet describe the actual effects of the 
New Being on the individual but their prerequisites and conditions. This however, carries some 
difficulties. Untill now TilUch had treated the classical theological lod in a highly philosophical and 
ontological way. In his "principles" he now tries to combine the results of his previous 
considerations with the classical phraseology of theology. However, he gets involved in this 
terminology so deeply that it often seems as if he takes up problems again which seemed to had 
been already solved. In his second and third principle, for instance, TilUch is concerned with the 
interrelation of justice and love in God, a problem which can arise only in a "theistic" theological 
framework but which has certainly no foundations in Tillich's ontological concept of God.^ 
109n,196 
110 cf. The Courage to Be and Tillich's attempt to overcome theistic concepts of God. 
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The more important principles are the last three ones. The fourth principle is according to TUUch 
the heart of a future doctrine of atonement: "The fourth principle for a doctrine of atonement is that 
God's atoning activity must be understood as his participation in existential estrangement and its 
self-destructive consequences. He cannot remove these consequences, they are impUed in his 
justice. But he can take them upon hUnseLf m participating in them and transforming them for those 
who participate in his participation." ^  This again raises some problems because of the 
terminology. TUUch admits that it is a "highly symboUc kind of speaking". To understand this one 
must "refer to what has been said in the section on God as the living, namely, the element of non-
being, which is eternally conquered in the divine life. This element of non-being, seen from inside, is 
the suffering that God takes upon himself by participating in existential estrangement or the state of 
unconquered negativity."^ ^ 2 
This is explained in the fifth principle: "The fifth principle of a doctrine of atonement is that in the 
Cross of the Christ the divine participation in existential estrangement becomes manifest. Once 
more it must be stressed that it is a basic distortion of the doctrine of atonement if, instead of 
saying 'becomes manifest', one says 'becomes possible'. On the other hand 'becomes manifest' does 
not only mean 'becomes known'. Manifestations are effective expressions not only communications. 
Something happens through a manifestation which has effects and consequences. The Cross of the 
Christ is a manifestation in this sense. It is manifestation by actualisation."! -^^  
In his sixth principle TUUch goes even further: It says that man participates in the atoning act of 
God by participating in the New Being, which means participating in the suffering of God. The 
suffering of God however is the power which overcomes creaturely self-destruction by 
participation and transformation. Participation in the divine participation, accepting it and being 
transformed by it, is the state of salvation. This is a quasi-mystical concept of a unity with God in 
suffering, which has nothing to do with Tillich's ontological concept of essence and existence. 
Untill now man's estrangement had been considered as an estrangement from his true essence 





paradoxical revelation of man's essence through Jesus Christ. The idea that Christ is the "effective 
manifestation" of an eternal ontological process is totally unexpected and not derived from TiUich's 
above-mentioned approach. Also the idea of God's suffering is quite inappropriate in the framework 
of Tillich's theology of essence and existence: it seems (as he gives no explanations but only sets up 
compulsory principles for future doctrines of atonement) as if he wanted to think the process of the 
paradoxical revelation of man's true essence from the point of view of God himself. In a very 
mythological way one then could say that the revelation of essential God-man-hood might mean for 
God the participation in man's estrangement. However, TUUch does not give any hermeneutical 
explanations of how to understand this "highly symboUc speaking". Therefore the connection with 
his more philosophical and ontological doctrine of God remains unclear. 
It also remains unclear in what sense TUUch here uses the concept of estrangement: if Jesus as the 
Christ reaUy is the "effective" manifestation of God's participation, which impUes the revelation of 
man's true essence, then why should man's estrangement not be overcome, as this estrangement 
was supposed to be the estrangement from his true essence? And if the estrangement itself is 
overcome, then why can the "self-destructive consequences" of it not be overcome? TiUich does 
not give any explanations; his principles are merely said affirmations of the fact. 
Having expounded the "objective" side of the future doctrine of atonement, he now turns to the 
subjective side, which deals with the appropriation of the beneficia Christi. the effects of the New 
Being on the individual. These considerations, however, lUcewise remain mysterious as TUUch again 
uses half-mythological language to expound his basic idea of a participation of God in man's 
estrangement. 
From man's point of view salvation is said to have a threefold character: participation m the New 
Being, acceptance by the New Being and transformation through the New Being. These terms are 
equated with the classical theological triad "regeneration-justification-sanctification". TiUich claims 
that: "The saving power of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ is dependent on man's participation 
in it. The power of the New Being must lay hold of him..." 114 j t important for TUUch to stress 
11411,204. 
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that "the objective reality of the New Being precedes the subjective participation in it"115 
However, it seemd as i f TUUch wanted to stress that this "objective reality" is by no means so 
objective as the term seemingly indicates. The objectivity is evident only for him who "enters it, and 
in doing so he participates" ^  16 j j j j s refers to TiUich's statement about the nature of Christ's work: 
"But he can take them (i.e.: the consequences of estrangement. A.S.) upon hunself by participating 
m them and transforming them/or those who participate in his participation." ^^'^ He obviously 
does not transform the consequences of estrangement themselves. 
Tillich discusses the "regeneration" as far as it is the presupposition of justification, m order to 
exclude any meritorious interpretation: "Justification in the objective sense is the eternal act of 
God, by which he accepts as not estranged those who are indeed estranged from him by guilt and 
the act by which he takes them into unity with him is manifest in the New Being in Christ." 11^ This 
is the act of divine acceptance to which corresponds the human act of "accepting that one is 
accepted." 119 TUlich never wearies of stressing that this is not possible for human beings but that it 
presupposes the being grasped by the New Being. 
At least the idea that the objectivity of the reality of the New Being precedes the subject's 
participation in it, turns out to accord with the main features of TiUich's theology in general: it goes 
well together with TiUich's above-mentioned concept that Christ himself is the actual paradoxical 
revelation of the New Being, not just a human being who gains his true essence by absolute self-
awareness. The New Being as man's true essence is supposed to be a platonic entity of its own. It is 
not a merely nominalistic term the reality of which is dependent on its being realized by the 
individuals. This is also presupposed in TiUich's considerations about the historicity of Jesus Christ. 
The reality of the New Being must be considered to be preceding the subjective participation in it. 
Another basic feature of TiUich's theology becomes relevant when he says: "Teilnahme am Neuen 
Sein ist nur moglich, indem man vom Neuen Sein aufgenommen wird, aber nicht indem man sich 
115 ibid. 
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bemiiht es selbst herzustellen."120 The individual can only be grasped by the New Being; it is not 
up to the individual's deliberate decision or its free will. This is related to TUUch's basic assumption 
of the revealed protestant principle "that in relation to God everything is by God" 121. Due to God's 
utter transcendence justification and salvation can by no means be achieved by man but are 
exclusively an act of God. Any meritorious misunderstanding is excluded from the beginning. 
However, one must again bear in mind that aU this still goes by the assumption of the dualistic 
principle of essence and existence. In a dialectical understanding of man's being where his true 
essence, i.e. being itself, can be found m his increasmg self-awareness, where cognition is 
ontological participation, the assumption of the protestant principle would be senseless. 
C) The effects of the New Being 
Tillich deals with the effects and the experience of the New being within the chapter "The Divme 
Spirit and the Ambiguities of Ufe". As he presumes the dualistic understanding of man's being 
TUUch calls human existence "ambiguous Ufe", as far as individual experience is concerned because 
it is torn apart between its being existence and its true essential nature. The quest for essence m this 
context becomes the quest for "unambiguous Ufe." 122 This "unambiguous Ufe" is made possible 
through the "Spiritual Presence", which means the divine Spirit, or the "actuaUty of the New 
Being". TUUch consistently uses the term "Spiritual Presence" to designate the presence of 
"unambiguous life". However, this term is a bit misleading as it is the description of a status only 
and does not pinpoint its connection to the New Being m Jesus Christ and the manner m which it 
proceeds from it. The fact that the relation between the symbolic manifestation of the New Being in 
Jesus and its actual presence in the human life is not clarified is a weak point within Tillich's system. 
For TUUch unambiguous Ufe reunites the separated realms of essence and existence; it is a 
"transcendent union" m which "ambiguous life is raised above itself to a transcendence which it 
would not achieve by its own power. "1^3 Again it is stressed that the New Being cannot be gained 





by man himself, but that it must be bestowed on him. According to Tillich the New Being is even 
"above the gap between essence and existence and consequently above the ambiguities of life." ^ ^4 
The characteristic mark of this "transcendent union" in which the ambiguities of hfe are united is 
that "it appears within the human spirit as the ecstatic moment which from one point of view is 
called 'faith', from an other 'love'". 1^ 5 paith and love now are defined with circular arguments. 
Faith is the "state of being grasped by the transcendent unity of unambiguous life - it embodies love 
as the state of being taken into that transcendent unity." ^ 26 A single page later "faith is the state of 
being grasped by an ultimate concern" and love is "the drive towards the reunion of the 
separate; this is ontologically and therefore universally true." 128 jt is difficult to understand what 
Tilhch means by these merely analytical statements. However, he becomes more precise when he 
states that the divine spirit's invasion of the human spirit (and with it its manifestations in love and 
faith) "does not occur in isolated individuals but in social groups, since all the functions of the 
human spirit - moral self-integration, cultural self-creation, and religious self-transcendence - are 
conditioned by the social context of the ego-thou-encounter."129 g^t how do love and faith come 
into this "Spiritual Community"? Tillich answers vaguely: "Christ's self-sacrificing love is the centre 
of the Gospels as well as their apostolic interpretation. This centre is the principle of agape 
embodied in his being and radiating from him into the world in which agape was and is known only 
in ambiguous expressions" 1 A n actual description of how the "radiating" is to be thought of is 
lackingl^l; "Latent or manifest the Spiritual Community is the community of the New Being. It is 
created by the divine Spirit as manifest in the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. This origin 
determines its character: it is the community of faith and love." 1^ 2 xhe relation between the New 
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unclear because Tillich does not develop an explicit dotrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit. 
The only connection seems to be a sort of structural similarity between Christ's (self-sacrificing) 
love and the love which can be experienced in the community of faith. 
Now Tillich does something, which allows him to overcome this gap between the revealed 
justification and revelation, a problem which had derived from the assumption of a basically 
dualistic understanding of man's being as existence as opposed to essence: Tillich implicitly 
reintroduces the principle of a dialectical understanding of man's being in order to show the 
possible connection of New Being and man's existence! 
Tillich asks what are the actual characteristics of the experience of the New Being for the 
individual as far as the New Being is present in the Spiritual Community in faith and love. He 
presupposes: "'Experience' here simply means the awareness of something that happens to 
somebody, namely the state of being grasped by the Spuitual Presence. 33 n indicative for 
Tillich that he uses the opaque term "awareness" designating both the different grades of self-
consciousness and the experience of empirical things. This gives him the possibility to combine both 
meanings. For Tillich a further question follows: "If the Spiritual Presence must grasp me and 
create faith in me, what can I do in order to reach such faith? ... No answer can be given to him 
who asks in this way, because every answer would tell him something he should do or be; it would 
contradict the faith for which he asks." ^ 34 Tillich's purpose is obvious: according to the protestant 
principle "that in relation to God everything is by God" ^ 35 he again claims the impossibiUty to 
reach God by one's own means. Faith and experience of the Spiritual Presence can be actualised 
only by an act of the grace of God and not by a self-preparation of man. Now Tillich continues: 
"If, however, the question - what can I do in order to to experience the New Being - is asked with 
existential seriousness, the answer is implied in the question, for existential seriousness is evidence 
of the impact of the Spiritual Presence upon an individual."(!)^36 jjej-g Tillich's change from the 






implies the answer. The awareness of one's own existential situation is already the evidence for the 
Spiritual Presence. These are ideas which Tillich developed within the framework of his 
epistemology. Tillich explicitly says: "He who is ultimately concerned about his state of 
estrangement and about the ground and the aim of his being is already in the grip of the Spiritual 
Presence." 137 xhe necessary conclusion was and now is again: as due to his finitude every human 
being is conscious of his existential state, every human being must be thought to be in the Spiritual 
Presence already. In the last analysis that means that everyone who is concerned about his existence 
ultimately is already in the New Being, and thus must be considered to be in the state of salvation. 
The awareness of the necessity of being saved fErlQsungsbediirftigkeit) is salvation! 
The concept itself is just the consistent expounding of what Tillich had said in his epistemology 
already: "Man occupies a pre-eminent position in ontology ... as the being who asks the ontological 
question and in whose self-awareness the ontological answer can be found."^38 Tillich's U-turn 
from his christology based on the concept of revelatory theology back to his epistemology based on 
a sort of natural theology is complete. 
Consistently he continues with the "Experience of the New Being as a process" according to the 
idea that salvation as awareness is never a stable state but the process of "increasing awareness". 
He gives "four principles determining the New Being as a process", the first of which is: self-
awareness. "One may give the following principles: first, increasing awareness; second, increasing 
freedom; third, increasing relatedness; fourth, increasing transcendence. How these principles will 
unite in a new type of Ufe under the Spiritual Presence cannot be described before it happens, but 
elements of such a life can be seen in individuals and groups who anticipated what may possibly lie 
in the future. The principles themselves unite religious as well as secular traditions and can, in their 
totality, create an indefinite but distinguishable image of the 'Christian life'". ^ 39 
The second principle does not help very much either: increasing freedom means liberation "from 






circular argument. TilUch combines this idea with the Lutheran discrimination between "law" and 
"gospel": "Freedom from the law is the power to judge the given situation in the Ught of the 
Spiritual Presence..." 141. if, however, the Hght of the Spiritual Presence reveals nothing but 
"increasing freedom" then freedom becomes an end in itself It seems as if TiUich wanted to stress 
the aspect of autonomy in man's hfe. But in his four principles it is just an "autonomy from" not an 
"autonomy for" something. 
The third principle is the principle of "increasing relatedness" which balances the principle of 
"increasing freedom". Relatedness for Tillich means the ability to sustain relationships to others and 
to oneself in a mature balance of ego and thou. It also implies "self-relatedness" which is equated 
with "search for identity" and reaches its fulfilment in a mature self-acceptance, the state of 
"reconcihation betweeen the self as subject and the self as object." 142 identity as the overcoming 
of alienation is thus an aim of the process of salvation. 
The fourth principle is self-transcendence. Again Tillich argues circularly: "The self-transcendence 
which belongs to the principles of sanctification is actual in every act in which the impact of the 
Spiritual Presence is experienced." 1^ 3 Self-ti-anscendence is the underlying principle for the three 
previous ones. It is the drive beyond the merely actually given into the depth of everything which is 
the Being itself. Therefore Tilhch can say: "self-transcendence is identical with the attitude of 
devotion towards that which is ultimate." 144 
Tillich concludes: "The Christian life never reaches the state of perfection - it always remains an 
up-and-down-course - but in spite of its mutable character it contains a movement towards 
maturity, however fragmentary the mature state may be." 145 if one wants to reconcile Tillich's 
christology and his epistemological preconditions one can possibly summarize his system as 
follows: Increasing awareness of the New Being (being itself) overcomes the ambiguities of life and 
the gap between essence and distorted existence. In short, the effect of the New Being is an 







meaningful only when applied to Tillich's idea that awareness is ontological participation. 
Nevertheless, however, a concrete description of what the content of the New Being and the 
essence of man really is, is still lacking. The terms "identity" and "maturity" only indicate the 
direction of Tillich's ideas about the state of salvation. 
II.2.6 CRITIQUE 
The main objection against Tillich's theology as a theological system has already become evident 
in the course of the discussion: before any substantial anthropological or theological issue it is the 
question of Tillich's epistemology which should concern us here. One can ask, whether Tillich's 
method of correlation is an appropriate hermeneutical means. Its presuppositions, which are not 
questioned by Tillich, are numerous and far-reaching: the main presupposition is that any answer 
can only be given within the realm which the question defined. Tillich's second apodictical 
presupposition is his idea that man asks for Being itself, even that his own existence is in itself the 
quest for being. According to his first principle any possible answer to this question must be Being 
itself. By correlating the answer to the question, Tillich necessarily predefines every answer through 
it: if man asks for being the answer must be being. Every other answer which might for example 
question the legitimacy of man's question itself is instantiy excluded (Karl Barth is an excellent 
example of a theology which is based on this hermeneutical principle). The whole theological 
problem is immediately reduced to the quaestio facti. whereas the quaestio juris remains totally 
neglected. Even the answer for the quaestio facti. however, is already predefined by Tillich when he 
says that man asks for being itself. 
This implies a further difficult problem: through his method of correlation Tillich implicitly 
presupposes that for every question there is also actually an answer! By correlating answer and 
question Tillich not only predefines the content of the answer, he also presupposes the actual 
existence of this answer and the possibility to apply it to the question. So in Tillich's system from 
the very beginning the die is cast: man is the question for being, therefore the answer is Being itself 
and this being can be applied to man: otherwise Tillich's whole theological enterprise becomes 
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totally senseless. The only remaining question is how being can be mediated. Its possibihty had been 
postulated by necessity. 
Without any actual reference to particularly theological concepts, Tilhch now develops the answer 
to the question in his epistemology. Tilhch presupposes the idea of the "depth of reason", which is 
the common root of subjective reason and objective world order. Again the concept of correlation 
has simply been applied: Tillich does not derive the idea of the depth of reason. He presupposes it, 
otherwise the. possibility of any true knowledge could be questioned and his whole epistemology 
would break down. He presupposes the idea because he needs it. Only this idea conveys the 
possibihty that true cognition as the real cognition of the essence of a thing is possible. TiUich now 
describes this epistemological process in ontological terms: true cognition becomes participation in 
the essence of its object. Tilhch reverses the line of arguments and says that participation in the 
object is possible through true cognition. Apphed to man's question for Being itself that means that 
man only has to understand Being itself and he will then participate in it. Thus the question of 
"how" man can participate in Being itself is half answered. The only question remaining is: where 
can man find Being itself, in order to get a true cogniton of it, in order to participate in it? 
One can ask whether Tillich's way of proceeding so far is very convincing: m the course of his 
considerations Tilhch "introduces presuppositions" whenever they are convenient. And his only 
implicit argument is that unless one agreed also on this point the whole attempt of his theology 
would become pointiess. From a epistemological point of view one has to say that indeed this 
proceeding is methodologically untenable. 
Tillich now turns to the analysis of human existence and here the kinship to Heidegger's existential 
analysis becomes obvious: like Heidegger Tillich states that man's quest for Being itself becomes 
evident in his anxiety before death and nothingness. TilUch points out that the anxiety of 
nothingness is the main feature of human existence. Man asks for Being itself in order to be able to 
overcome his finitude. Even this resembles Heidegger's considerations about the relation of Dasein 
and Being itself: by anticipating its own finitude as its ultimate possibihty Dasein becomes aware of 
its own ontological structure. It becomes "eigentlich" and thus its own being is tinly revealed to it. 
However, Heidegger stressed that Eigentiichkeit did not serve the purpose of overcoming the 
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anxiety before death. Rather he said: "Das Man lasst den Mut zur Angst vor dem Tode nicht 
aufkommen ... Versuchung, Beruhigung und Entfremdung kennzeichen aber die Seinsart des 
Verfallens"146 Being "eigentiich" means to admit the anxiety before death and to recognize in it 
the ultimate potentiality of one's own being. 
Tilhch applies his epistemological principle "true cognition is participation" and concludes: as man 
himself is the question for being itself one has to assume that man already participates with his 
being in Being itself to a certain degree, otherwise he would not be able to ask for it. This is 
because every question presupposes at least the cognition of the possibility of the existence of what 
is asked for. As, however, cognition is participation, man already participates in Being itself 
through his own being. Tillich therefore can finally conclude that man only has to develop an 
increasing self-awareness, in order to participate in Being itself; because an increase in cognition 
necessarily means an increase in participation and as man finds being itself in his own being, he only 
has to become increasingly self-aware: "Man is able to answer the ontological question himself, 
because he experiences directly and immediately the structures of being and its elements." ^ '^ ^ 
Besides all hermeneutical and epistemological questions one may put, one must ask two questions 
which arise immanently in Tillich's system: 
First Tillich does not develop any categories for what is "true cognition". Though he starts with 
the assumption that "true cognition" is "essential participation", in the course of his arguments he 
ends with the presupposition that any cognition is already participation, for example also the 
"cognition" which is inherent in a question. This is the method of correlation at its very best: the 
existence of everything and man's ontological participation can be presupposed as far as man asks 
for it! 
Secondly, one must ask whether Tillich's answer meets the standards his question set up. He 
presupposed that man asks for being itself in order to be able to overcome the anxiety of non-being 
and death. One might doubt whether "increasing self-awareness" really has the desired 
psychological effect. 
146 cf. footnote 43. 
147 1,187. 
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Actually TiUich's system faces an even greater problem at this point: no matter whether it is true 
or false, consistent or inconsistent, logical or illogical, it is complete and finished. Nothing more has 
basically to be added in order to fuUiU the presuppositions which TUhch had set up. Without even 
having touched religious concepts TilUch has set up a whole ethical-ontological anthropology 148. 
Nothing more is really necessary and therefore in his system nothing more is possible. TilUch has, 
roughly speaking, to introduce the necessity of a religious turn in his concept in order to be able to 
examine its possibilities. And he does so by the above-mentioned shift from the dialectical 
understanding of man's being to a dualistic understanding. Strictiy speaking TUhch has to neglect 
the presuppositions of his epistemology in order to constitute a state of human hfe, in which any 
mediation of true being can come only from outside. This, however, is exactly contradictory to the 
dialectic approach, which was the necessary condition for the theory that man, though he has to ask 
for Being itself and thus shows his being estranged from Being itself, can nevertheless fmd Being 
itself in himself, as he dialectically must be thought to be united with it, due to that fact that he 
could not ask for it if he had no primordial knowledge of it. And as cognition is participation, man 
is dialectically both united with Being itself and estranged from it. However, TilUch now claims 
man to be in the state of mere estrangement, into which the overcoming of esti-angement, his true 
essence, can come only from a realm outside man's existence. 
Here Tilhch fmaUy leaves the heideggerian concept of existence: in Heidegger's philosophy a 
realm outside existence is quite impossible due to the ontological character of Dasein. Being 
cannot be transcended to anywhere because being is the most uruversal of aU categories. Here it 
becomes obvious that TilUch may well be influenced by Heidegger's analysis of actual human 
existence, but that he was not willing to give up SchelUng's "essence" as the transcendental 
condition of existence. However, as TilUch had presupposed a mainly existentiahst view of human 
existence it seems as if here into TiUich's theology a new feature was introduced. The idea of a 
supernatural revelation only occured in his "protestant principle" which he supposed to be 
unconditional. However, in his theological system, which could be considered to be a sort of 
natural theology, there had been no real place for the category of revelation so far. It seems as if 
148 This ethical-ontological concept might even better be expressed in Tillich's Courage to be. 
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this was the reason for his withdrawing this category from theological discourse by pointing to its 
putative "paradoxical" character. Through this characterization, however, both its nature and its 
possibility are disguised rather than explained. I already pointed out the inherent difficulties of 
Tillich's christology above. 
A further point which has to be stressed is the question, what Jesus Christ as the New Being 
actually reveals. Man's question to which this revelation was supposed to be the correlating answer 
was the quest for being in order to overcome the anxiety of nothingness. If TUMch does not 
anymore go by the assumption of a dialectical character to man's life, he cannot claim that the 
content of Jesus' revelation is that which can be found in every human being, namely awareness. 
Rather must he set up an actual content of this revelation which differs from man's existential 
conditions, because the revelation is supposed to reveal essential being, which is not found in man's 
existence. 
However, this most important point of Tillich's system remains hollow and empty. Jesus does 
nothing but sacrifice himself in order to become transparent for the ground of his being. Being 
itself. But what is revealed through this transparence of Jesus? The fact that TUlich does not and 
cannot give any concrete details of man's essence is connected with his existential approach: by 
presupposing that man's actuality is mere existence and thus not what it ought to be, he devalues 
the whole of actual human life. However, as there is nothing else but exactiy this actuality in this 
world, Tillich cannot but define the essence of man only e negative as that which is different from 
man's actual existence. The strong emphasis on the all-decisive revelation consistentiy implies that 
this actual world becomes inferior, though no one can say, what the actual content of revelation is. 
TilUch has switched from his former approach of natural theology to a revelatory theology in 
order to combine his anthropological-ontological concept with specifically christian concepts. 
However, once again he is forced to switch: in order not to remain within a totally empty, 
apodictical claim of revelation, he has to show the actual connection of Jesus Christ as the New 
Being with the experience of the individual. I showed above how he does so by reintroducing the 
dialectical character of man's being. Finally Christ as the New Being does not reveal anything but 
what is always already actual in man; or the other way round, the New Being must be assumed to 
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be universally actual in man's existence. Consistently the question arises why man is still looking for 
something to overcome his anxiety which, according to TiUich, stems from his unessential, 
existential state of being. 
As one can see: TiUich's system is founded on rather dubious and weak epistemological 
presuppositions, which already expressis verbis imply the outcome. From there he develops a 
merely anthropological system which has nothing to do with traditional christian dogmatics. He 
then changes his presuppositions and develops a traditional revelatory theology. By again 
changing his presuppositions he connects it with his anthropological approach. Nevertheless, even 
his excursion into dogmatic theology does not help to make his claim more realistic, that salvation 
is universally actual wherever it is being asked for. 
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11.3 K A R L R A H N E R 
n.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A) Biographical note 
Karl Rahner was born on March 5th 1904 in Freiburg/Breisgau where he attended the 
Gymnasium. After having done his Abitur in 1922 he immediately joined the Society of Jesus in 
Tisis near Feldkirch as a novice, as his brother Hugo had done some years before. He stayed there 
untiU September 1924 and moved then to the Philosophische Hochschule Berchmannskolleg in 
PuUach near Miinchen where he stayed untiU 1929 in order to complete his studies in philosophy. 
From 1929 till 1933 he was in Valkenburg (near the Dutch border) for further philosophical 
education and training. Returning to St.Andra in Austria, in 1933 the final phase of his 
Ordensstudium began, the Terziat, the spiritual preparation for the final vows. The order now 
wanted Rahner to teach philosophy at the Berchmannskolleg. But in order to do so he had to hold 
a doctorate. Therefore Rahner was sent to the University of Freiburg in 1934 to do a doctorate in 
philosophy. His supervisor was Martin Honecker, a neo-thomist philosopher, but in fact Rahner 
studied with Martin Heidegger, by whom he was to become deeply influenced. Rahner wrote a 
dissertation on epistemology in Thomas Aquinas which, however, was not accepted by his 
supervisor in 1936. (However, this dissertation was pubUshed with the title Geist in Welt in 1939 
and turned out to be one of Rahner's most famous books). Having failed his doctorate in 
philosophy Rahner was send to Innsbruck in order to take a theological doctorate (E latere Christi. 
Eine Untersuchung iiber den typologischen Sinn von Jo 19.34) and was appointed Privatdozent for 
metaphysics. 
However, due to the German invasion of Austria the faculty of theology of Innsbruck University 
was dissolved by the Nazis. After a short time as a professor at the Jesuit College in Innsbruck, 
Rahner left for Vienna in 1939 where he was to become lecturer at the Vienna Jesuit College. 
During this time (1941) he wrote his famous book Horer des Wortes. He stayed in Vienna till 1944 
when he became a parish priest in southern Bavaria. After the end of the war he finaUy became 
professor at the Berchmannskolleg in Pullach. He stayed there tUl 1948 when he was sent back to 
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Innsbruck to teach dogmatics and history of dogmatics as the successor of F.Mitzka. From this 
time stems his new edition of the Lexikon fiir Theologie und Kirche. Sacramentum Mundi and the 
Kleines theologisches Worterbuch. In 1962 he was invited by the Archbishop of Vienna to become 
his theological counsellor and expert and to join him at the Vatican Council I I . Soon Rahner 
became one of the most influential figures of the "Theological Commission" and his personal 
influence on the constitutions Lumen Gentium. Dei Verbum and Gaudium et spes cannot be 
overestimated. 
In 1964 he succeeded Romano Guardini in his chair for Christhche Weltanschauung und 
Religionsphilosophie in Munich. In 1967 he was called to the University of Miinster. This however, 
was to be a short episode only because in 1971 he was given emeritus status and returned to 
Munich where he Uved in the Berchmannskolleg untiU 1981. Here he wrote the book which was to 
spread his fame beyond the borders of catholic theology and which is certainly his best known: 
Grundkurs des Glaubens. a systematic summary of his life's work. Finally in 1981 he moved back to 
Innsbruck and died there on March 30th 1984, being the most influential catholic theologian of the 
20th century. 
Karl Rahner's work is extraordinary in several aspects: firstiy because of its volume: it covers 
several thousand titles; secondly because of its broad variety: Rahner was concerned with virtually 
every aspect of theology and society. But most astonishing is the fact, that his work did not 
undergo a long process of development in which his ideas would have been moulded and shaped 
so that one cannot speak of a mature Alterswerk in contrast to Jugendschriften as with Barth or 
TiUich. From the beginning in Geist in Welt the main features of Rahner's theology are already 
present and they changed only slightly in emphasis. Whereas from the beginning Rahner was deeply 
concerned with epistemology the stress shifted towards philosophical anthropology in his later 
years. However, both have always been connected in his works, so that one cannot really speak of 
a break in his line of thoughts. 
In order to ease a preliminary survey of the whole of his work one could say that Rahner was the 
theologian who led catholic theology into the 20th century by introducing a modern concept of 
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human existence into dogmatic theology. He did this by developing a transcendental epistemology 
to which he subordinated traditional dogmatic contents: by analysing the universal a priori 
structures of human understanding and positing them as the starting-point of his understanding of 
human existence, he introduced and developed a theology which is both truly anthropological and 
existential 149. Thus there is an inherent connection between Rahner's epistemology and 
anthropology. 
In order to understand the unfolding of Rahner's theology one now has to trace back the sources 
of his two most influential concepts, i.e his epistemology and his anthropology. I stressed already 
above Rahner's being dependent on Heidegger's analysis of human existence as far as his 
anthropology is concerned. His epistemology, however, was originally neo-scholastic. 
B) Joseph Marechal and "transcendental thomism" 
While Rahner was a student at the Berchmannskolleg he discovered the Belgian philosopher and 
Jesuit Joseph Marechal and read his Le point de depart de la metaphysique. In 1926 Marechal 
published his Cahier V which contains a system of metaphysics in critical discussion with Kant's 
Critique of pure Reason but based on the epistemology of Thomas Aquinas. 
Thomas Aquinas stated that the intentional intellectus agens had to be thought of as the main 
factor in human understanding, whereas Kant had mainly pointed to the passive receptivity of the 
human mind in which the phenomena are subdued to categories and Anschauungsformen by 
Schemata. However, Kant was unable to explain how the transcendental subject can "categorize" 
the phenomena and assign them to the appropriate schemata in order to subordinate them to the 
categories which make them comprehensible: "Dieser Schematismus unseres Verstandes, in 
Anschaung der Erscheinungen und ihrer bloBen Form, ist eine verborgene Kunst in den Tiefen der 
149 This methodological connection of anthropology and Rahner's abstract transcendentalism is a point which is 
often overlooked by many of his critics as for example by P.D.Murray, who pleas for an empirical approach in order 
to ground theological sentences in human experience. He does not see that exactly this would dissolve theology into 
anthropology or psychology, whereas Rahner developed an anthropological starting point for theology, namely the 
ground for an understanding of revelation in every human being. 
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menschlichen Seele, deren wahre Handgriffe wir der Natur nur schwerlich jemals abraten, und sie 
unverdeckt vor Augen legen werden." ^ 50 
With Thomas, Marechal stressed the necessity that knowledge should in general be understood as 
an act of the subject. Marechal's critique of Kant was, that Kant himself in examining the a priori 
structures of knowledge had always implicitiy presupposed the dynamics or intentionality of the 
transcendental subject, which in itself must be prior to any merely formalistic categories in order to 
apply the phenomena to them. The transcendental subject must be thought of as primarily 
"dynamic" or "agens". 
Thomas understood the process of knowledge as followsl^^: singular things consist in materia 
and the principium individuationis. that which shapes the things into the form through which they 
are defined to be what they are, such as a tree instead of a mouse. Through this inherent "form" 
matter becomes individualized. This form necessarily conveys the species impressa sensibHis. that 
which is receiveded by the senses. From this species impressa sensibUis the intellectus agens 
abstracts a certain feature, namely the abstract quidditas or "what-ness" of the things (e.g. the 
"being-a-tree", or "tree-ness"). The species impressa sensibUis becomes species impressa 
intelligibilis. Through another act of the intellect this abstracted species impressa intelhgibilis is now 
put into words and it is only in this form of species expressa intelligibilis that the content of sense-
data can become the content of consciousness. The main difference from Kant is Thomas' idea, 
that, though nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu. the intellectus agens has to go, and can 
go, beyond the mere sense data in order to abstract the species impressa intelligibilis. the what-ness 
of the thing, which in itself is not recognizable in the disparate phenomena of the things. Thomas 
thinks the categories which allow us to categorize the phenomena to be "beyond" the object and 
subject, instead of inside the subject like Kant did. 
Marechal thought that this transcending beyond the "phenomena" of beings is possible because 
human cognition stretches out for Being itself, which is beyond the actual, individual phenomenon 
of single things. Marechal thought that the formal object of human cognition is Being itself, which 
150 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p.200 (A141/B180). 
151 According to Vass. 
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underlies the knower as well as the known. True cognition is possible because knower and known 
previously share in the same reality of being. Therefore it becomes senseless to keep on speaking of 
"mere phenomena" in contrast to "noumena", like Kant did. The actual content of our cognition is 
the thing as it really is because teleologically the intellectus agens is heading for Being itself, which 
underlies all beings. And as the intellectus agens is thus connected with things as they are, it is able 
to abstract from the species impressa intelhgibUis which is as they are. Certainly, the object is not 
itself the. content of the intellect but only its abstract "species" (i.e. Kant's phenomenon). However, 
the species is exactiy like the thing (noumenon) from which it is actively taken by the intellectus 
agens. Thus the result of Marechal's considerations is his claim that Being itself is both condition 
and goal of human cognition. 
Using Thomas' concept of the intellectus agens and the idea of the Being to which the inteUect 
streches out, Marechal thought he had estabhshed a metaphysics which went beyond kantian 
restrictions. Rahner was deeply influenced by Marechal's epistemology and in fact Rahner's 
approach in the Grundkurs des Glaubens is neither thinkable nor understandable without this idea 
of Marechal's. 
n.3.2 BASIC PROBLEMS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
It is reasonable to examine Rahner's concept of salvation according to his book Grundkurs des 
Glaubens. This book has the advantage of being the only more extensive theological work of 
Rahner in the form of a systematic approach; for the most part Rahner's theological oeuvre consists 
in theological dictionaries and hundreds of scholarly essays. So Grundkurs des Glaubens can be 
considered to be Rahner's summa - in spite of its understating title. 
A) "Selbstverstandnis" 
From the very beginning Rahner makes clear, that his book is supposed to be a Lehrbuch. Its 
external cause is the papal decree Optatam totius which demands that "die kirchhchen Studien mit 
einem ausreichend langen Einfiihrungskurs beginnen (soUen. A.S.)"152. More precisely it is stated: 
152p.l5. 
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"In diesem Einfiihrungskurs soli das Heilsmysterium ... dargelegt werden."^53 This is the task 
Rahner wants to take over, however, not in the form of a traditional catechism which only repeats 
the dogmatic formulae: "Theologie ist echt verkundbare Theologie nur in dem Masse, wie es ihr 
gelingt, mit dem gesamten profanen Selbstverstandnis des Menschen, das dieser in einer 
bestimmten Epoche hat, Kontakt zu finden, ins Gesprach zu kommen, es aufzugreifen und sich 
davon in der Sprache, aber noch mehr in der Sache selbst befruchten zu lassen.''^ ^^ More precisely 
Rahner states that it is necessary for theology to make its statements in the form of philosophical 
anthropology "und jeder ist dann gefragt, ob er sich als der Mensch erkennen konne, der hier sein 
Selbstverstandnis auszusprechen versucht, oder ob er verantwortlich vor sich und seinem Dasein 
die iiberzeugung als seine Wahrheit setzen kann, dass er ein solcher Mensch nicht ist, wie ihn das 
Christentum ihm zusagt" 1^^. 
These two preliminary sentences open up the horizon within which the whole of Rahner's 
theology is placed. The implications of these few lines mark out the aspects and the limits of 
Rahner's approach: 
Firstly Rahner knows and presupposes that there is a gap between profane self-understanding and 
the christian message. 
Secondly his consequence is not to condemn the secular self-understanding, but to try to mediate 
it with the christian idea of man. 
Thirdly for Rahner this impMes that this mediation must have the form of a critical examination of 
the christian tradition: in order to be acceptable for modem man, the message with which he is to 
be confronted has to meet his prerequisites, i.e. it must be intellectually honest, critical and 
philosophical. 
Fourthly Rahner's statement implies, that the theological interpretation of man can only be 






Here the hermeneutical limit of Rahner's approach comes into sight: it is the human self. 
According to Rahner's definition the task of theology is to speak about human self-understanding 
and to change it by offering a different and better striking interpretation of what man is. The 
difficulty, however, is that even this different interpretation is e negativo dependent on the self-
understanding of secular man. As it must be possible for secular man to identify himself with the 
different interpretation of himself this interpretation must describe him as he himself might conceive 
himself I f it were totally different from his own secular self-understanding it firstly could not claim 
to describe him as he really is and secondly secular man could not identify himself with it. Thus the 
possibilities for a real change of self-understanding are narrowed by the fact that secular man stUl 
must be able to recognize himself in this new interpretation. It must not describe anything but the 
previous self itself in order to be acceptable by this self Therefore the structure of the human self is 
the hermeneutically limiting factor in Rahner's approach. 
This for Rahner implies the necessity of adopting the main issues of secular philosophical 
anthropology in order to be understandable for modern secular man. A genuinely religious 
approach seems to be excluded. In order to show that in the end his approach does not only come 
to a mere description of secular man, Rahner now has to show that there is an actual difference 
between secular and christian self-understanding and that it is possible to mediate this difference in 
spite of the above-mentioned difficulties. Regarding the content both interpretations must be 
similar, even identical and yet there must be a difference: "Sie (die kirchliche Lehre, A.S.) ruft 
vielmehr die Wirklichkeit an, die nicht nur gesagt, sondern in der transzendentalen Erfahrung des 
Menschen wirklich erfahren wird. Sie sagt also dem Menschen sein eigenes immer - wenn auch 
unreflex - vollzogenes Selbstverstandnis aus."156 Rahner shifts the problem itself onto the level of 
consciousness and unconsciousness, respectively of reflection and non-reflection. Not the content 
but the level of consciousness is the actual difference between secular and christian self-
understanding. The differences regarding content must be eliminated as much as possible, and it 
must be shown that even genuinely christian points of view are actually anthropological constants 




The main theme Rahner uses to mediate with secular self-understanding is the idea of a 
"Heilsmysterium", defined according to ecclesiastical tradition and papal decree. This raises a 
second difficulty in Rahner's system. If anything is defined to be a mystery, then it must remain a 
mystery in order to remain what it is. If, however, the "Heilsmysterium" remains a mystery, then 
any interpretation, explanation and mediation of it becomes difficult. 
Rahner is aware of this problem. He draws the only possible conclusion and thus switches the 
framework for the whole of his theology and concept of salvation. I f the mystery cannot be made 
evident and i f it is nevertheless to be mediated with human self-understanding then there is only one 
remaining possibility: "Und dieses eine Mysterium lasst sich dem Menschen durchaus nahebringen, 
wenn er sich als der versteht, der in das Geheimnis verwiesen ist, das wir Gott nennen."157 
Moreover, as this mystery was defined to be a "Heils"-mystery Rahner impUcidy has to conclude 
that God himself as the mystery is the content of our salvation. Rahner's following sentence makes 
this clearer: "So gibt es dariiber hinaus doch nur die Frage, ob dieser Gott bloss der ewig Feme 
Oder dariiber hinaus in freier Gnade in Selbstmitteilung die innerste Mitte unserer Existenz sein 
wollte. Nach der Bejahung der zweiten Moglichkeit als faktisch realisierter ruft aber unser ganzes, 
von der Frage getragenes Dasein, es ruft nach dem Geheimnis das bleibt."158 Actually Rahner's 
whole book is nothing but the expounding of these few words, because they contain the whole of 
his theology - together with its problems. Rahner does not argue whether there is a God and 
whether this God is or could be our salvation. All this is presupposed because "unser ganzes, von 
der Frage getragenes Dasein" calls for it, demands it. For Rahner the only question that remains is 
how far God can be shown to be our salvation as "innerste Mitte unserer Existenz". As, however, 
God was defined as remaining mystery, our salvation must remain mysterious as well. Rahner has 
to try to achieve the impossible, to develop an understanding of God which conveys both at the 




think God as "die innerste Mitte unserer Existenz" (i.e. God in his self-communication in free 
grace). 
This, however, as I pointed out, can be mediated with secular self-understanding only, if Rahner 
can prove that all this is necessarily derivable from anthropological constants. He must take secular 
self-understanding as the starting-point in order to show that actually every human being is in the 
state of "Verwiesenheit" towards something which has the characteristics of his concept of God. 
II.3.3 TRANSCENDENTAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 
A) The a priori structure of subjectivity 
Rahner asks what man is. And his first and all-decisive answer is that man always is a person. Man 
experiences himself as a person. And he experiences the world only due to the fact that it is 
different from himself. That implies and presupposes a self as a defined entity which is prior to any 
experience. Therefore Rahner can say that being-a-self cannot be considered to be something 
merely accidental but that it is the basic principle of human being. 
However, being-a-self implies some further characteristic features like subjectivity, consciousness 
and self-disclosure. Being a subject is always intrinsically connected with one's being conscious of 
oneself. There is, however, no identity between both and this is Rahner's starting point for 
explaining what man is. 
Being a subject is the necessary condition of having a consciousness, as I pointed out, because 
consciousness is dependent on the subject as its bearer and object. That means that consciousness is 
always posterior to a reality, which is not posited by itself. It is posterior to the facticity of the 
subject. Man's ontological origin is hidden from his own consciousness, because he never becomes 
totally objectified in it, due to the fact that the subject is the precondition of the consciousnesss and 
not vice versa. The origin of the self remains hidden from consciousness because it is not posited by 
the consciousness. 
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Rahner calls this "Selbstgegebenheit des Subjekts" the a priori structure of the self "Die Struktur 
des Subjektes ist vielmehr selbst eine a priorische, d.h. sie bildet ein vorgangiges Gesetz dafiir, was 
und wie etwas sich dem Subjekt zeigen kann.... Die a priorische Struktur einer Erkenntnisfahigkeit 
gibt sich nun am einfachsten dadurch kund, das sie sich in jedem einzelnen Akt der Erkenntnis des 
in ihr gegebenen Gegenstandes durchhalt und zwar auch dann noch, wenn dieser Akt in seinem 
Gegenstand und als solcher die Aufhebung oder Bestreitung dieser a priorischen Struktur ist oder 
vielmehr sein will." j^tis becomes obvious if one remembers that the a priori structure of man 
was said to be his subjectivity. Subjectivity is the necessary condition for any act of cognition and 
any statement, even for the denial of one's own self, which thus becomes self-contradictory. 
However, man does not only have this a priori structure, he also asks for it. Though the origin of 
his facticity must necessarily remain hidden and mysterious, man nevertheless asks for it. Man asks 
the "transcendental question" by asking for the necessary precondition of his own self And as this 
necessary precondition is not posited by the consciousness, man experiences himself as dependent 
on something which is not himself Rahner calls this experience the "transcendental experience" and 
as this experince derives from man's transcendental question, man himself is called "Wesen der 
Transzendenz"160 . "transcendence" (not transcendentality) because in asking the transcendental 
question, man transcends the mere facticity of his reality. 
And because asking this question necessarily derives from human consciousness, Rahner has now 
pinpointed what he thinks are the two main characteristics of man: the fact that his origin is hidden 
from himself and the fact that man nevertheless necesssarily asks for it. 
B) Daseinsfrage as Heilsfrage 
Thus man's condition is perceived as a mixture of freedom and bondage or dependency: as far as 
man is dependent on the mystery of his origin he is unfree and bound to something which itself is 





Only because man asks the transcendental question does he transcend himself towards something 
else. And only in this necessary experience of difference does man become aware of his own being 
as a person, of being a subject. For Rahner this is the source of freedom: "Wo das Subjekt sich als 
Subjekt erfahrt, also als das Seiende, das eine urspriinglich nicht mehr aufzulosende Einheit und 
Selbstgegebenheit vor dem Sein durch Transzendenz hat, ... da wird in einem urspriinglichen Sinn 
Verantwortung und Freiheit im Grunde des je eigenen Daseins erfahren.''^^! 
Rahner knows that man is radically dependent on the world and its impacts on him, that man is 
always "verfiigt" or "welthaft-geschichtiich bedingt". Man always remains within the causality of 
world and creation. Therefore one can never be sure, whether one's deeds are the result of one's 
own deliberate decisions or whether they are caused by influences hidden from our consciousness. 
However, man can be conscious of exactiy this very ambiguity and in being conscious man 
distances himself from the causality and its effects conceptually. In becoming conscious of himself 
as the one who is different from the world (though indissolubly involved in it) man becomes free 
towards himself. Man as a person is free, because as subjectivity only he himself possesses himself. 
Subjectivity is unverausserlicher Selbstbesitz: "Dort wo Freiheit wirklich begriffen wird, ist sie nicht 
das Vermogen, dieses oder jenes tun zu konnen, sondem das Vermogen, iiber sich selbst 
entscheiden und sich selbst tun zu konnen. "1^2 
That impUes that man's existence is placed in his own hands; because man is free, as far as he is a 
person, the shaping and forming of his existence becomes his task and problem. Whether his life 
fails or not depends on himself, especially on a proper self-understanding because only through his 
self-understanding and self-reflection man becomes aware of himself as free and as bound to the 
world. Therefore the right self-understanding becomes the key for a proper understanding of 
oneself in the world and thus for a successful existence. The question of true self-understanding 
becomes the question of salvation: "denn der wahre theologische Begriff des Heiles besagt ja nicht 
eine zukiinftige Situation, die von aussen her sachhaft als erfreulich oder, wenn es Unheil ist, 




Beurteilung zuerkannt wird, sondern besagt die Endgiiltigkeit des wahren Selbstverstandnisses und 
der wahren Selbsttat des Menschen in Freiheit vor Gott durch die Annahme seines eigenen Selbst, 
so wie es ihm in der Wahl der in Freiheit interpretierten Transzendenz eroffnet und iibereignet 
ist. "163 Rahner's definition of salvation, as quoted above, is a key passage of Grundkurs des 
Glaubens. Salvation is definitiveness of true self-understanding and the acceptance of one's own self 
as it is put before us. We will consider the far-reaching imphcations of this definition later. For the 
time being we will confine ourselves to the conclusions Rahner himself draws from it: Human self-
understanding can be definite only i f it is true. As I showed above, according to Rahner, the two 
main characteristics of man are firstly the fact that his origin is hidden from himself and secondly 
the fact that he nevertheless asks for it. Now, within the above-mentioned context, man's 
transcendental question suddenly reveals itself to be the one important question on which his 
existence and salvation is dependent. However, if both characteristics are equally true, any explicit 
answer as to what the condition of the possibihty of our subjectivity is, cannot be given. The only 
remaining possibility is to consider these two characteristics themselves to be the content of true 
self-understanding, the consequence of which is to consider man to be the one "der in das 
Geheimnis verwiesen ist" Jhis, however, as we remember, is exactly what Rahner had to prove 
that the anthropological constant was, in order to be able to make the idea of God as the remaining 
"Heilsmysterium" plausible to human self-understanding and thus to be able to mediate christian 
tradition with secular self-understanding. At this point both Rahner's anthropological concept and 
his concept about God as the "Heilsmysterium" necessarily converge. Rahner now has to prove that 
the idea of a God as the mystery of salvation is logically derivable from the basic anthropological 
insight that man is "verwiesen." 
C) The unthematic knowledge of God 
Surprisingly enough Rahner now states that the fact that man asks for the necessary condition of 




mystery. Rahner claims that man could not ask for his origin if he did not know anything about it, 
because asking for something necessarily implies that one knows at least about the possibihty of the 
existence of what is asked for. What does man know about the necessary condition of his own self 
and where does he know it from? 
Rahner calls this knowledge "unthematic" because it cannot be made an object of statements. We 
cannot make it explicit, yet it must be given to us, because it is necessarily the precondition of our 
asking for the origin of our own self. Exactiy because of this, it cannot become an object of our 
consciousness and be made explicit. 
Yet Rahner claims that this knowledege (which he just had stated to be "unthematic") is the 
knowledge of "Sein", Being-itself: "Der Mensch ist das Wesen der Transzendenz, insofem alle 
Erkenntnis und seine erkennende Tat begriindet sind im Vorgriff auf das Sein iiberhaupt, in einem 
unthematischen aber unausweichlichen Wissen um die Unendlichkeit der Wirklichkeit, so konnen 
wir etwas kiihn und vorlaufig jetzt schon sagen."^65 Ontologically it seems reasonable to say that 
the necessary condition of the possibility of the self is the possibiUty of being, which logically is 
Being itself. Rahner now concludes, that the "Vorgriff, the transcendent drive of human 
intentionality does not only have Being itself as an object but that it is also carried and directed 
towards it by Being itself: "Da sich aber der Vorgriff als blosse Frage andererseits nicht selbst 
erklart, muss er als das Walten jenes - eben des Seins selbst- verstanden werden, auf das hin der 
Mensch eroffnet ist. Die Transzendenzbewegung ist nun aber nicht das machtvolle Konstituieren 
des menschlichen Raumes des Subjektes vom Subjekt als dem absolut Seinsmachtigen her, sondern 
das Aufgehen des unendlichen Seinshorizontes von diesem selbst her. Wo immer der Mensch sich 
in seiner Transzendenz als der Fragende erfahrt, der durch diesen Aufgang des Seins beunruhigte, 
der ins Unsagbare Hinausgesetzte, kann er sich nicht in diesem Sinne des absoluten Subjektes als 
Subjekt begreifen, sondern nur in dem Sinne der Seinsempfangnis, letztiich der Gnade."1^6 
Here Rahner anticipates a main feature of his theology which is dealt with in more detail later. 




of subjectivity was all-decisive for human salvation and that it pointed to an infinite distance to that 
which is the condition of the possibility of our subjectivity, he now turns things around: Though we 
do not know the answer to our question explicitly, it must be given and near to us, because the 
question presupposes its object and therefore also our question for the origin of our subjectivity 
presupposes a primordial self-disclosure of its object. Before asking any question, man has received 
his own being from that which must therefore be thought to be the necessarily fulfilled condition of 
the possibility of his subjectivity and his human existence, Being-itself And this primordial turning 
of Being itself to its "objects", us, is called "grace". 
n.3.4 THE SELF-COMMUNICATION OF GOD 
A) Transcendental self-communication 
Rahner calls this God's self-communication. The first thing Rahner does is to see which 
possibihties of unfolding are inherent in his concept of this transcendentally experienced "self-
communication". First Rahner states that this self-communication has an eminentiy ontological 
character. As God was perceived to be Being-itself this is totally coherent: "Das Wort 
'Selbstmitteilung' will wirklich bedeuten, dass Gott in seiner eigensten Wirkhchkeit sich zum 
innersten Konstitutivum des Menschen selber macht. Es handelt sich also um eine seinshafte 
Selbstmitteilung Gottes."^^^ God's primordial turning to man must not be considered to be a sort 
of epistemological revelation which enables man to ask for the condition of the possibihty of man's 
being. Rather must man's being itself be considered to be this self-communication of God: the 
question for the condition of the possibility of man's being originates from the facticity of this being 
itself Thus that which enables man to ask the transcendental question is the fact that man is. 
Therefore God's self-communication, which was supposed to enable man to ask this question, is his 
having "created" man (as far as God must be considered to be the ontological condition of the 
possibility of man). God's self-communication is his being the ontological condition of the 
possibility of man. 
167 p. 122. 
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As I pointed out above, God in his self-communication is experienced both as "innerste Mitte 
unserer Existenz" and as "der ewig Feme". By introducing the term "ontological self-
communication" Rahner stresses the ontological (!) immediacy of man's transcendental dependency 
on God: "...(Es) soil damit gesagt werden, dass einerseits Gott fiir den Menschen in seiner 
absoluten Transzendentalitat nicht nur west als das absolute, aber sich immer entziehende, immer 
nur asymptotisch gemeinte, radikal fembleibende Woraufhin und Wovonher dieser Transzendenz, 
sondem dass er sich als er selber gibt.''^^^ 
However, in this sentence Rahner admits that still both views of God as "distant" and as "innerste 
Mitte unserer Existenz" are possible. God's self-communication is not his revealing himself to be 
absolute closeness which could be experienced. As God's self-communication is the transcendental 
condition of our ontological reality it necessarily reveal exactiy that, what we actually now know 
about God through our natural transcendentality. In the previous chapter we saw that God must, by 
means of natural transcendentality, be conceived to be a) the necessary condition of the possibility 
of our existence (and thus also of our natural transcendentality) and b) a "mystery" because man 
cannot have any knowledge about it exept an unthematic one. As God's self-communication is the 
very condition of the possibility of man's natural transcendentality, the content of God's self-
communication and the result of man's natural transcendental enquiries must necessarily be 
identical. Therefore Rahner says: "Diese Unmittelbarkeit Gottes in seiner Selbstmitteilung ist 
gerade die Entbergung Gottes als des bleibenden, absoluten Geheimnises."169 
The whole of our ontological reality must be considered to be the result, or as Rahner says, the 
"event" of God's ontological self-communication. Rahner now derives from this the conclusion 
that God actually is the "innerste Mitte unserer Existenz": "Seinshafte Selbstmitteilung Gottes muss 
von vorneherein als Bedingung der Moglichkeit personaler und unmittelbarer Erkenntnis und Liebe 
zu Gott hin verstanden werden. Aber eben diese unmittelbar erkennende und liebende Nahe zu Gott 





einer sachhaft gedachten Wirklichkeit hinzutritt, sondern als das eigentiiche Wesen dessen, was das 
ontologische Verhaltnis zwischen Gott und Kreatur ausmacht."171 
But what enables Rahner to draw this conclusion? Had not he just claimed that whatever is man's 
ontological reality was the "event" of God's self-communication? One of Rahner's starting-points to 
describe man's reality, however, had been that man may also experience God as "distant". So how 
can he now claim that God must necessarily be perceived to be closeness? It is important to see that 
Rahner expMcitiy stresses that closeness is the characteristic of the ontological relation between 
God and creature, not necessarily the content of man's consciousness: by applying the 
transcendental method, Rahner asks for the logically and ontologically necessary conditions of 
man's reality, not for the characteristics of this reality itself! Due to its character of being the 
transcendental condition, God's closeness may well be the characteristic of man's ontological 
reality, but nevertheless not be the object of his consciousness. The condition of its possibility is 
ontologically prior to man's consciousness, but not necessarily conceptually. Also Kant did not 
claim that the categories are an empirical reality and part of man's nature, but only that they must 
logically be assumed, i f cognition is supposed to be possible. In the same way Rahner can say, that 
i f man's existence has God as the condition of its possibility, then ontologically the relation between 
man and God must be closeness. That does not affect the fact that man's experience of this relation 
to God may well be ambiguous. 
The important point is that man's natural transcendentality (which led him to the cognition of God 
as mystery and the transcendental condition of his existence) must in itself be thought to be the 
result of God's self-communication. This is because man is the event of God's self-communication 
and his natural knowledge of God identical with what God revealed about himself in his ontological 
self-communication. Regarding the content natural transcendentality and God's ontological self-
communication must therefore necessarily be identical. This becomes evident in the above-
mentioned quotation: "Diese Unmittelbarkeit Gottes in seiner Selbstmitteilung ist gerade die 




mystery is the content of man's natural transcendentality it must be thought to be the content of 
ontological God's self-communication through which he creates man and his natural 
transcendentality. 
From this characterization of the ontological relation between God and man Rahner draws two 
conclusions, an immanent one and a transcendental one. 
The immanent one is concerned with the question what this kind of transcendental-ontological 
relation between God and man means for any concept of human freedom. As these considerations 
do not directly contribute to Rahner's concept of salvation but are nevetheless important for the 
whole of his line of arguments we will examine this problem in the framework of excursus. 
The transcendental conclusion Rahner draws from the above-mentioned idea of the identity of 
natural transcendentality and God's self-communication as regards content is of vital importance 
for our questioning. It is Rahner's infamous doctrine of the "supernatural existential". We will deal 
with it in the following section. 
Excursus: Rahner's concept of the freedom of will 
In expounding Rahner's ideas I left out this very important part in order to ease an understanding 
of Rahner's transcendental-anthropological approach in general. We had seen that freedom for 
Rahner originally meant person-hood or being a subject and being immediate and therefore free to 
oneself. Moreover, we saw that Rahner considered God to be the transcendental horizon in which 
subjectivity necessarily finds itself and which cannot be negated or denied because this denial would 
necessarily affirm the subjectivity of the speaker and its a priori structure which points to this 
horizon towards which it is "verwiesen". Thus it becomes totally impossible to deny or negate 
God's existence (provided one shares Rahner's concept of God). As we had seen in chapter III.3.3B 
Rahner's concept of freedom is paradoxical due to his transcendental approach. On the one hand 
one has to say that due to his being the necessary condition of the possibility of subjectivity God is 
the source of our freedom, i.e. being a subject. That makes possible the idea of a free individual. On 
the other hand, exactiy due to his being the necessary condition of the possibility of subjectivity 
man is absolutely dependent on God, and cannot possibly deny him by an act of his subjectivity 
without affirming him. God is paradoxically both the source of human freedom and its limiting 
factor. Therefore, Rahner is in a difficult situation, if he now wants to point to the possibility of 
free will in order to make understandable any concept of sin. On the one hand he has to stress the 
absolute necessity of God, as he is the necessary condition of the possibility of our subjectivity. On 
the other hand he wants to preserve the possibility to think man to be free towards God in order to 
be able to explain the different ways of self-understanding of human beings. If God were to be 
conceived with necessity every human being would have the consciousness of his transcendental 
dependency. Freedom would be excluded: "Wurde die Moglichkeit nicht bestehen, dann ware es 
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mit einer wirklichen Subjekthaftigkeit der Freiheit, mit ihrer Eigentiimlichkeit, dass es ihr um das 
Subjekt selbst und nicht um diese oder jene Sache geht, im Grunde genommen doch vorbei."1^3 
order to be able to negate one's own dependency from the condition of one's owns possibihty it 
would be necessary to resolve the self-contradictory character of this denial or negation. This, 
however, is possible only if one resolved the paradoxical transcendental structure of the 
dependency of subjectivity on the condition of its possibility. One would have to make the 
"condition of the possibility" itself the object of the denial and not any longer what it really is, 
namely the condition of the possibility of the denial. Rahner does not tell us how this could ever 
work out. But he postulates its possibility in order to make possible a freely chosen "thematic no" 
against God. 
It is not only Rahner's concern about man, which leads him to this postulate. Human freedom is a 
concept which is intrinsically necessary for the whole of his approach. Without the possibihty of a 
radical turning away from God, any concept of salvation becomes hollow, as grace without the 
possibility of sin on the human side is pointiess. Thus the concept of free will and a free rejection of 
God as such is necessary: "Schuld ist in der konkreten Ordnung als 'Siinde' das freie (und als 
Freiheit auf Endgultigkeit zielende) Nein zu Gottes unmittelbarer intimer Liebe im Angebot seiner 
Selbstmitteilung durch die ungeschaffene, vergottlichende Gnade, darum ein absolut dialogischer 
"174 Yhis human "no" against God, however, presupposes God's divine self-communication as 
its object. This means that God's loving grace is always prior to man's possible rejection of it, which 
is sin. We saw that this is a main difficulty in Rahner's concept of sin. As God's grace is an 
ontological one, man would have to reject what is the basis for this rejection, the necessary 
condition of the possibility of his subjectivity. 
Due to his paradoxical concept of a transcendental dependency of man on God, also Rahner's 
concept of sin as the denial of God bears signs of being paradoxical: only because God is the 
necessary condition of our subjectivity is there anything like human freedom, i.e. being a subject of 
one's own, at all. But exactiy due to this very structure freedom becomes intrinsically impossible, 
because every human being is ontologically totally dependent on the ontological condition of its 
possibility. Rahner in the end has to admit that there is at least an imbalance in his concept of sin 
and free will: "Naturlich darf das Nein der Freiheit Gott gegenuber, da es von einem transzendental 
notwendigen Ja zu Gott in der Transzendenz getragen ist und sonst gar nicht sein konnte (!) - also 
freie Selbtzerstorung des Subjektes und innere Widerspriichlichkeit seines Aktes bedeutet -, nie als 
eine existential-ontologisch gleichmachtige Moglichkeit der Freiheit neben der des Ja zu Gott 
aufgefasst werden."l^^Strictiy speaking one would have to say that the possibihty of a thematic no 
on reasonable grounds is not only not "gleichmachtig" but totally excluded in Rahner's system. It 
remains a "Widerspriichlichkeit, dass dieses Nein wirkhch zu dem transzendentalen Horizont 
unserer Freiheit sich verschliessend Nein sagt und dabei gleichzeitig von einem Ja zu diesem Gott 
lebt."176 
173p.l07. 
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176 p. 109. Basically one has to say that this contradiction could easily be resolved if Rahner was more realistic. His 
system always presupposes human beings to be totally conscious about the a priori structure of their subjectivity. 
However, certainly most people in this world are totally unconscious about it. As they therefore do not identify God 
with the condition of the possibility of subjectivity they subjectively can negate the former without denying the latter, 
because they do not know about the latter. I suppose this is how it works in reality, provided that Rahner's idea that 
God is identical with the condition of the possibility of subjectivity is right. 
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The divine self-communication is not an offer, which can be actually rejected (on rational 
grounds), it can only be denied against one's better judgement: "In diesem Sinn muss jeder, wirklich 
radikal jeder Mensch als das Ereignis einer iibematiirlichen Selbstmitteilung Gottes verstanden 
werden, wenn auch eben nicht in dem Sinne, dass notwendigerweise jeder Mensch diese 
Selbstmitteilung Gottes an den Menschen in Freiheit annimmt.''^^^ 
B) The supernatural existential 
This leads us to Rahner's doctrine of the "supernatural existential". This doctrine has often been 
misunderstood. It is, however, necessary to see it in its connection with the above-mentioned 
problem of the relation between man's natural ti-anscendentality and God's ontological self-
communication. As the latter was conceived to be the necessary ontological condition of man and 
his natural transcendentality, the result of man's natural transcendentality had to be understood 
implicitiy as the content of God's own self-communication. However, the fact that man is the event 
of God's self-communication and that thus his natural knowledge of God is identical with what God 
revealed about himself, has an important impact on Rahner's view of the relation between God and 
man. 
Rahner self-critically states about his whole concept of ti-anscendental theology: "...so konnte man 
dennoch den Eindruck haben, dass der Satz, der Mensch sei das Ereignis der absoluten 
Selbstmitteilung Gottes, diesem von aussen in dem Raum einer blossen Begrifflichkeit zugesagt 
werde, dass er aber nicht eigentiich das vor den Menschen bringe, was der Mensch in Wahrheit 
selber ist und als was er sich selber im Grunde seines Daseins erfahrt. Doch dies ist nicht so."178 
Of course Rahner knows that to the idea that man is the event of God's ontological self-
communication no appropriate experience can be conveyed, due to its ontological and 
transcendental character. But he now claims that due to this very character his claim about God's 




Again Rahner uses the transcendental question. He asks for the condition of the possibihty of the 
reception of God's ontological self-communication in man. As, however, it is only through God's 
self-comunication that man is created at all, the condition of the possibihty of the reception and 
perception of God is also God's ontological self-communication itself "Um Gott annehmen zu 
konnen ... muss diese Annahme von Gott selbst getragen werden, ist die Selbstmitteilung Gottes als 
angebotene auch die notwendige Bedingung der Moglichkeit ihrer A n n a h m e . " h a d seen 
that as regards content man's natural transcendentality must be identical with God's self-
communication. As, however, this self-communication, due to its ontological character, is also the 
condition of the possibility of its own perception by man, one has to conclude that every attempt of 
man's natural transcendentality to know God is from the very beginning sustained and carried by 
God himself Man's natural transcendentality is not only a merely human means of cognition which 
came into being only due to God's being the ontological condition of it. Rather it is also necessarily 
carried by and directed to God. Rahner therefore calls man's transcendentality "ubematiirhch 
erhobene Transzendentalitat" or "iibematiirliches Existential": due to its being the event of God's 
ontological self-communication man's natural transcendentality is a priori directed and elevated to 
God and its content is God! 
That means that actually God is close to man not only in an unintelhgible ontological way, but 
also as the inherent aim and underlying principle of his natural transcendentality. Therefore Rahner 
can write: "Diese vorgangige und der Freiheit vorgegebene Selbstmitteilung Gottes bedeutet nichts 
anderes, als dass die transzendentale Bewegung des Geistes in Erkenntnis und Freiheit auf das 
absolute Geheimnis hin so von Gott selbst in seiner Selbstmitteilung getragen ist, dass diese 
Bewegung ihr Woraufhin und Wovonher nicht in dem heUigen Geheimnis als ewig femen, immer 
nur asymptotisch erreichbaren Ziel hat, sondem in dem Gott absoluter Nahe und 
Unmittelbarkeit."180 AS natural transcendentality is supernatural transcendentality Rahner can say: 
"Diese (the supernatural A.S.) Selbstmitteilung Gottes als angebotene und der Freiheit des 




die Eigentumlichkeit aller Momente der transzendentalen Verfasstheit des Menschen 
uberhaupt. "181 goth must be thought of to be identical. Therefore: "Die gnadenhafte 
Selbstmitteilung Gottes als die Modifikation der Transzendenz, durch die das die Transzendenz 
innerlich eroffnende und tragende Geheimnis als solches von absoluter Nahe und Unmittelbarkeit 
anwesend ist, kann daher nicht ohne weiteres durch eine einfache, individuelle Reflexion und 
psychologische Introspektion abgehoben werden von jenen Grundstrukturen der Transzendenz des 
Menschen..." 182 
That however impMes that man's experience of God as closeness rather than as distance is not 
necessary. As man's actual, natural reality is his supematural transcendentality he cannot expect any 
other experience than the one he has in his actual, natural reality. And the experience he has in his 
actual reality is ambiguous. Therefore Rahner speaks of a certain "Verhiilltheit" of the experience 
of grace 183 j jg has to admit that the ontological reality of God's self-communication does not 
necessarily imply also the experience or even only the consciousness of it. We saw that already 
above, when Rahner could infer God's self-communication as closeness in spite of the ambiguous 
character of man's actual experience. However: "so darf nur darum wegen der Unmoglichkeit einer 
direkten und sicher zugreifenden Individualreflexion nicht darauf geschlossen werden, dass die 
Selbstmitteilung Gottes eine absolut subjekt- und bewusstseinsjenseitige sei, die nur durch eine von 
aussen her an den Menschen herangetragene dogmatische Theorie postuliert wurde. "1^4 
D) The transcendental experience 
Therefore Rahner's only possibility is to appeal to personal experience beyond the paradoxes of 
theory: "Hier kann zunachst nur an jene individuelle Erfahrung appeliert werden, die der Mensch 
von dieser Selbstmitteilung Gottes hat und haben kann und die zwar nicht in der individuellen 
Sphare ... mit einer eindeutigen reflexen Sicherheit erkannt werden kann, die aber dennoch auch fiir 







ontological self-communication is experienced positively as grace or negatively as distance. Both is 
possible, neither is necessary. Therefore Rahner can do nothing but to encourage the individual to 
risk getting involved with the experience of God's ontological self-communication. The quality of 
this experience is unpredictable: "Der Mensch, der sich iiberhaupt auf seine transzendentale 
Erfahrung des heiligen Geheimnises einlasst, macht die Erfahrung, dass dieses Geheimnis nicht nur 
der unendlich feme Horizont, das abweisend und distanzierend-richtende Gericht iiber seine Um-
und Mitwelt und sein Bewusstsein ist, nicht nur das Unheimliche, was ihn zuriickscheucht in die 
enge Heimat des Alltages, sondern dass dieses heiUge Geheimnis auch die bergende Nahe ist, die 
vergebenden Intimitat, die Heimat selber, die Liebe, die sich mitteilt, das Heimhche, zu dem man 
von der Unheimlichkeit seiner eigenen Lebensleere und -bedrohtheit fliehen und ankommen 
kann." It remains, however, unclear how Rahner thinks this "sich einlassen" to happen. Rahner 
uses mystical language to describe the event of this experience. It is, however, not any longer the 
language of transcendental philosophy: "Wo der Mensch theoretisch oder praktisch erkennend oder 
subjekthaft handelnd in den Abgmnd seines Daseins fallt, der allein allem Gmnd gibt, und wo dieser 
Mensch dabei den Mut hat, in sich selbst hineinzublicken und in seiner Tiefe seine letzte Wahrheit 
zu finden, da kann (!) er auch (!) die Erfahmng machen, dass dieser Abgmnd als die wahre 
vergebende Bergung. ihn annimmt und die Legitimiemng und den Mut fur den Glauben gibt, dass 
die Deutung dieser Erfahrung durch die Heils- und Offenbamngsgeschichte der Menschheit (d.h. 
durch die Deutung dieser Erfahmng als des Ereignisses der radikalen Selbstmitteilung Gottes) die 
letzte Tiefe, die letzte Wahrheit eben dieser scheinbar so banalen Erfahmng ist." 1^7 
The perception of God as the "Abgmnd", the depth, is an old mystical topos. In a way it matches 
Rahner's assumption that God is the infinite horizon beyond individual subjectivity. Therefore he 
can say that "in sich selbst hineinzublicken und in seiner Tiefe seine Wahrheit zu finden" is the 
possible way to experience God's graceful self-communication. As it is, however, not any longer 
the way of transcendental reflection, it is not possible to pursue this practical methodological advice 
theoretically. Rahner's hne of arguments breaks off as the theological considerations end with what 
186p.l37. 
187 p.138, exclamation marks by A.S. 
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they began, the ambiguity of the experience of the condition of the possibility of one's own 
subjectivity: "So bleibt er (der Mensch A.S.) sich selber in dieser Grundfrage seines Daseins, die er 
subjekthaft schon immer beantwortet hat, in der Reflexion immer zweideutig als Subjekt, das die 
Subjekthaftigkeit der gnadenhaft erhobenen Transzendenz vollzieht in der aposteriorischen, 
geschichtUchen nie adaquat verfiigten Begegnung mit seiner Um- und Mitwelt, in der Begegnung 
mit einem menschlichen Du, an dem Geschichte und Transzendenz und durch beides die 
Begegnung mit Gott als dem absoluten Du in Einheit ihren einen Vollzug fmden."188 
11.3.5 SELF-UNDERSTANDING AND SALVATION 
A) Self-understanding and consciousness 
Thus the result of Rahner's extensive theological speculations is that the content of secular and 
christian self-understanding in the end are identical because of the transcendental dependency of 
natural transcendentality and divine self-communication. Neither, however, can amount to more 
than the cognition that God remains a mystery. As 1 pointed out above, this was also the necessary 
condition for the mediating of secular and christian self-understanding within the same self. Only if 
both are identical regards content, the self can accept either without losing its characteristic of 
being the self. 
However, i f both are identical, why do they have to be mediated at all? In other words, what is the 
special soteriological function of the Heilsmysterium for the christian self-understanding which the 
secular self-understanding does not have? 
As one remembers, it cannot be any religious secret or arcane mysticism; rather Rahner pointed 
out that the level of consciousness with which reality is perceived is decisive: "Sie (die kirchhche 
Lehre A.S.) ruft vielmehr die Wirklichkeit an, die nicht nur gesagt, sondern gegeben und in der 
transzendentalen Erfahrung des Menschen wirkMch erfahren wird. Sie sagt dem Menschen sein 
eigenes immer -wenn auch unreflex- voUzogenes Selbstverstandnis aus.''^ ^^ That forces man to 
decide: "...und jeder ist dann gefragt, ob er sich als der Mensch erkennen konne, der hier sein 
188p.l39. 
189 cf. footnote 156. 
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Selbstverstandnis auszusprechen versucht, oder ob er verantwortlich vor sich und seinem Dasein 
die iiberzeugung als seine Wahrheit setzen kann, dass er ein solcher Mensch nicht ist, wie ihn das 
Christentum ihm zusagt." ^90 
Can, however, the making conscious and expHcit of what the condition of the possibihty of reality 
of man is, really redeem and change this very reality? In other words, can the existential ambiguity 
of man's ontological status (God either as distant or near) be made unambiguous and clear by his 
becoming conscious about the necessary condition of the possibility of this reahty? It cannot; in 
Rahner's own theological considerations this conclusion has to be drawn. According to his own 
idea of the supernatural existential (that our ontological reality must transcendentally be conceived 
to be the result of God's ontological self-communication) Rahner cannot possibly try to prove the 
possibility of an unambiguous experience of this self-communication, as human experience does not 
convey it either (though transcendentally one must conceive God as being gracious). 
It seems, however, as i f this deadlock in Rahner's theology was not caused by the hmited divine 
self-communication which only reveals God as mystery, but by an implicit presupposition of 
Rahner. 
The ambiguous character of God's self-communication cannot be cancelled out through the 
becoming conscious of it, because it is unavoidable. It seems, as if the ambiguous character of the 
experience of the condition of the possibility of subjectivity is the necessary reflexion of the twofold 
structure of consciousness itself: it is the very structure of self-consciousness that it (the self as 
subject) can be conscious of itself (the self as object). As far as the self perceives itself as the object 
of its self-consciousness (das Ich), it wiU necessarily see its ontological relatedness to the 
ontological condition of the possibility of the Ich as object, i.e. it will stress the ontological kinship 
with Being-itself and will perceive it as "innerste Mitte der Existenz". However, as far as the self 
concentrates on itself as its own self, the immediate absolute subject and Ich-denke. it will perceive 
the relation to the ontological condition of its own possibility to be "distance" because the absolute 
self is in lY^e//totally singular, free and eigen-standig. Only if it relates itself (sich) to itself (selbst), 
can it become conscious of itself as being not only the absolute subject but also the object of (or 
190 cf. footnote 155. 
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to) itself, which can not be derived from itself ontologicaily. I f the latter prevails, true self-
understanding leads to seeing one's own ontological dependency on the condition of one's own 
possibility. 
This point is impUed already in Rahner's preliminary considerations and it turns now out to be the 
main problem of his approach. He wrote: "Wo immer der Mensch sich in seiner Transzendenz als 
der Fragende erfahrt, der durch diesen Aufgang des Seins beunruhigte, der ins Unsagbare 
Hinausgesetzte, kann er sich nicht in diesem Sinne des absoluten Subjektes als Subjekt begreifen, 
sondern nur in dem Sinne der Seinsempfangnis, letztlich der Gnade."^^^ That is exactly the 
inversion of my objection. However, Rahner makes one mistake: he presupposes God's self-
communication and then infers that it is impossible to perceive oneself as the absolute self. It is, 
however, quite the other way round. Rather is the self (which does not perceive itself to be 
absolute) the condition for the experience of an ontological self-communication of the condition of 
the possibility of its own subjectivity 1^ 2 xhe self, however, is both subject and object. Thus the 
ambiguous character of transcendental experience seems to be the reflexion of the experience of the 
structure of human consciousness itself 
Thus the ambiguous character of God's self-communication which is present in secular self-
understanding cannot be cancelled out in an expUcit christian self-understanding. Christian self-
understanding does not know anything additional, as it is identical with the secular and it can not 
say anything about what the condition of the possibility of itself is. 
191 cf. footnote 166. 
192 It seems as if this was an apt starting-point for a further development of Rahner's system. The acknowledgement 
of the above-mentioned structure of human self would possibly lead to a consistent theory of why man can deny or 
affirm what ontologically is the condition of its own possibility, a point with which we were left a little bit 
unsatisfied by Rahner. The idea of God as the condition of the possibility of our subjectivity would remain 
untouched. But Rahner would have to do without the idea of the structural possibility of an unambiguity of the 
experience of God's self-communication. The self-communication itself is not ambiguous, as it is ontological, but its 
perception necessarily is, because of the structure of the human self. No self-understanding can change this, because 
the structure of the self can not be changed. Rahner actually came to this conclusion, but his line of arguments was 
meant to prove the opposite. 
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B) Radical openness and salvation 
Rahner nevertheless claims that it should be understood as grace and that one should ground on it 
a definite self-understanding. This self-understanding can of course only be the being conscious of 
the facticity that there is a condition of the possibihty of my own subjectivity. It is the being 
conscious of being "verwiesen", which thus does not differ from secular self-understanding. 
Yet Rahner claimed that this definite self-understanding was salvation. He states more precisely: 
"Was iiber die Gnade und die unmittelbare Anschauung Gottes erklart werden kann ist ... eine 
Aussage, die nur in einer ganz bestimmten transzendental bleibenden Weise die Nennung Gottes 
und den stummen Hinweis auf unsere transzendentale Erfahrung wiederholt, nur eben so, dass jetzt 
auch gesagt werden kann, dass diese Erfahrung ihre radikalste Moglichkeit nicht immer nur vor 
sich hat, sondern dass sie sie auch einholen wird, ja dass sie in der Bewegung auf diese Einholung 
hin schon immer durch die Selbstmitteilung der Zukunft getragen ist, auf die hin als absolut erfullte 
diese Bewegung geht."193 
It remains rather unclear how this "highest possibility" as the "unmittelbare Anschauung Gottes" 
can be achieved, because it is quite a different thing to be conscious of the ontological condition of 
one's own possibility or to claim that this is the underlying basis for an immediate visio beatifica. 
Rahner again identifies ontological self-communication of God with its existential experience. 
Ontological self-communication of God is understood as graciously encouraging sign and beginning 
of the existential "Bewegung" towards a full cognition of God. It remains unclear how Rahner can 
infer the one from the other. He continues: "Die Lehre von dieser Gnade und ihrer Vollendung ist 
darum der Befehl(!), sich in Glaube, Hoffnung und Liebe radikal und offen zu halten und sich nie 
abzuschliessen, bevor nichts mehr abzuschliessen ist, well nichts mehr draussen ist, well wir ganz in 
Gott und er ganz in uns sein wird." ^ ^4 
Finally we touch Rahner's impUcit idea of how christian and secular self-understanding do actually 
differ; and here it becomes evident what he thinks that the content of the christian self-
understanding is. Salvation is, however, nothing actual but something future: "Zukunft Gottes als 
193p.l32. 
194 p. 132, exclamation mark by A.S. 
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absolute Ankunft". Right self-understanding is not merely something which says how man should 
be conceptually conceived, but also what man has to do. We have to remember that for Rahner 
salvation was the definitiveness of both "des wahren Selbstverstandnisses und der wahren Selbsttat 
des Menschen." 195 Salvation as the definite self-understanding is thus to understand oneself as 
being "verwiesen" not only ontologically towards the condition of the possibility of one's own being 
but also towards the "absolute future as absolute presence" of God. The resulting "Selbsttat des 
Menschen" is to keep himself radical and open for the future of God. 
We have to say that it is quite unclear how Rahner can suddenly introduce this kind of future-
tending eschatological element. It is neither derived nor derivable from Rahner's ontological and 
transcendental presuppositions. Moreover, it is not really understandable how we can base our 
radical openness towards God's absolute presence on his ontological revelation and self-
communication, the content of which was God as the remaining mystery. How could one possibly 
keep oneself open towards something, the only thing one knows about which is that it will 
necessarily remain a mystery. Rahner's doctrine of grace thus has to be turned into a "Befehl". The 
passively to be received salvation has been turned into an ethical task, which is formulated with 
severe rigidity. God's grace is an order for man. Moreover, we finally have to ask whether "radical 
openness" towards an "absolute future" as definitive self-understanding is not a contradiction in 
terms. Radical openness as such towards something unknown (God as the remaining mystery) can 
never be definitive self-understanding, because such a self-understanding (if it is supposed to be 
really definitive and radical) must necessarily exclude the one and all-decisive possibility, the final 
revelation of the yet unknown. Thus it is no radical openness any more. Radical openness must take 
into account as its own possibility the dissolving and cancellation of itself into a definitiveness. 
Even if one did not exclude a final revelation of the yet unknown, how could one then ground a 
definitive self-understanding on radical openness, if one knows that the final revelation must reveal 
something different than the status quo (as now God is a mystery). Radical openness as definitive 
self-understanding is self-contradictory. 
195p.50. 
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II.3.6 HEILSGESCHICHTE AND HISTORY OF REVELATION 
The main idea underlying Rahner's considerations of the idea of a Heilsgeschichte is not that 
history is a process leading towards a future state of salvation. This is the more classical approach. 
As, according to Rahner, salvation is God's ontological self-communication and (being the prior 
condition of the possibility of man) creates him and his history, salvation can be said to be going 
through history, "accompanying" man in his history: "Die vergottlichende Transzendentalitat des 
Menschen hat im Menschen, der sein Wesen in Geschichte voUzieht und es nur so in Freheit 
iibemehmen kann selbst individuell und kollektiv eine Geschichte." 1^ 6 Therefore the title of this 
passage is not meant to be disjunctive but conjunctive: the history which God's salvation necessarily 
has through its being actualized by man can be called Heilsgeschichte. It is the Geschichte which 
Heil inherentiy has, not the history which tends to a future Heil: "Gottiiche Heilsgeschichte 
erscheint darum immer in menschlicher Heilsgeschichte, Offenbarung in Glaube und umgekehrt: 
also in dem, was der Mensch als sein Eigenstes erfahrt und als dieses eigene als von dem fernen und 
zugleich (!) nahen Gott seiner Transzendenz zugeschickt entgegennimmt."197 Rahner therefore can 
say that world history and heilsgeschichte are "koextensiv"198 because they are intrinsically 
connected; regarding our above-mentioned consideration about human self-understanding one has 
to conclude that heilsgeschichte and world history are even identical, as the latter is the ontological 
consequence of the former. Rahner dares to say: "Die Weltgeschichte bedeutet also 
Heilsgeschichte. Das Selbstangebot Gottes, in dem sich Gott absolut an die Totalitat des Menschen 
mitteilt, ist per definitionem das Heil des Menschen. Denn es ist die Erfullung der Transzendenz des 
Menschen, in welcher er sich auf den absoluten Gott hin selber transzendiert."^99 
A less important but very interesting implication of this application of Rahner's transcendental-
anthropological approach to history is that "heilsgeschichte" and history of the christian religion or 






self-communication, which per definitionem is salvation, is ontological and transcendental and thus 
universal and necessary Rahner can say: "Wegen des allgemeinen HeilswUlens Gottes hat der Christ 
kein Recht, das faktische Ereignis des Heils auf die alt- oder neutestamentliche exphzite 
Heilsgeschichte zu begrenzen."200 "Man kann angesichts der uns heute bekannten raumlichen und 
vor aUem zeitlichen Ausdehnung der Menschheitsgeschichte nicht mehr im Ernst und nicht ohne 
willkiirliche Postulate annehmen, dass aUe Menschen mit der konkreten historischen 
Wortoffenbarung im engsten Sinn, also mit der expliziten Tradition einer paradisischen 
Uroffenbarung oder mit der alt- oder neutestamentiichen bibUschen Offenbarung in Verbindung 
gestanden haben oder stehen mussten, um Glauben zu konnen und so ihr Heil zu erreichen."20J 
Rahner defined: "Weltgeschichte bedeutet Heilsgeschichte". He now develops this idea in 
accordance with the above-mentioned concept of natural tianscendentality and God's self-
communication. God is the a priori horizon of subjectivity and thus his ontological self-
communication is primordial revelation: "Die gottiiche Bewirkung des apriorischen Horizontes 
unserer Erkenntnis und Freiheit muss als eine eigentiimliche, urspriingliche, ja sogar alle ubrige 
Offenbarung tragende Weise von Offenbarung angesprochen werden."202 xj^js revelation is not a 
magical, supernatural intervention into our physical reality: "Wir haben nicht erst dann mit Gott 
etwas zu tun, wo wir Gott gewissermassen begrifflich thematisieren, sondem die urspriinghche, 
wenn auch namenlose, unthematische Erfahrung Gottes wird iiberall dort gemacht, wo und insofem 
Subjektivitat und Transzendentalitat vollzogen wird."203 jhat is a fine summary of both Rahner's 
concept of natural transcendentality and his idea of the encounter with God in the depth of this very 
transcendentality, as I summarized it above. Nothing is new so far. 
Until now Rahner has merely stated that through its being applied to man, God's self-
communication itself becomes "historical". What precisely does Rahner mean by this? He had 
conceived man basically as the "Wesen der Transzendenz" and only due to this transcendentality is 
man able to distinguish himself from the world. But now, in order to make his concept of 
200p.l53. 
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heilsgeschichte as history of revelation seem meaningful Rahner has to state, that man is also 
absolutely an historical being. Only then Rahner is able to connect ontological self-communication 
and human history. In order to do so, he must refer man's transcendentality to his historicity. 
Therefore he introduces the idea, that man's categorical history is the self-explication of his 
transcendentality: "Kategoriale Geschichte des Menschen als eines geistigen Subjektes ist immer 
und iiberaU die notwendige, aber geschichdiche objektivierende Selbstauslegung der 
transzendentalen Erfahrung, die den WesensvoUzug des Menschen ausmacht. Dieser 
WesensvoUzug des Menschen ereignet sich nicht neben den Ereignissen des geschichtlichen Lebens, 
sondem in diesem geschichtlichen Leben."204 
He now has prepared the ground for a possible alignment of ontological self-communication and 
categorical history. One has to have a very close look to see how elegantly Rahner now turns 
things around and finds a way to claim that actually human history is the self-explication of the 
eternal self-ommunication itself: "Gibt es also Geschichte als notwendige objektivierende 
Selbstauslegung der transzendentalen Erfahrung, dann gibt es offenbarende Geschichte der 
transzendentalen Offenbarung als notwendige Selbstauslegung derjenigen urspriinglichen 
transzendentalen Erfahrung, die durch die Selbstmitteilung Gottes konstituiert wird. "205 
A few pages earlier the identity of heilsgeschichte and world history was only a conceptual one: 
there was no direct effect of God's self-communication on the actual, categorical history. It was 
mediated by human transcendentality. History was the self-explication of human transcendentality 
and God's revelation was merely the condition of the possibiUty of this transcendentally. But now 
Rahner declares that the transcendental revelation itself has a history: in so far as it must be 
understood to be the condition of man, it creates the historical consequences actively! History now 
is the self-explication of that which intrinsically is the condition of the possibiUty of man; it is now 
directly the self-explication of the divine self-communication: "Diese geschichtliche Selbstmitteilung 




die folgende Objektivation eben der urspriinglichen Gott offenbarenden Selbstmitteilung Gottes, sie 
ist deren Auslegung und so (!) eben deren Geschichte selbst."206 
Thus Rahner has again introduced the old concept of heilsgeschichte as world history which tends 
to a future state of salvation and perfection. And if heilsgeschichte is not the mere self-explication 
of human transcendentality, which always remains what it is, then it is supposed to have a centre, a 
soteriological and revelatory climax: "Wenn transzendentale Gotteserfahrung iibematurlicher Art 
sich notwendig geschichtiich auslegt, darum kategoriale Offenbarungsgeschichte bildet und diese 
somit iiberall gegeben ist, dann ist auch gesagt, dass eine solche Geschichte immer eine noch nicht 
voUig gelungene, anfanghafte, sich selbst noch suchende ... ist."207 That imphes that if there is an 
explication of divine self-communication, it will always be endangered of being misunderstood or 
distorted in its categorial manifestations. I f one therefore wanted to find out what is really divine 
and what is merely human, one would have to have an absolute state of categorical objectivation 
for this divine self-explication. Rahner postulates the reality of such an absolute state and clauns the 
person of Jesus Christ to be this: "Erst im voUen und uniiberholbaren Ereignis der geschichthchen 
Selbstobjektivation der gottlichen Selbstmitteilung an die Welt in Jesus Christus ist ein Ereignis 
gegeben, das als eschatologisches einer geschichtiichen Depravation, einer verderbenden Auslegung 
in der weiteren Geschichte der kategorialen Offenbarung und des Unwesens der ReUgion 
grundsatzlich und schlechthin entzogen ist."208 This is a merely apodictic statement, which cannot 
be deduced from what has been said so far. Rahner knows this: "Wir werden im sechsten Gang die 
theologischen Grundlagen dieser Aussagen beizubringen haben."209 However, Rahner has 
prepared the ground for an understanding of the person of Jesus Christ as the "absolute 
Heilsbringer". 
Through the necessary self-explication of man in history we transcendentally can and must assume 
that also God's self-communication explicates itself through man. Therefore we can infer 
206p.l58. 
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conclusions about the eternal self-communication from its a posteriori historical consequences. And 
this is exactly what Rahner intends to do, when he now concludes that Jesus Christ with his way of 
self-explication is the categorical climax of the history of Christianity and must therefore be 
considered to be the climax of divine self-communication as such. Christology and the 
transcendental-anthropological approach converge. 
Thus Rahner's christology is characterized by an oscillation between the two poles of divine 
necessity and anthropological contingency. That is why it has often been considered to be 
unapproachable and incomprehensible: Rahner seems to deduce anthropology from divine eternal 
necessity, whereas in fact he infers the latter from the former according to his tianscendental 
method. Thus (as an example and as preparation for the next section) the old and haunting problem 
of preexistent christology "from above" versus adoptianist christology "from below" is totally 
cancelled out in Rahner's theology: both are indissolubly connected and mutually dependent. As far 
as we see Jesus Christ with the explication of his tianscendental experience which is merely human, 
we have to speak of an adoptionist christology "from below". However, as soon as we turn to the 
necessary condition (in Rahner's system) of the possibihty of this anthropological self-explication, 
we have to consider a preexistent christology because any anthropological self-explication is 
necessarily the consequence of the self-explication of the divine self-communication. This is the 
methodological heart of Rahner's christology to which we will now turn. 
n.3.7 RAHNER'S CONCEPT OF CHRISTOLOGY 
A) World history and consciousness 
At first Rahner has to prove the necessity and the possibihty of a tianscendental christology. 
Though he had already mentioned briefly what kind of christology that would be, it still remained 
dubious, whether christology is necessary and therefore possible within his systematic approach. 
The question of necessity is to be considered in a general critique; by now Rahner is concerned to 
prove the possibility of christology. 
We had already seen, that he thought world history to be effected by the ontological self-
communication of God by means of human transcendentality. In order to show a possible 
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embedding of his christology in the general process of world history he provisionally reverses this 
idea and claims that, seen from the stand-point of natural transcendentality, man can be considered 
to be the matter which comes to itself through the spirit by means of its natural transcendentality: 
one must try "den Menschen als das Seiende zu verstehen, in dem die Grundtendenz der 
Selbstfindung der Materie im Geist durch Selbsttranszendierung zu ihrem definitiven Durchbruch 
kommt, so dass von daher das Wesen des Menschen selbst gesehen werden kann innerhalb einer 
Grund- und Gesamtkonzeption der Welt."210 This general concept must necessarily be an 
assignment of Geistesgeschichte as history of man and Naturgeschichte: "Wenn so der Mensch die 
Selbsttranszendenz der lebendigen Materie ist, dann bilden Natur- und Geistesgeschichte eine 
innere gestufte Einheit, in der die Naturgeschichte sich auf den Menschen hin entwickelt, in ihm als 
seine Geschichte weitergeht, in ihm bewahrt und iiberboten ist und darum mit und in der 
Geistesgeschichte des Menschen zu ihrem Ziel kommt."211 This inherent goal of world history 
must therefore be the "highest possibility" of man as Geistwesen. We have come across this term 
already. There it meant the immediate cognition of God, as the character of grace, which is given in 
God's gracious self-communication. Also here for Rahner this highest possibihty of man as the 
highest point and goal (not end) of history is man's self-transcendence into God: "Dieses Ziel ist 
entsprechend der Transzendenz des Menschen auf die absolute Wirkhchkeit Gottes als des 
unendlichen Geheimnisses, gerade well in der unendhchen Fulle Gottes bestehend, dem Menschen 
selbst verborgen und entzogen."212 The "Fiille Gottes" is man's inherent goal, however, it remains 
withdrawn and hidden due to the unavoidable ambiguity of experience. If one unites both aspects 
the well-known term of the "Verwiesenheit" towards the remaining mystery is the result. Thus 
world history is a continuous process of the "Zusichselbstkommen" of matter in spirit, and the self-
transcending of this spirit into the openness of what is its condition and horizon: God. 
Now Rahner infers a very important argument which, however, rests on shaky ground: "Eben well 
die Bewegung der Entwicklung des Kosmos von vomeherein und in alien Phasen getragen ist von 





Verhaltnis zu ihrem Grund, liegt die Botschaft, dass es zu einer absoluten Vermittelbarkeit mit 
diesem unendhchen Grund komme, durchaus in ihr selbst gegeben vor. Ist die Kosmosgeschichte 
im Grunde immer Geistesgeschichte, das Kommenwollen zu sich und seinem Grund, dann ist die 
Unmittelbarkeit zu Gott in der Selbstmitteilung Gottes an die geistige Kreatur und in ihr an den 
Kosmos iiberhaupt das sinngerechte Ziel dieser Entwicklung."213 
Rahner therefore infers the actuality of a consummation from the mere facticity of its process. The 
assumption of this state of perfection is claimed to be "sinngerecht". Now Rahner again applies the 
transcendental question to his concept of world history as process of spirit and can therefore say 
that the immediacy of creature and God is based not on a merely human effort to tianscend himself 
towards what is beyond him, but that this transcending itself is in turn based on God's self-
communication as its condition. Thus Rahner can produce the apparentiy paradoxical sentence: 
"Wir setzen voraus, dass das Ziel der Welt die Selbstmitteilung Gottes an sie ist, dass die ganze 
Dynamik ... immer schon auf diese Selbstmitteilung und ihre Annahme durch die Welt ausgerichtet 
ist."214 But it is of course not meant, that the world is thriving towards God's self-communication 
as something which it did not yet possess; as God's self-communication is the ontological condition 
and prior to the world, the process of world history must be understood as a continuous becoming 
conscious of the fact of God's self-comunication. This is exactly the idea I pointed out already in 
chapter n.3.5A but now it is applied not to the individual but to the world in general. 
I f one views this process as the process of becoming conscious one can understand Rahner's idea 
that man reaches, or gets this self-communication, that he is put before it and that he then has to 
decide for or against it. Because he thinks of the event in which man becomes conscious of the 
primordial state of being as the "Ereignis einer freien, ungeschuldeten und vergebenden, absoluten 
Selbstmitteilung Gottes"215 Rahner can speak of God's self-communication as a contingent event 
within history: it appears in history, because man becomes conscious of it. However, how can man 
become conscious of it and decide for affirmation or rejection of this self-communication (see the 





Gottes muss einen bleibenden Anfang, darin eine Garantie ihres Geschehens haben, durch die sie 
mit Recht die freie Entscheidung zur Annahme dieser gottiichen Selbstmitteilung fordern kann."216 
As necessary according to his concept that God's self-communication is the condition of the 
possibility of man's subjectivity, Rahner adds: "Diese freie Annahme oder Ablehnung von seiten der 
einzelnen Freiheiten befindet nicht eigentiich iiber das Ereignis der Selbstmitteilung Gottes als 
solcher, sondern nur iiber das Verhaltnis, das die geistige Kreatur zu dieser Selbstinitteilung 
einnimmf'^l^ 
B) Christ and conciousness 
The "bleibende Anfang" must therefore be the event or person through which God's self-
communication for the first time becomes totally and evidentiy apparent for man. As far as one can 
say that in becoming conscious God's self-communication "comes" or "happens" or "reaches earth 
and man" one can call this person (or event) the "absolute Heilsbringer": "Von hier aus ergibt sich 
nun zunachst der Begriff des Heilsbringers schlechthin. Wir nennen so jene geschichtiiche 
Personlichkeit, die - in Raum und Zeit auftretend - den Anfang der ins Ziel kommenden absoluten 
Selbstmitteilung Gottes bedeutet, jenen Anfang, der die Selbstmitteilung fur alle als unwiderruflich 
geschehend, als siegreich inauguriert anzeigt."218 Thus the Heilsbringer is the one who awakens 
man's consciousness of God's self-communication, which is irrevocable and victorious because it 
has already happened as it is the prior condition of the being of man. That means that, strictiy 
speaking, the Heilsbringer is not the "Heil" himself. He "brings" man to the consciousness of that 
ontologically previous "Heil": "Mit diesem Begriffe des Heilsbringers (genauer vieUeicht des 
absoluten Heilsbringers) ist nicht gesagt, dass die Selbstmitteilung Gottes an die Welt in ihrer 
geistigen Subjektivitat zeitlich erst mit ihm beginnen miisse. Sie kann schon vor dem Heilsbringer 
beginnen, ja koexistent sein mit der ganzen geistigen Geschichte der Menschheit und der Welt, so 






The "Heilsbringer" reveals God's self-communicaton through his natural self-transcendence and 
his being conscious of the self-communication. He is the event of the absolute self-communication 
in the sense that he is absolutely conscious of it, what tianscendentally presupposes the total self-
explication of God to his subjectivity. However, according to Rahner's concept of natural 
transcendentality he has to admit: "Fine solche und absolute Selbsttranszendenz des Geistes in Gott 
hinein ist aber zu denken als in alien geistigen Subjekten geschehend."220 Therefore Rahner must 
conclude that ontologically there is no difference between the "absolute Heilsbinger" and mere 
mortals: "Man sieht daraus, wie schwer es ist, das Verhaltnis genauer zu bestimmen zwischen jener 
VoUendung, die der christhche Glaube alien Menschen zuerkennt und jener einmaUgen Vollendung 
menschhcher Moglichkeit, die wir als unio hypostatica bekennen."221 "Die These, die wir 
anstreben, geht dahin, dass die unio hypostatica wenn auch als in ihrem eigenen Wesen einmaUges 
und in sich gesehen hochstes denkbares Ereignis, doch ein inneres Moment der Ganzheit der 
Begnadigung der geistigen Kreatur iiberhaupt ist. "222 
However, there is one necessary difference between us and Jesus Christ as the "absolute 
Heilsbringer": in him God's self-communication must be thought of as being perfect and absolute, 
due to his perfect and total self-transcending (again we infer the former from the latter). Therefore 
Jesus is God's promise to us, the promise of the possibility of the state of absolute self-
transcendence which we have not reached yet: "Diese unio unterscheidet sich nicht von unserer 
Gnade durch das in ihr Zugesagte, das ja eben beides mal die Gnade (auch bei Jesus) ist, sondern 
dadurch, dass Jesus die Zusage fiir uns ist und wir nicht selber wieder Zusage sondem Empfanger 
der Zusage Gottes an uns sind."223 order to understand the fuU implication of this sentence, we 
have to remember that Rahner's transcendental-anthropological approach led to the final conclusion 
that grace was the Befehl to keep oneself open and radical towards the future of God. And tiiis is 
what happens through the "absolute Heilsbringer". In him the absolute future of God is radically 






ontological state (not his person of course) is the promise to us. However, it is not the promise that 
this state will occur to us automatically or necessarily. It implies the task, the "Befehl" to transcend 
oneself in order to keep oneself open towards the absolute future of God. The "absolute 
Heilsbringer" in Rahner's system is not a supernatural, graceful intervention of God into our reality 
on behalf of man. He is a shining example of total self-tianscendence and therefore proof of the 
facticity and possibility of a total self-communication of God to all human beings. From that derives 
"grace" as the "Befehl" to follow his example in keeping oneself open towards the absolute future 
of God. 
C) Salvation and negation 
However, which are the actual signs which substantiate the idea for me that Jesus is the highest 
possibihty of human transcendence? This self-transcendence must be presupposed in order to infer 
from it the idea of an a priori self-communication of God. The question we ask is the question of 
the categorical sign of the a priori self-communication of God in human life. We ask for God in the 
realm of categoriality, in order to see whether Jesus of Nazareth really is a guarantee for the event 
of absolute self-communication; Rahner had presupposed that the "Heilsbringer" is the guarantee 
for the self-communication of God and the necessary condition for our deliberate decision for or 
against it. What, however, is the guarantee of the "Heilsbringer" himself? What are the signs which 
would make it plausible to assume that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ. Rahner states 
disappointingly: "Wie das Endliche und Bedingte und Vorlaufige das Kommen des Unendhchen, 
Absoluten und Endgiiltigen melden und Hoffnung dafiir iiberhaupt erwecken kann, ohne Gott 
selbst zu kategorialisieren und zur blossen Chiffre einer 'unendhchen' offenen Bewegung auf etwas 
immer Endliches zu machen ... das miisste in einer Theologie der Offenbarung iiberhaupt genauer 
bedacht werden, was hier nicht nochmals moglich ist."224 Rahner only hints at how it could be 
possible to think God in categorical terms. Surprisingly enough he comes to a similar conclusion as 
Tilhch in the same situation. The divine in the realm of the categorical must be thought of as the 
negation of this very realm: "Jedenfalls aber kann Gott als er selbst im Raum des Kategorialen... 
224 p.209. 
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nur sich offenbarend anwesend sein im Modus der Verheissung (als des dauernden tlberstieges 
iiber das Kategoriale, der den Ausgangspunkt der Hoffnung und ihr kategoriales Ziel als blosse 
Etappe der Hoffnung schlechthin bejaht - als Vermittiung der Offenbarung - und so auch vemeint 
als nicht identisch mit dem eigentiich Gemeinten) und des Todes als des radikalsten Ereignisses 
jener Vemeinung, die zum Wesen jeder geschichthch vermittelnden Offenbarung gehort und im 
Tod absolut wird, well nichts Kategoriales mehr gehofft werden kann und so nur noch die 
Hoffnung auf "alles" oder die blosse Verzweiflung ubrigbleibt."225 Apphed to the idea of the 
human Heilsbringer that means: "Die Kategorialitat der irreversiblen Selbstzusage Gottes an die 
Welt als ganze, die diese unwiderrufliche Zusage da sein lasst und die dieser Zusage entsprechende 
Hoffnung vermittelt, kann nur ein Mensch sein, der einerseits im Tod jede innerweltiiche Zukunft 
aufgibt und der andererseits sich in dieser Todesannahme als von Gott endgiiltig angenommen 
erweist."226 
Thus the presence of God's graceful self-communication, which is the condition of the possibihty 
of our subjectivity, is recognizable in the man who dares to negate every "innerwelthche Zukunft" 
in order to transcend himself toward the mystery of his own existence. The consequence is a radical 
openness towards death and any negation of human existence. By being that way, Jesus of 
Nazareth can be considered to be the event of the absolute divine graceful self-communication. 
Thus it is supposed to encourage us (or better: it orders - as it is a "Befehl") to risk and dare the 
same, namely to become conscious of our ontological reality of being "verwiesen". It orders to 
transcend and negate ourselves towards the inherent goal, horizon and condition of our hfe, the 
mystery of God. The consequence is negation of our existence and radical openness towards the 
"absolute future of God" which in the last analysis turns out to be radical openness towards death, 
as the radical and highest possibility of negation of our existence. 
It is suprising how in the very end Rahner's theological considerations resemble Heidegger's 
existential-ontological analysis. Also Heidegger had perceived death as the ultimate and highest 




And through the contemplating anticipation of the own death Dasein becomes "eigentlich" and 
reaches its inherent fulfillment. 
II.3.8 CRITIQUE 
In order to have a closer look at the advantages and problems of Rahner's theology one must 
analyse it in more detail. Rahner makes it very clear from the beginning that his aim is to mediate 
the christian Heilsmysterium with modem secular self-understanding and worldview. Thus Rahner 
from the very beginning outlines the limits of his theology: any positivistic revelatory theology is a 
priori excluded; i f Rahner wants to mediate self-understanding and mystery of salvation he has to 
find common ground between both. This endeavour, however, presupposes that there actually is 
common ground between the secular worldview and the christian mystery of salvation; this 
assumption of a communality between the divine and the human realm is exactly what distinguishes 
natural theology from revelatory theology. So basically his aim to mediate forces Rahner to develop 
a natural theology. 
As Rahner wants to mediate self-understanding, his first step is to show that the christian mystery 
of salvation is a priori implied in or the content of every true self-understanding, even the secular. 
Otherwise it would not be possible to demand that modem secular man should accept this 
understanding as an understanding of himself. I already pointed out above in how far that narrows 
the range of possible theological approaches. It is, however, even more limited if Rahner wants to 
do justice also to his second presupposition: he presupposes a mystery of salvation and thus accepts 
the facticity of its character as being mysterious unquestioned and ultimate. I f it is therefore 
supposed to remain a mystery the only possibility to refer human self-understanding to this mystery 
is to prove that man is already a priori referring to this mystery, that man is always the one "der in 
das Geheimnis verwiesen ist, das wir Gott nennen."227 jhus from the very beginning Rahner has 
predefined what has to be mediated (mystery as underlying principle of human self-understanding) 
and how this mediation must operate: due to the necessity of showing the a priori character of the 
mystery, Rahner has to proceed by transcendentally asking for the condition of the possibility of 
227 p.24 
111 
human self-understanding. And actually the idea of a necessary condition of the possibility of 
human self-understanding turns out to be a most apt way of showing the a priori Verwiesenheit of 
man. The idea of transcendental dependency conveys exactly the possibility to do justice equally to 
either of Rahner's presuppositions: the idea of a necessary condition of the possibility of man's 
subjectivity (which is the condition of the possibihty of any self-understanding) is logically 
necessary and it can therefore be proved to be necessarily immanent in every human subjectivity. It 
is by definition a priori. On the other hand the condition of the possibility of man's subjectivity is 
only a logical necessity and does not necessarily affect man's empirical reality. Due to this very 
character it does not become an object of the consciousness; man is merely verwiesen towards it. 
The more difficult question is how one can possibly perceive this logical necessity to be of divine 
character. Rahner's approach is basically dialectic. For Rahner the idea of the mystery of salvation 
and the necessary condititon of the possibility of man's subjectivity necessarily converge: firstly man 
is actually (i.e logically necessarily) dependent on the condition of the possibility of his subjectivity 
and secondly the actual character of this condition remains withdrawn from man's consciousness. 
Thus the idea of the necessary condition of the possibiUty of man's subjectivity fulfils both criteria 
of the divine mystery of salvation: man is verwiesen towards it and it remains a mystery. 
However, the equation of God as the mystery with the ontologically and logically necessary 
condition of the possibility of man's subjectivity is problematic: the assumption of such a condition 
is logically necessary but it is an a priori analytical statement and thus conveys no real cognition. 
Moreover it remains unintelligible whether any real entity corresponds to this logically derived 
necessity. Rahner personifies the object of this analytical judgement when he declares it to be God 
as the mystery. This is not only theologically difficult: the criteria of any relating "God" to a certain 
realm in human reality always remain highly arbitrary in natural theology. They entirely depend on 
the individual choice of the theologian as any "objective" theological criteria like "revelation" have 
been excluded. Rather Rahner's personifying of the necessary condition contradicts in a way his 
own presupposition that the actual what of this condition is totally withdrawn from human 
consciousness: so how does Rahner know that the logically necessary condition of the possibility of 
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man's subjectivity is more than just the logically necessary condition of the possibihty of man's 
subjectivity? 
Then he postulates the even further reaching anthropological assumption that man is the "event of 
a primordial self-communication of God". This becomes understandable i f one recalls that "God" 
was nothing more than the ontologically and logically necessary condition of the possibihty of man. 
Without it man would not be and therefore man can be perceived as being existent only due to the 
self-communication of this condition. The being of this condition to be what it is (namely an 
ontological condition) is expressed as an active process of "self-commmunication". However, one 
must again bear in mind that the formula "ontological self-communication of God" and all its 
implications are merely the categorical and half-mythological circumscription of what is nothing but 
a logical necessity. Due to this idea of "ontological self-communication" Rahner can also conclude 
that man's natural transcendentality and its cognition of God as mystery is identical with what God 
actually reveals about himself and that there is no further or other cognition of God possible. As 
God's ontological self-communication is his self-communication, man's natural ti-anscendentality 
must be considered to be the medium through which God mediates himself to man. Any 
supernatural revelation can be excluded. Rahner's proceeding becomes understandable i f one thinks 
of God as the ontologically and logically necessary condition of the possibility of man's subjectivity: 
due to this, everytiiing this subjectivity knows about this condition must be thought to have 
"originated" from this condition and there can be nothing which has not. One must, of course, not 
forget that there is nothing to know about this condition except that it is a logically necessary 
condition and that we are therefore logically dependent on it. In Rahner's terminology this reads 
like the claim that man's natural transcendentality is identical with divine self-revelation as regards 
content. 
Rahner, however, wants to show that this condition (or divine self-communication) can be 
regarded as man's salvation. Rahner had defined salvation as "Endgiiltigkeit wahren 
Selbstverstandnisses"228 of man, the state when man accepts and knows that he is the one who is 
228 p.50. 
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verwiesen towards God, who then becomes the "innerste Mitte unserer Existenz"229 goth ideas 
together constitute Rahner's concept of salvation. (The critique of his general concept of salvation 
will concern us in the last chapter). I f it is possible to show that and how far God actually is the 
innermost centre of our existence and not only the logical precondition of it the task of showing the 
reality of salvation is according to Rahner's presuppositions fulfilled. But so far he has said nothing 
that could ever be connected with man's actual existence and experience of it. Due to the 
transcendental character of his approach Rahner is not concerned with man's reality itself but only 
with its logical "pre"-conditions. Therefore Rahner has to ask: "...so konnte man dennoch den 
Eindruck haben, dass der Satz, der Mensch sei das Ereignis der absoluten Selbstmitteilung Gottes, 
diesem von aussen in dem Raum einer blossen Begrifflichkeit zugesagt werde, dass er aber nicht 
eigentiich das vor den Menschen bringe, was der Mensch in Wahrheit selber ist und als was er sich 
selber kn Grunde seines Daseins erfahrt. Doch dies ist nicht so."230 g^t {JQW far can Rahner's 
theological claim be mediated not only with man's logical presuppositions but with his real self-
understanding? In other words, in how far is God as the mystery, is God as the logically necessary 
condition of the possibility of man, also man's salvation? 
Again, Rahner argues transcendentally and comes to the conclusion that ontologically and 
epistemologically God has to be considered to be the underlying principle and the inherent aim of 
man's being and his natural transcendentality. Due to the fact that man is dependent on the 
condition of the possibiUty of his subjectivity not only his being but also his natural 
transcendentality must a priori be thought of as "supematurally" sustained and directed by God, as 
his self-communication makes possible also man's perception and reception of it. Therefore man 
must be thought of as such that God necessarily and a priori is the "innerste Mitte" of his existence. 
However, again this argument of the "supernatural existential" amounts to nothing more than a 
merely logical statement about man's ontological, transcendental dependency upon the condition of 
his possibility. Due to his transcendental approach Rahner can not possibly claim any soteriological 
plus beyond what is already human reality. In Rahner's system there is no place for any further 
229 p.24. 
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event or state with saving character, because he asks only for the conditions of the possibihty of 
reality and thus posits this reality as absolute and immutable. In the end he has to admit that human 
experience of God remains ambiguous and unpredictable. God is with necessity ontologically the 
"innerste Mitte unserer Existenz", but not as far as our actual experience and thus our actual 
"existence" is concerned. The question of how far God can be individually experienced and 
regarded as salvation remains unanswered. 
The only thing that Rahner can do now is to encourage the individual to find the experience of 
grace in his own depth. Rahner has to leave the realm of systematic theology and turns to pastoral 
theology. 
At this point two problems are imminent: the first is that Rahner according to his transcendental 
approach could not make probable any actual soteriological function of the christian self-
understanding. It can amount to nothing more than secular self-understanding does. 
Secondly an even greater problem is that Rahner's system at this point seems to be complete and 
finished: it has exhausted all inherent imphcations of its transcendental presuppositions, however, 
without even having touched particularly christian issues like revelation and christology. Though 
his system is seemingly self-sufficient Rahner now has to show the necessity of a christological 
extension. And only i f he can show this necessity within his system has he also the possibihty to 
introduce it. 
However, here Rahner's major problems begin: if Rahner wants to mediate any soteriological plus 
of christian self-understanding by connecting it with particularly christian contents, he has to leave 
his transcendental presuppositions because the idea of God as our salvation, as the a priori 
condition of every human consciousness, is then no longer tenable. And then also the issue of how 
to mediate a "self"-understanding has again to be raised. But Rahner has within his system no 
choice: he has to show the necessity of a specific soteriological function of christian self-
understanding which then can be shown to be connected with and mediated through a concept of 
revelation and christology: Rahner introduces the idea of the "absolute future of God" towards 
which we are supposed to keep ourselves open. 
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Whereas grace formerly had been the quality of man's ontological status it now becomes the order 
(!) to wait for something which is supposed to be existent but not fully to be experienced yet and 
the fulfilment of which is therefore still to come and to be expected. Finally here Rahner has 
changed his presuppositions and has left the realm of the transcendental questioning. The idea of a 
future event cannot be justified transcendentally. Rahner has switched over from ontology into 
eschatology: "the absolute future of God" is substituted for salvation as "God as the necessary 
condition of the possibility of man's subjectivity". 
Rahner then introduces the idea of a history of revelation which reaches its revelatory cUmax in 
that human being who transcendentally must be considered to be the event of the absolute self-
communication of God. I already showed above the dialectical turn of Rahner with which he 
projects the idea of history as the result of man's transcendentality onto the level of man's 
transcendentality as the result of the history of God's self-communication. 
According to Rahner Jesus must be considered to be the absolute Heilsbringer because his 
existence transcendentally proves the possibility of an absolute state of God's self-communication in 
man. Again this cannot any longer be considered to be in accordance with Rahner's transcendental 
presuppositions according to which God's self-communication was the necessary condition of the 
possibiUty of man' subjectivity and thus always a priori fulfiUed and intelligible through natural 
transcendentality. Any proof of an a priori statement is by definition not necessary. And the idea of 
the "possibiUty of an absolute state of God's self-communication in man" contradicts the idea of its 
transcendental ontological and therefore necessarily universal character. 
Moreover even Rahner's immanent reason why Jesus is this proof remains dubious: Rahner claims 
that from Jesus' absolute negation of his categorical being and existence one could transcendentally 
infer the actuality of a previous absolute self-communication of God. According to Rahner this 
"proof" or "guarantee" of the possibility of an absolute state of God's self-communication can and 
should encourage man to dare and to risk also to negate his categorical being and thus keep himsetf 
open towards the absolute future of God in which his self-communication wiU fmaUy be 
experienced. Here again it becomes obvious that this self-communication cannot be thought of as 
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transcendental because it is still to be expected in the moment of radical negation of categorical 
being, in the moment of death. 
One can easily see that at least two problems permeate Rahner's theological system: firsUy 
Rahner's theology is based on the methodological approach of transcendental questioning. 
However, with his identification of purely logical assumptions with issues of natural theology 
Rahner overstretches the inherent possibihties of any transcendental approach, as it does not 
convey any hermeneutical categories which make the relation of both understandable or even 
necessary. 
Secondly Rahner does not succeed in combining his transcendental natural theology with 
specifically christian ideas, because he only asks for the transcendental condition of reality which is 
thus perceived to be absolute. Rahner in the end has to acknowledge that reality itself does not 
answer the question of man's salvation which this reality raised. Therefore Rahner has to leave his 
transcendental ontological approach and develops a classical revelatory theology which enables him 
to introduce the answers for man's quest for salvation from outside this reality. 
117 
III. CRITICAL EVALUATION 
III.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARK 
After having expounded and criticized the theologies of Paul TilUch and Karl Rahner in general 
we finally come to the examination of their inherent view of salvation itself, which as I have shown 
is definitely a major issue in the theology of both of them. And as the problem of salvation is the 
core of their theology by expounding it we will be able to see more clearly the structure of both 
theologies in general with their advantages and weaknesses, similarities and differences. The 
examination of their concept of salvation leads us to a structural comparison of Paul TilUch's and 
Karl Rahner's approaches. Due to the complexity of the matter, due to the interdependence of form 
and content within theological systems, it did not seem reasonable for me to separate the 
examination of the concept of salvation from the structural comparison. Rather, I think that both 
issues can be properly understood only through each other as they elucidate one other. In a fmal 
step we wiU see whether and how far this concept of salvation is appUable to the criteria I 
formulated in the introduction. 
We had seen that the criteria for a soteriology in the modern, secular society had been developed 
through a process starting with Hegel. Since Hegel two different things had happened to the 
theological idea of salvation. On the one hand salvation was definitely and fmaUy conceived to be 
the overcoming of the alienation of man. However, as we saw, the concept of what aUenation 
meant was quite different with different philosophers. On the other hand we saw that throughout 
the development of philosophy in the 19th and 20th century some criteria became apparent and 
became conditions for every concept of salvation in the framework of modem secular thinking. 
Salvation was separated from the purely religious realm: due to the all-embracing concept of 
salvation as the overcoming of man's alienation it could also become relevant in other fields Uke 
philosophy, politics and sociology. The first criterion I pointed out to be most important for 
modem consciouness was the assumption of the unity of reality in which man, his quest for 
salvation and salvation itself are set. The Ideologiekritik of Marx and his followers let religious or 
ideological systems fall victim to the suspicion of being massively oppressive and authoritarian 
systems which alienate man from himself and the real world. Therefore any concept which goes by 
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the assumption of two realities, a religious heavenly realm and the earthly realm is suspicious: 
modern secular thinking presupposes only one reality. And since Heidegger's turn to the existential 
structure of the human Dasein this reality has to be understood in radically individualistic and 
existential terms. From this originates the second citerion, the demand for personal experience 
which verifies or falsifies the claim of any concept, religious or ideological. Only personal 
experience is considered to be an apt means of reassuring their rightness. Moreover, as salvation is 
now generally (though mostiy implicitiy and unconsciously) perceived in terms of overcoming 
alienation, it must also have the notion of the experience of happiness; "die Forderung seines 
wirklichen Gluckes"231 is a category which obviously has been introduced by Marx: salvation must 
be something better than the status quo and in terms of experience that means it must convey 
actual happiness. 
These were the criteria and conditions of any future soteriology consonant with modern secular 
thinking as I expounded it in the introduction. 
III.2 COMPARISON AND CRITIQUE 
III.2.1 Comparison 
A) Mediation and Natural Theology 
I showed how the basic idea and intention to mediate between this modem secular thinking and 
the christian tradition was a matter of concem for both TiUich and Rahner. TUhch exphcitiy 
developed the "method of correlation" in order to do justice to the necessity of applying the 
existential question of modern man to the christian answers and vice versa. I here already called 
into doubt the theological appropriateness of this method. However, the point is that TUlich is 
aware of the necessity to mediate. Also Karl Rahner is concemed with the general problem of 
whether and how self-understanding can be mediated (and therefore be changed) without losing its 
character of being je//-understanding. This basic idea of mediation leads both theologians to the 
attempt to "construct" a modem natural theology. As the criteria for the mediation are the ones of 
231 see footnote 19. 
119 
secular thinking for both Rahner and TilUch, they have to cope with the demand for the 
epistemological unity of reality and they do so by stressing and showing either the unity (TiUich) or 
the transcendental dependency (Rahner) of religious and secular realm. This is a basic feature of 
natural theology the use of which might seem even more suprising i f one remembers TilUch's claim 
be a dialectical theologian and the fact that he presuppossed the unconditional and revealed 
"protestant principle" for the whole of his theology. Also Rahner's stress on revelation as the self-
communication of God at first glance does not seem to blend with the idea that this approach is one 
of natural theology. However, this becomes quite obvious as soon as one regards the starting point 
of either theologian which is mediation and not crisis, as in Barth. The justification and the 
rightness of the facticity of the secular world are actually presupposed. Secular man and his 
problems are taken seriously and the christian tradition does not just claim its rightness but feels the 
urge to show it. This is certainly the main reason why both TilUch and Rahner chose the existential 
approach to anthropology: man in his actual existence and his criteria are the condition and the limit 
of Rahner's and Tillich's attempt to mediate. 
TilUch's basis for a natural theology is his ideaUstic starting-point, the assumption of the "identity 
of thinking and being"232 jn his pursuit of this idea he finaUy comes to the result that inteUectual 
cognition of the essence of something is ontological participation. This basicaUy means that there is 
no ontological "gap" between the human and the divine realm: as God is the ground of being and as 
man participates in the ontological structures of this ground of being (as he participates in it 
through his intellectual cognition, even if only in terms of asking for it) man also participates 
ontologically in God himself This is natural theology. 
Rahner deals with the problem somewhat differentiy but it is obvious that he also offers a system 
of natural theology. World and God are indissolubly connected, because God, as Being itself, is the 
transcendental condition of the possibility of man and world. Thus man and God are united in an 
aU-embracing system of ontological transcendental dependency. I already pointed out above the 
logical and philosophical Umits of this idea what I shall not repeat here. It is, however, important 
that both theologians actually see the importance, even necessity, to show that the divine reakn is 
232 see footnote 61. 
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not something like a second reality beyond our human reality. Rather is God himself the "innerste 
Mitte unserer Existenz"233(Rahner) or the "essence" (Tillich) of ourselves. One reality embraces 
God and man. However, also the hmits are immediately clear: i f there is only one reality, then God 
must be something out of this reality. And everything now depends on the choice of the theologian 
what out of the experience of man is to substitute the seemingly old-fashioned term "God". 
B) Salvation and God as Being itself 
For both theologians not any extraordinary state of happiness but God himself is the content of 
salvation. According to Tillich in God man finds his "tme" being, his "essence", which is revealed in 
the "New Being" of Jesus Christ which in turn is uninterrupted unity of Christ with God as Being 
itself. Salvation is the state of being united with God as our ultimate concern, nothing more, 
nothing less. Also Rahner states so expUcitly when he says that God himself is the mystery of 
salvation into which man is verwiesen234^ and in which man will find his definite, final self-
understanding which is Heil235 jhus for both theologians the basic feature of existence is self-
alienation which can and has to be overcome. Salvation is therefore basically the overcoming of 
existential alienation. Theologically speaking that means that God himself, as he is himself 
salvation, is the means of overcoming the alienation. Rahner does not expUcitiy call the human 
condition the state of alienation as Tilhch does, but it is evident that for both existence is the state 
of being separated from God. And in this state man is also alienated from himself due to the lack of 
either "essence" or "definite self-understanding" which can be found only in God himself as he is 
the ground of being (Tillich) or Being itself (Rahner). This is the idea of salvation which both 
TiUich and Rahner have in common, though their theologies at first glance seem to be totally 
different. However, the origin of their understanding of the concept of salvation and alienation is 
complex and must be examined in more detail. 
It is surprising how closely Tillich and Rahner stick to the philosophical traditions of the 19th and 





theological dependency from Hegel's concept of alienation and salvation. However, there is also a 
remarkable difference from Hegel: for Hegel the identity of God and man was not to be found in 
God but in the tertium comparationis beyond God and man, in the Absolute Consciousness. TiUich 
and Rahner, however, assume that in God himself alienation can be overcome. Then- use of Hegel 
seems to be influenced by Feuerbachian points of view: for Feuerbach the identity of God and man 
was found in man himself, and only the wrong perception of him led to a theistic concept of God. 
When both Rahner and TUUch claim that in God man's e^/Z-aUenation is overcome they impUcitiy 
state that the actual Wesen of man is God! For TUUch God is man's essence, for Rahner he is the 
"essential" and all-decisive feature of our existence, the "innerste Mitte unserer Existenz". Salvation 
is perceived as the actualization of the essential identity of God and man. 
However, there remains a tension between the two quite different assumptions that a) God is the 
overcoming of the alienation of man and b) that it is the self-alienation of man which is overcome 
m God. And here the influence of Heidegger becomes evident. Both TUUch and Rahner cope with 
this problem by referring to Heidegger's transcendental ontological analysis of existence. Together 
with Hegel's concept of the Absolute as the overcoming of man's alienation, Heidegger's concept of 
human existence and its ontological relatedness to Being itself is the basic idea of both TilUch's and 
Rahner's soteriology: TUUch and Rahner, however, identify God and Being itself whereas in 
Heidegger's Sein und Zeit Being itself had by no means been perceived to be of divine character. 
Being itself is no longer just the transcendental condition of man's Dasein as Heidegger had 
claimed, but it can now be perceived to be the HegeUan absolute, in which man's alienation is 
cancelled out. However, as the traditional theistic concept of God has been replaced with the idea 
of God as Being itself, it is also possible to think that it is no longer man's alienation from God 
which is overcome in Being itself, but his alienation from himself, as far as he is alienated from the 
ground of his own being. By stressing the character of God as Being itself in which man through 
his own being already participates it becomes possible to say that man's self-alienation and his 
alienation from God are identical, rather than to say that reUgion and concepts of God m general 
are what alienates man from himself This had been the conclusion of Feuerbach. TilUch and Rahner 
take the wind out of the sails of the critique of Feuerbach and Marx by substituting the theistic 
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concepts of God with a concept in which the very essence of man himself, his not-being-alienated, 
coincides with what God is. As far as man is alienated at all he is alienated from God. God now is 
not the source of man's alienation but by definition the very essence of man and thus rehgion can 
no longer be blamed for alienating man by distracting him from his actual human reality. But the 
price Rahner and Tilhch had to pay was the rejection of theistic concepts of God. However, one 
must see that this interpretation of the nature of Being itself does not do justice to Heidegger's 
original idea. Tilhch and Rahner reintroduce remains of essentialist thinking into Heidegger's 
concept of Dasein and Being itself. 
The advantage of Tillich's and Rahner's proceeding is that they are now able to claim the existence 
of God within the boundaries of man's existence and thus can maintain the claim of the unity of 
reality, a criterion basic for modem man's self-understanding. 
However, there is a remarkable difference between Tilhch and Rahner as far as the estimation of 
the reality of man's alienation is concerned. Both are influenced by Heidegger's analysis of man's 
existence. But whereas Tillich adopted the Heideggerian concept of the interrelation of Being itself, 
finitude and anxiety, Rahner made use of Heidegger's idea of Being itself as the transcendental 
condition of Dasein. According to Heidegger the main characteristic of Dasein was temporality, 
which led to the fact that Dasein had to perceive its being als continuous "potentiality". This 
imphed the danger of losing the Eigentiichkeit and to flee into the anonymous Uneigentiichkeit of 
the Man. Only a definite understanding of the nature of Dasein as being finite and bound to death as 
its "eigentlichste Moglichkeit" prevented it from "falhng" into Uneigentiichkeit. In fact the same 
idea is found in Rahner's soteriology, when he defines "Heil" to be definite and final self-
understanding236 However, in distinction to Heidegger definite self-understanding for Rahner is to 
understand that one is "verwiesen" towards God as the mystery of Dasein. The main stress is on the 
mysterious character of God and not on death and mortality, although theses features play a certain 
role also in Rahner's theology, when he describes "grace" as the Befehl to keep oneself radically 
open towards the "absolute future of God", which in the last analysis turned out to be radical 
openness towards death. Generally speaking Rahner's concept of alienation is far more optimistic 
236 cf.footnote 235. 
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than Tilhch's, because for Rahner definite self-understanding is actually possible by perceiving 
oneself as being "verwiesen" into the mystery. Therefore, according to Rahner, also "Heil" is actual. 
However, the soteriological character of this "Heil" remains vague and obscure. 
Tillich is much more radical and existential in his analysis. He adopted Heidegger's idea that the 
main characteristic of human existence is its mortality and finitude. TilUch claims that the 
cancellation of man's self-estrangement enables him to cope with his existential anxiety in the face 
of death and mortality, thus having a practical psychological result. Death itself for Tilhch is a 
characteristic of existence itself and can therefore not be abolished. Tilhch never says that the 
overcoming of death itself is the result of God's saving activity as one might possibly here expect in 
the light of the christian doctrine of resurrection. Man's anxiety is what has to be overcome and 
what according to Tilhch also can be overcome as it is the result of man's self-estrangement. 
Although TilUch adopts Heidegger's concept of alienation, anxiety and finitude he changes it in one 
decisive point: according to Heidegger the effect of Eigentiichkeit was not to come to terms with 
the anxiety before death. It was the "uneigentiiche Dasein" that did not accept the own death as its 
ultimately "own" but flees from it and tries to hide in the anonymity of the "Man": "Das Man lasst 
den Mut zur Angst vor dem Tode nicht aufkommen ... Versuchung, Beruhigung und Entfremdung 
kennzeichen aber die Seinsart des Verfallens. Das alltagliche Sein zum Tode ist als verfallendes eine 
standige Flucht vor ihm. Das Sein zum Ende hat den Modus des umdeutenden, uneigentiich 
anstehenden und verhuUenden Ausweichens vor ihm."237 xhe effect of Eigentiichkeit is therefore 
not the overcoming of existential anxiety; rather it is the admission of this very anxiety in which 
Dasein gains Eigentiichkeit. 
C) Consciousness and the Actuality of Salvation 
So far we have seen that the attempt to mediate the christian tradition with the phUosophical 
tiadition of modernity led TUUch and Rahner to develop a natural theology in which God is Being 
itself and in which thus the unity of reality can be maintained through the idea that alienation from 
God is identical with alienation from one's own self. However, i f one wants to pursue the 
237 cf.footnote 43. 
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existentialist line of thought then the actual presence of salvation must be claimed and shown. Here 
one of the fundamental weaknesses of TUUch's and to a certain extent also of Rahner's system 
becomes evident. Both have to deal with the problem that salvation must be conceived as 
simultaneously present and absent. As far as man's real existence is concerned TiUich and Rahner 
conceive man as alienated and self-esti-anged. However, as there cannot be any reality apart from 
this existence, salvation as the overcoming of this very alienation must be shown to be also present. 
Both Tillich and Rahner have the same problem but they try to solve it ui different ways. For TUUch 
absence and presence are simultaneously possible if one shifts the problem onto the level of 
consciousness and unconsciousness. According to his idea that due to the dialectical character of 
man's being he participates in the ontological structures of Being itself he only has to become 
increasingly aware of himself and of Being itself in order to participate (identity of thinking and 
being) m it more fiiUy, which leads to the overcoming of self-estrangement and of alienation from 
God. Ontologically salvation is present; as far as man's being unconscious about it is concerned it is 
absent. 
Rahner solves the problem differentiy: due to his transcendental approach he does not have any 
difficulties with simultaneous presence and absence. As far as God is the logicaUy necessary 
condition of the possibUity of our existence we must perceive ourselves as radically verwiesen 
towards God. As far as he is only logically necessary we are separated from him in our actual, 
practical existence. God as the salvation of man does not actually affect man's being; the 
ambiguous character of the presence and absence of salvation is grounded in the transcendental and 
therefore ambiguous character of our relation to God hUnself. It is a matter of self-understanding 
how far his saving character becomes relevant for us. In the perception of ourselves as bemg 
verwiesen towards God the overcoming of the alienation from God and from ourselves coincide. In 
perceiving God as the mystery we finaUy perceive him as that which he is and we are then able to 
perceive ourselves to be what we actually are, namely verwiesen towards this mystery. However, 
also in Rahner's theology as m TUUch's in the end it boils down to a difference in the grades of 
conciousness. The only difference is that in Rahner's theology man is conscious of the ambiguous 
character of man's existence as being both separated and united with God as its transcendental 
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condition. In TUhch's theology it means a lack of consciousness not to reahze the primordial 
participation of man in Being itself. In Rahner salvation means being conscious about the 
ambiguous character of existence; in TUUch it means that the ambiguity of consciousness which is 
not conscious about the actual character of existence is abolished. 
D) The Problem of Experience 
Thus the first criterion of secular thinking is fulfiUed in both approaches: the unity of reality. The 
attempt of a natural theology and its idea of God as Being itself in which man participates, the idea 
of salvation as the overcoming of self-alienation which is identical with alienation from God, and 
the attempt to explain the simultaneous ontological presence and absence of salvation in terms of 
grades of consciousness, aU this served the purpose of doing justice to the criteria of modern 
secular thinking, in order to make possible a real mediation. However, at this point in both 
approaches the same problem emerges: the question of experience. I had pointed out that the 
possibility of individual experience was the second criterion of any future doctrine of salvation. 
However, the ontological presence of salvation is not as evident in real experience as it is in the 
theory of the different grades of consciousness. Rahner has to admit that the transcendental 
experience always remains ambiguous; TilUch does not even mention the problem expressis verbis 
but it emerges as a necessary implication of his theology if one appUes his method of correlation to 
his own theology: i f the quest for salvation already impUes a certain primordial participation in 
Being itself, why does man still ask for it, even has to ask for it? As far as experience is concerned 
the mere self-awareness and the awareness of one's ontological participation in Being itself does 
not seem to be sufficient to overcome man's existential anxiety or his self-estrangement, though it 
should be in theory. 
Actual experience does not verify the theological claim of either theologian. Both have the same 
problem and both chose a similar way of deaUng with it: they leave the realm of natural theology 
and introduce a theology of revelation which enables them to do both, to deal with the fact that 
man's existence is such that he stUl has to seek salvation in spite of aU assertions that it is 
ontologically present. Salvation is present in the consciousness but not in experience! 
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The second problem which can be dealt with by introducing a revelatory theology is the lack of 
peculiarly christian features. I akeady showed the turn or shift in the system of both theologians at 
this point: TilMch introduces his more dualistic understanding of man's existence as opposed to 
essence what makes necessary the revelation and appropriation of essence from a realm outside 
existence. Rahner develops the idea of an absolute future of God which is not present yet and still 
to come. That actually does justice to man's empirical experience of the absence of salvation, the 
experience of alienation; thus it serves the purpose of doing justice to the criterion of experience; 
however, it does not prove the positive claim of the presence of salvation; it only affirms the 
rightness of man's actual experience that salvation is not at hand. 
Moreover, this cancels out all achievements of Tillich's and Rahner's natural theology, the effort 
to maintain the unity of reality in which man, his quest for salvation and salvation itself are set. By 
projecting the actuality of salvation into either a realm of "essence" outside man's existence or into 
an absolute "future" the unity of man's reality is broken. The above-mentioned attempt to 
understand the presence and the absence of salvation in terms of different grades of consciousness 
of salvation as ontological matter of fact (Tillich) or transcendental postulate (Rahner) becomes 
pointless: salvation is no longer an ontological fact or transcendental postulate but a transcendent 
and future event. Paradoxically both theologians have to leave the reahn of natural theology and 
have to develop a classical revelatory theology in order to be able to do justice both to the claim of 
the actuality of salvation and to the actual experience under the conditions of existence. 
As both theologians have to cope with the same problems it is no wonder that the similarities in 
both christologies are striking. The terms differ, but the meaning of the different dogmatical topics 
within the theological systems is nearly the same. Both theologians have to consider existence as 
the state in which man is in need of salvation, which is characterized through the absence either of 
"essence" or the absolute future of God. And now something remarkable happens in Tillich's and 
Rahner's theology: whereas in the beginning and in the prehminary remarks both theologians had 
stressed the necessity to take man's actual existence seriously and to mediate it with the classical 
tradition all that is suddenly no longer relevant. The characteristic feature of salvation which is now 
revealed in Jesus Christ is no longer a sort of consummation of existence or its inherent climax, but 
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something qualitatively totally different: it is the negation of existence! Salvation is not the 
redemption of, but the redemption from, existence. However, paradoxically enough this U-turn is 
the necessary implication of the existential approach of both TilMch and Rahner: by interpreting 
man's existence as the only reality and the criterion for the verification of theological statements 
they posit this reality as absolute. Therefore both TiUich and Rahner cannot but define salvation e 
negativo as that which is different from man's actual existence. However, i f there is nothing but this 
reality then there is nothing existing which could be different from it; therefore salvation of 
existence must now be considered to be the negation of this very existence. For Tillich the 
presence of "essence in existence" is characterized by the fact that Christ has to sacrifice and to 
neglect entirely everything that "is merely 'Jesus' in him"238_ And in Rahner's theology the 
presence of the absolute in the categorical is consummated in the mode of promise as the negation 
of the ontological status quo and in the mode of death "als des radikalsten Ereignisses jener 
Vemeinung"239; jesus is the absolute Heilsbringer in so far as he is the one "...der im Tod jede 
innerweltliche Zukunft aufgibt"240 xhis sharply contrasts TUUch's and Rahner's above-mentioned 
conviction that man's existence in its dialectical character is either "open to the ontological 
structures of being" (Tillich) or transcendentally united with God who as "dieses heihge Geheimnis 
auch die bergende Nahe ist, die vergebende Intimitat, die Heimat selber, die Liebe, die sich mitteilt, 
das Heimliche, zu dem man von der Unheimlichkeit seiner eigenen Lebensleere und -bedrohtheit 
fliehen und ankommen kann."241 As this claim could not be maintained in the face of man's 
experience man's existence is now totally devalued and emptied of any positive aspect. Ironically 
enough the content of the divine revelation or of salvation as essence or of the presence of the 
absolute remains totally empty and without any positive content as it is dialectically dependent on 
the prior definition of existence: philosophically revelation is defmed through man's existence, 




241 cf. footnote 186. 
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Existentialist theology is thus in a dilemma. It wants to do justice both to the criterion of the unity 
of reality and to the criterion that theological assumptions at least must not contradict actual 
experience. To do justice to the former, the claim of thinking, TilUch and Rahner have to claim the 
presence of salvation in existence. To do justice to the latter, the claim of experience, they have to 
admit the absence of salvation and must therefore introduce the category of revelation and of the 
transcendent which cancels out the claim of the unity of reality. Both at the same time seem to be 
impossible. 
However, there is a slight difference between Rahner's and Tillich's way of coping with this 
dilemma. As I pointed out Tillich claims the actual ontologial presence of salvation in which we 
participate ontologically. We are not conscious of that though; therefore this does not affect our 
experience. However, this leaves untouched the question why man does not become or is not 
conscious of it. TilUch at least concedes the structural possibility of experiencing salvation and can 
therefore be tied down to his claim. 
Rahner tries to solve the problem more elegantly: he avoids the question for actual experience 
altogether by stressing the fact that God (as salvation) actually is the transcendental condition of 
man's existence, which is a priori not open to experience. Due to his transcendental approach 
Rahner is able to integrate the absence of experience into his system. Nevertheless he goes by the 
assumption of an absolute/w^ure of God as salvation. Any presence in which salvation could be 
experienced is excluded. And, more important, this means that Rahner cannot convey any proof for 
his concept of salvation through experience. Rahner wrote a revealing passage about the conditions 
and Umits of his theology and of any theology which wants to take seriously Christianity's claim of 
the facticity (if not even presence) of salvation: "Es ist fiir ein heute zu reahsierendes Verstandnis 
von Erlosung von grosster Wichtigkeit, dass ihre Verkiindigung von vomeherein fiir immer so 
dargelegt wird, dass die Gesamtgeschichte der Menschheit immer und iiberaU unter der 
vergebenden Liebe Gottes in Christo steht, dieses Erlosungsereignis des Kreuzes Christi also nicht 
so Ursache der Erlosheit ist, dass es nicht (oder auch nur in wesentlich anderer Weise) Ursache des 
Heils der vorchristlichen Menschheit ware. Sonst setzt sich der Prediger der skeptischen Frage aus, 
was sich den 'seit' Christus in der Welt geandert hat. Weil aber seit jeher und immer vergebende 
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Selbstmitteilung Gottes (auf Christus hin) in der Welt wirksam war, ist die Frage, was sich denn 
'seit' Christus zum Besseren gewandt habe, von vorneherein falsch gestellt oder jedenfalls 
sekundar. Wir haben gar keine Moglichkeit, empirisch schlechthin ausserhalb des 'experimentum 
Christi' zu treten und zu sehen, wie es mit der Welt ohne Christus bestellt ware."242 Rahner on the 
one hand sees that "experience" actually is one of the criteria which theology has to face and to 
meet. On the other hand his theology cannot give any answer which does not exceed or transcend 
this question, though it is of course dialectically dependent on it. The problem remains unsolved. 
E) Salvation and Predestination 
One final and more general point has to be considered. It hopeftilly became quite evident that the 
framework of Tillich's and Rahner's concept of salvation as overcoming of alienation is human 
"consciousness": the self-alienation of man which is his alienation from God must (and according to 
both can) be overcome by a change of consciousness, by a change in man's self-understanding. In 
both Tillich's and Rahner's theology finally the saving character of salvation is not any actual 
impact on man himself from outside. It is his assumption of the facticity of salvation which changes 
him. And it is certainly psychologically true that for the individual whose self-understanding 
changes also the perception of reality changes, and that means that subjectively also reality itself 
seems to change. Thus possibly the notion of experience is subjectively inherent in Tillich's and 
Rahner's theology but due to its very character cannot be expressed objectively. But this leaves 
untouched the possibility that it might be true subjectively, even for every subject (and the latter is 
certainly what existentialism claims). And surely this is what is the positive legacy of "existentialist 
theology". Not only is it a remarkable attempt to come to terms with the altered situation of 
religion and theology in a post-enlightenment and secular society. Also its emphasis on 
consciousness and the insight that a change of self-understanding may subjectively (and possibly 
one day also objectively) change reality. 
However, being a sort of Bewusstseinstheologie Rahner's and Tillich's system have a theological 
implication which finally must be considered and which leads us back to more traditional or 
242 Sacramentum mundi, Vol.1, p.l 163-1164. 
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revelatory concepts of theology: it is the question of how one can gain this altered self-
understanding in order to participate in the process through which man's existential reality may 
actually change. Why do some people have the consciousness of the a priori, transcendental grace 
(Rahner) or of their being united with Being itself (Tillich)? And why do some not have this self-
understanding if it is supposed to be preferable? This is the point at which in classical theological 
systems the question of predestination was treated. In his famous book Courage to be Tillich 
answered this question by saying having or not having this courage was a matter of "grace"243 . 
Thus using the old theological concept of the absolute and transcendent will of God Tillich makes 
everything dependent on the divine decision according to his "protestant principle" that "in relation 
to God everything is by God"244; TilUch admits that only some people experience this grace and 
that others do not. Therefore his usage of the term "grace" in this context impUes the whole 
problem of predestinatio either simplex or even gemina. Rahner has some more difficulties: as 
secular and christian self-understanding are identical (as man himself must be considered to be the 
event of God's ontological self-communication) it is totally a matter of personal decision whether 
one chooses to consider oneself to be a secular human being or whether one sees oneself as the 
event of God's ontological self-communication. But who would not rather see himself as the latter 
i f this conveyed an alteration in his attitude towards reality with the above-mentioned psychological 
effects. Nevertheless not every one shares Rahner's opinions about the ontological conditions of 
man. Therefore in Rahner's theology there is at least one undefined spot: there must be some other 
force (be it predestination, fate or whatever) which graciously actualizes the potentiality in man's 
consciousness to see God as his gracious transcendental condition. This force is not explained or 
mentioned in Rahner's approach. And the difficulty is that it could not ever possibly be mentioned 
at all because it would question the logical necessity of God's being the transcendental condition of 
man's subjectivity. Finally here is a sort of contradiction in Rahner's system which remains 




theological approach. Rahner is altogether unable to consider the problem if he wants to maintain 
the consistency of his theological approach. 
III.2.2 Critique 
Finally we have to state that existentiahst theology generally like those of Paul Tillich and Karl 
Rahner does not provide the urgently needed theological solution of the predicament soteriology is 
in nowadays. Both criteria which I developed in the beginning together seem to make any theology 
impossible i f it wants to pursue the claim of the facticity of salvation: either one does justice to 
actual experience and must concede that whatever salvation might mean is absent. Then the only 
possibility is to leave the realm of our existential reality and to hope for salvation from outside 
reality. But if one also wants to meet the requirements of thinking, if one does not want to give up 
the idea of the unity of reality, then also this solution becomes impossible. We have to see that with 
both criteria together a successful approach towards soteriology becomes impossible: our 
experience, if it is supposed to be justifiable before the thinking, tells us that salvation is absent. In 
distinction from Tillich we have to say that asking for salvation does not presuppose its ontological 
presence. Rather, it proves its absence: the idea of God as the overcoming of our alienation, God as 
salvation, still presupposes a second, divine reahn beyond our reality because it still goes by the all-
decisive and fundamental assumption of God itself. Otherwise there is nothing but our bare reahty 
which makes us ask and long for salvation. 
Moreover in this context also the old problem of natural theology versus revelatory theology 
again became virulent and it became obvious that the problem of natural theology is not yet 
obsolete or even solved. I f one wants to mediate between christian and secular thinking natural 
theology will always be necessary. But there will always be a gap or a break in it when it comes to 
deal with those things which exceed the secular worldview. And these things will always have to be 
dealt with; otherwise the whole attempt to mediate was unnecessary because there was no 
difference between the two worldviews. Both the necessity to mediate and the incompatibihty of 
natural and revelatory theology is a structural problem for theology in general. 
132 
It is to the credit of theologians like Rahner and Tillich that they dared a new synthesis of both in 
a time when all attempts of natural theology seemed to be discredited by the theology of Karl 
Barth, the "Church Father of the 20th century" as he has been called. Without theologians Uke 
Rahner and Tillich theology would have become alienated even more from the secular world than it 
is today. In the last analysis, however, even they have not been wholly successful in mediating and 
explaining the claim of the christian gospel. The christian concept of salvation seems to exclude 
modem secular thinking and vice versa. Either must be wrong. 
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